Liska Fell - Chinese to English translator. Translation services in Education / Pedagogy

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Liska Fell
Chinese (繁 & 简) to English Translator

Cooks Hill, New South Wales, Australia

Local time: 03:32 AEST (GMT+10)

Native in: English (Variants: UK, US, Australian)

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Chinese to English: The roots of Iraq's reconstruction predicament and the way out General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: Government / Politics
Source text - Chinese ·研究论坛· 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路王丽影王林聪内容提要国家重建是伊拉克战后发展进程中亟待破解的难题。伊拉克国家重建是在现代民族国家建构尚未完成和治理面临困境的背景下展开的。当前，伊拉克重建陷入政治制度难以有效运转、尚未实现社会整合、经济社会重建未能全面展开的困境。美国主导的重建、地缘政治博弈和地区国家的介入是伊拉克重建陷入困境的外部因素; 政党教派化，政府治理能力缺乏，进而弱化伊拉克的政治权威与政府的合法性、传统上伊拉克民众凝聚力不足，按教派、族群划分的政治架构削弱了国家认同是内部根源; 极端主义和恐怖主义蔓延也直接危及重建进程。伊拉克解决重建困境的关键是在寻求平衡域内外大国关系的前提下走自主重建之路。关键词国家重建伊拉克族群教派国家认同政治权威作者简介王丽影，中国社会科学院研究生院西亚非洲系博士研究生 ( 北京102488) ; 王林聪，中国社会科学院西亚非洲研究所所长助理兼国际关系研究室主任、研究员( 北京100007) 。国家重建是现代国家建构的重要组成部分。从2003 年伊拉克战后重建启动至今已有15 年，美国在伊拉克战后之初声称要将伊拉克建成民主、稳定的国家，然而，历经波折与反复，目前的伊拉克各政治派别分化加剧，经济社会重建难以顺利推进，特别是2014 年“伊斯兰国”异军突起，国家重建一度陷入中断。即使在2017 年“伊斯兰国”溃败之后，伊拉克重建进程仍裹足不前。伊拉克作为中东地区重要产油国，在经济资源等方面具有相对优势的情况下，为何重建步履维艰? 其重建困境的根源何在? 如何破解重建诸难题? 这是学术界亟需深入探讨的重要议题。本文拟围绕伊拉克重建诸问题，分析伊拉克战后重建困境根源，进而探究破解伊拉克重建困境的出路。 ·99· 西亚非洲2019 年第3 期概念阐释与研究综述 ( 一) 国家重建概念的界定及其内涵西蒙·切斯特曼( Simon Chesterman) 将国家重建定义为“国际社会广泛地介入一个国家，旨在重建能够为公民提供物质和经济保障的统治机构的行为。”① 世界银行发表的报告指出，国家重建是指重新确立某一国家社会、经济体制并建立一个保证该体制有效发挥作用的和平社会。② 从上述国家重建定义可以看出，切斯特曼对国家重建的理解侧重外部力量的介入，并未重视重建对象国的经济社会条件和如何发挥重建国家的能动作用。而依据世界银行对国家重建的界定，目前伊拉克重新确立的政治制度尚不能完全有效发挥作用，没有实现社会有序运转和经济重建的既定目标。就伊拉克重建的内涵而言，本文主要指“政权和国家机器重建、经济恢复和社会秩序重建”，虽然伊拉克政权和国家机器已经建立，但按照国家重建的标准，即重建完成可视为国家在一个能正常、稳定运行的法律规则的基础上实现政治、军事和经济社会正常运转，以及国家认同的恢复。③ 因此，伊拉克的重建仍远未完成。这里需要强调的是，国家重建不仅仅是重新建立一套制度，而是如何使新的制度有效地运转起来; 不仅仅依靠外部军事力量，而是本国军队能够独立保障社会安全稳定; 政府不仅能够促进社会力量的整合，恢复经济发展，而且在价值观和意识形态方面实现民众对国家认同的回归等等，这将是艰巨而长期的任务。 ( 二) 相关研究进展整体来看，学界对伊拉克重建问题的研究主要从重建范围与外部干涉、教派分化与国家认同，治理能力与权力争夺几个方面展开。学界关于战后重建的研究最初主要围绕重建范围的变化和外部主导力量 ·100· ① ② ③ Simon Chesterman，You，the People: the United States，Transitional Administration，and State － Building，Oxford ＆NewYork: Oxford University Press，2004，pp. 4 － 5. World Bank， Post － Conflict Ｒeconstruction: The Ｒole of the World Bank，Washington， D. C. : World Bank，1998. Seth G. Jones，Jeremy M. Wilson，Andrew Ｒathmell and K. Jack Ｒiley，“A Theory of Ｒebuilding Internal Security”，Establishing Law and Order After Conflict，ＲAND Corporation，2005，p. 7. 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路对国家重建的干预而展开。① 戴维·艾克波拉德( David Ekbladh) 指出，与二战后的国家重建相比，冷战时期的国家重建范围有所扩大，它不再是一个国家内部事务，后冷战时期伊拉克和阿富汗的重建主要是在大国主导下进行的，重建对象国政治制度和发展方向会发生明显改变。关于外部干预对目标国重建的影响，纳米尔·科达( NemirKirdar) 认为，美国对伊拉克战后重建政策使该国陷入一个破碎状态。刘月琴指出，伊拉克与美国在重建目标和利益方面的不同，使伊拉克重建没有保障自身利益。② 汪波探讨了美国政府在伊拉克政治重建中的政策失误及由此产生的消极作用。③ 江涛认为，美国对伊拉克重建是对其内部事务的侵犯，违背了国际法和国际关系中的主权原则和不干涉原则。④ 上述研究侧重分析美国主导下的重建对伊拉克国家利益的负面影响。伊拉克历史上教派、族群关系与民众认同对重建的影响也成为学界关注的问题。威廉·波尔克强调，伊拉克社会群体是多元的，美国的重建政策侧重当政者和制度安排，而忽略了社会关系的重塑。⑤ 托比·道奇( Toby Dodge) 指出，美国由于对伊拉克社会结构缺乏了解，使伊拉克难逃国家建构失败的命运。⑥ 黄民兴认为，历史上长期存在的库尔德人与阿拉伯人之间尖锐的民族矛盾，逊尼派和什叶派之间的教派争端，农村甚至城市中长期积淀的传统部落关系及其价值观念不同程度地影响伊拉克现代民族国家建构。⑦ 另外，一些学者尝试从历史和社会视角分析伊拉克文化认同以及教派、族群关系对伊拉克政权重建的制约因素。此外，政府治理能力逐步成为学界分析伊拉克重建制约因素的一个重要视角。弗朗西斯·福山指出，美国政府没有预判到将重建任务移交给这样一 ·101· ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ David Ekbladh，“From Consensus to Crisis: The Postwar Career of Nation － building in U. S. Foreign Ｒelations”，Nation － Building beyond Afghanistan and Iraq，The Johns Hopkins University Press，2005; NemirKirdar，Saving Iraq: Ｒebuilding a Broken Nation，Weidenfeld ＆ Nicolson London，2009. 刘月琴: 《伊拉克战争和战后重建问题》，载杨光: 《中东非洲发展报告( 2003—2004) 》，社会科学文献出版社，2003 年版，第23 ～ 26 页。汪波: 《美国中东战略下的伊拉克战争与重建》，时事出版社，2007 年版。江涛: 《后冲突时代的秩序重塑———美国在海外的国家重建行动研究》，世界知识出版社， 2009 年版，第155 ～ 168 页。 William Ｒ. Polk，Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History，from Genghis Khan’s Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation，New York: Harper Perennial，2005. Toby Dodge，Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied，New York: Columbia University Press，2005. 黄民兴: 《伊拉克民族构建问题的根源及其影响》，载《西亚非洲》2003 年第6 期，第44 ～48 页。西亚非洲2019 年第3 期个治理能力低下的政府所带来的真正问题。① 他认为一个缺乏凝聚力和必要治理能力的“弱政府”面对一个分裂型社会时，很难形成一个政治共同体。② 扎伊德( Zaid Al － Ali) 强调，伊拉克国家建构中政府权威并没有得到广泛认同，目前伊拉克政府的治理缺乏有效性。③ 韩志斌认为，国家建构主要指发展中国家树立新型国家的政治权威、自上而下地向全社会渗透国家权力、建立现代政治体系的过程，而伊拉克的国家建构仍不具备上述条件。④ 由此，一些学者认为伊拉克重建仍面临自身合法性不足和政府治理能力欠缺等问题。从上述研究成果看，既有研究多为伊拉克重建初期的阶段性成果，而对美军2011 年撤离伊拉克和“伊斯兰国”溃败后国家重建为何仍步履维艰等问题缺乏系统考察。鉴于此，本文将重点分析当前伊拉克重建所面临困境的深层次原因，并尝试探讨伊拉克自主重建的出路。当前伊拉克国家重建面临的困境从2003 年6 月起，伊拉克开始进入战后国家重建时期，至2019 年初，国家重建经历了以下几个阶段: 其一是政权移交阶段( 2003 ～ 2006 年) 。伊拉克战争结束后，临时管理委员会于2003 年6 月成立，美国负责重建的保罗· 布雷默对临管会拥有否决权，伊拉克国内逊尼派及部分什叶派民众都强烈反抗美国的占领。据统计，当时该国平均每天发生70 次针对占领军的袭击。⑤ 2004 年6 月，阿拉维临时政府成立，并接管了行政权。2005 年10 月伊拉克 “永久宪法”获得通过，确认伊拉克为伊斯兰、民主、联邦议会共和国。由于 2005 年国民议会选举最初遭到逊尼派穆斯林抵制，直到同年12 月第二次国民议会大选才产生275 名国民议会成员，2006 年5 月20 日由马利基领导的第一届伊拉克政府遂正式成立。其二是战后秩序重建阶段( 2006 ～ 2011 年) 。这 ·102· ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ Francis Fukuyama，“Nation － Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory”，Nation － Building beyond Afghanistan and Iraq，The Johns Hopkins University Press，2005，p. 13. ［美国］弗朗西斯·福山: 《国家构建: 21 世纪的国家治理与世界秩序》，黄胜强、许铭原译，中国社会科学出版社，2007 年版，序第2 页。 Zaid Al － Ali，The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption，Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy，New Haven and London: Yale University Press，2014. 韩志斌: 《伊拉克教派结构与政治分裂危机》，载《西亚非洲》2006 年第9 期，第37 页。［美国］塔比特A. J. 阿卜杜拉: 《伊拉克史》，张旭鹏译，商务印书馆，2013 年版，第188 页。伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路一时期是伊拉克秩序由乱到治的过渡时期。其中，2006 ～ 2007 年是伊拉克教派冲突最为严重的时期。据统计，大约有3 000 人死于每月发生的宗派冲突。① 从2008 年起，伊拉克国内安全状况有所改善，局势开始趋于稳定。在 2009 年1 月举行的选举中伊拉克安全力量已经能够承担起维护社会秩序的任务。伊拉克经济重建也缓慢启动。在此背景下，2011 年底美国完成从伊拉克撤军。其三是战乱反复阶段( 2011 ～ 2017 年) 。随着美国从伊拉克撤军，脆弱的政治平衡随即被打破，伊拉克各派冲突逐步升级。宗教极端势力借着伊拉克混乱的国内局势迅速壮大，他们最初打着“基地组织伊拉克分支”的旗号发展起来。2014 年起“伊斯兰国”在伊拉克攻城略地，一度威胁到政权的存亡。伊拉克战后重新建立起来的秩序再次陷入分裂状态，国家处于内战的边缘。伊拉克各民兵力量、库尔德人武装与政府军共同参与到打击“伊斯兰国”的斗争中。在此过程中，各武装力量进一步壮大，其中伊拉克库尔德地区于2017 年9 月举行了公投，伊拉克政府军强力出击，有效打击了库尔德武装力量，为新一轮国家重建赢得主动权。其四是国家重建重启阶段( 2017 年底至今) 。2017 年12 月，随着“伊斯兰国”最终被击溃，时任总理阿巴迪宣布政府军已收复“伊斯兰国”在伊拉克所控制的领土，伊拉克政府2017 年底开启再度重建，并制定了《重建与发展框架》( Ｒeconstruction and Development Framework) ，强调力争通过政治和解，从经济、社会、法制与安全等多个方面展开自主重建。② 目前，伊拉克大多数民众希望国家重新走向安定、实现民族和教派和解，但各派政治力量的博弈仍没有停止。2018 年5 月，在伊拉克举行的议会选举中，倡导民族主义的什叶派宗教人士萨德尔( Sadr) 领导的萨德尔运动与左翼力量伊拉克共产党( 下称“伊共”) 等组成的“沙戎联盟” ( Sairoon Coalition) 赢得329 个席位中的54 席，超过其他竞选联盟。此后，各政治派别经过艰难的重组新一届政府组建基本完成，由各派制衡的弱势政府将面临如何推进重建的艰巨任务。纵观持续十余年的伊拉克战后重建，其间交织着宗教与民族、国家主权与外部干涉等多方面矛盾关系，其复杂性、反复性超出伊拉克战前国际社会的预期，重建进程历经波折与反复。 ·103· ① ② ［美国］塔比特A. J. 阿卜杜拉: 前引书。 Dr. Maher Johan，“Ｒeconstruction and Development Framework”，http: / /documents. worldbank. org， 2018 － 05 － 20. 西亚非洲2019 年第3 期 ( 一) 政治力量分化，各派别相互制衡自伊拉克政治重建以来，该国基本形成了什叶派领导人主掌议会、库尔德人担任总统、逊尼派人士出任议长的政治格局。然而，这三大主要政治势力之间缺乏包容，难以达成共识。同时，什叶派内部各派别经过分化组合又形成了相互制衡的态势。 2018 年议会选举后，伊拉克什叶派内部各政治力量激烈博弈，最终形成了五大政治派别，即萨德尔领导的“萨德尔运动”、阿米里领导的“巴德尔组织”、时任总理阿巴迪组建的“胜利联盟”、前总理马利基领导的“法治国家联盟”以及伊拉克伊斯兰最高委员会哈基姆组建的“希克玛运动” ( Hikma) ( 也被称为全国智慧运动) 。在政府组建问题上，各派都试图扩大自身在议会中的权力，不愿让步或接受其他政治联盟的领导。当前，伊政府呈现出由萨德尔领导的沙戎联盟和以哈迪·阿米里( Hadi alAmiri) 为核心的征服联盟 ( Conquest Alliance) 两大什叶派阵营相互制衡的局面。① 为了在各方之间达成微妙的平衡，最终阿卜杜勒·迈赫迪( Mr. Abdul Mahdi) 作为一位政治独立人士被提名为总理，并组建政府。至今伊拉克并没有形成一个强有力的中央政府，很多重建政策可能被各方利益集团所阻挠。 ( 二) 经济重建未能全面展开，民生问题突出随着“伊斯兰国”被击溃，战后重建中民生问题成为伊拉克政府面对的首要问题。2014 年至2017 年“伊斯兰国”在该国攻城略地，致使伊拉克石油管道等基础设施不同程度地受到破坏。2016 年，伊拉克国民生产总值为1 706 亿美元，还没有达到该国1990 年1 799亿美元的水平。② 由于缺乏安全保障，外商纷纷逃离。伊拉克重建所需资金缺口巨大，目前伊拉克获得的重建基金仅占所需资金的不到2%，③ 严重影响国家经济重建。常年战乱对经济和社会生态的破坏给伊拉克战后重建带来诸多困难。由于经济重建滞后，民生问题愈加突出。2018 年9 月初，伊拉克南部什叶派民众居住的中心地区巴士拉和其他城市发生了近年来最严重的抗议活动，民众因糟糕的公共设施( 如停电、自来水污染) 、失业等问题爆发抗议活动，愤怒的示威者 ·104· ① ② ③ “Will Nationalism Determine the Future of Iraqi Politics?”，http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx? articleid = 1667443350＆Country = Iraq，2018 － 12 － 14. 参见世界银行网站: http: / /databank. worldbank. org /data /home. aspx，2018 － 02 － 10。曲翔宇、黄培昭: 《伊拉克重建进程步履蹒跚》，载《人民日报》2019 年1 月8 日。伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路直接冲击政府办公大楼，表明民众对政府的信任危机加剧。实际上，战后多年来，从马利基政府到阿巴迪政府都没能有效解决和应对重建中的民生问题，他们为巩固自身权力，将相当精力用在与逊尼派政治力量和其他政治阵营之间的政治角力上。加之，石油价格走低、收入减少和打击“伊斯兰国”组织付出的高昂战争代价，加剧了政府的财政赤字。这些都使伊拉克政府无法满足民众恢复经济、改善民生的需求，导致民众对政府的信任降低，国家凝聚力减弱。 ( 三) 安全重建滞后，社会持续动荡重建以来的社会持续动荡表明，伊拉克仍缺乏一支强有力的安全部队来实现安全重建。一方面，“伊斯兰国”残余势力仍有能力发动局部恐怖袭击，对伊拉克安全局势构成威胁。虽然2017 年底“伊斯兰国”极端组织已经被整体击溃，但仍有上万名残余势力在伊拉克与叙利亚接壤的边境地带活动。 2019 年初，部分恐怖分子在叙、伊边境地区发动汽车炸弹袭击，造成数十人伤亡。伊拉克的安全形势仍不容乐观。当下，伊拉克国内仍未建立起统一、有效的政治秩序，残余势力和极端思想仍对伊拉克国家安全构成威胁。努力实现各派和解、消除恐怖组织滋生的土壤和打击宗教极端主义势力仍是伊拉克重建中的重要任务。另一方面，政府军难以掌控各派武装力量，军队战斗力和凝聚力被进一步削弱，对国家安全治理构成挑战。2014 年，由于“伊斯兰国”极端组织的迅速扩张，伊拉克政府军无法独立扭转危局，伊拉克宗教领袖西斯塔尼遂号召有生力量共同抗击“伊斯兰国”，于是，包括什叶派民兵组织、逊尼派武装和雅兹迪人、土库曼人等其他少数族群组成跨教派、跨族群的武装团体，即“大众动员力量”( PMF) 应运而生，“大众动员力量”在打击“伊斯兰国”的过程中发展壮大。然而，当“伊斯兰国”覆灭后， “大众动员力量”的武装力量仍然存在，其派别之间相互对立，且不受政府军控制，军队内部分裂日益明显。① “大众动员力量”已经形成相对独立的武装力量，并与安全部队形成某种程度的抗衡。目前，伊拉克中央政府通过一项法律，将“大众动员力量”纳入到安全部队之中，承认“大众动员力量”是一个合法的武装实体，但“大众动员力量”拒绝放弃他们的武器，坚持使用他们统一的制服和旗帜。② 由此看，如何强化政府军事力量? 如何整合和掌控各 ·105· ① ② O’Driscoll，Van Zoonen，“The Future of Iraq: Is Ｒeintegration Possible?”，Middle East Policy， Vol. XXIV，No. 3，Fall 2017，p. 35. “Partial Cabinet Appointed”，http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx，2018 － 11 － 05. 西亚非洲2019 年第3 期派武装力量? 如何维持地方安全秩序? 仍然是摆在现政府面前的一道难题。 ( 四) 民族、教派隔阂难以消弭，未能实现社会整合国家重建启动以来，一方面伊拉克民族主义和伊斯兰主义意识形态相互交织，尚未形成统一的政治共识; 另一方面，教派和族群身份认同增强，使民众之间隔阂加深，进而影响难民回归与社会整合。 2018 年议会选举后，由于主掌议会的什叶派内部政治主张存在明显差异，民众主流价值观也随之被分化，影响国家主流意识形态重构。以萨德尔为首的政治力量强调国家民族主义意识形态，反对外部的干涉，赢得很多民众的认同; 以西斯塔尼为代表的伊斯兰权威主义影响力有所增强; 另有什叶派领导人公开表示对伊朗阿亚图拉哈梅内伊的忠诚，声称追求霍梅尼风格的政权形式。① 正如一些学者所言，在中东民族国家建构中，阿拉伯民族受到双重认同的困扰最为突出。伊斯兰主义者很自然地将文化、社会和国家的政治纽带建立在宗教基础之上，而在阿拉伯民族主义者看来，文化和语言是国家、社会和公民资格的政治认同的支柱。由此，阿拉伯民族主义被视为一种世俗的意识形态。② 伊拉克重建以来这两种认同相互交织，特别是伊拉克宪法明确规定伊拉克为伊斯兰国家、伊斯兰教为国教后，伊斯兰主义对民众国家认同的影响日益增加。由此，“宗教主义通过政治伊斯兰等形式产生广泛影响，直接影响伊拉克民众意识形态”。③ 另外，教派、族群关系紧张在一定程度上影响了伊拉克难民回归问题的解决。“伊斯兰国”曾故意煽动教派冲突，袭击什叶派平民和其他少数族群，这种做法造成民众在身份认同上的分化和对立④，来自不同教派和族群的民众之间隔阂加深。2014 年“伊斯兰国”恐怖分子大举进攻伊拉克北部地区，曾造成辛贾尔山( Mount Sinjar) 地区数万名雅兹迪人逃离家园。“伊斯兰国” 制造的大规模杀戮引发的逊尼派阿拉伯人和雅兹迪人及少数基督徒间的仇视心理难以在短时间内弥合。一些逊尼派难民回归家园担心会面临曾经遭受屠 ·106· ① ② ③ ④ Abbas Qaidaari，“Iran’s New Group in Iraq: Saraya Al －Khorasani”，Al Monitor，January 11，2015. 刘中民: 《当代中东国际关系中的伊斯兰因素研究》，社会科学文献出版社，2018 年版，第360 页。［伊拉克］巴萨姆·穆希: 《伊拉克左翼政党的发展及其眼中的中国经验》，载《当代世界与社会主义》2017 年第1 期，第174 页。刘中民: 《当代中东国际关系中的伊斯兰因素研究》，社会科学文献出版社，2018 年版，第342 页。伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路杀的少数族群的报复，族群矛盾仍是难民回归面临的主要障碍之一。① 据联合国难民署统计，截至2018 年4 月30 日，约210 万伊拉克人流离失所。② 综上，尽管从2003 年战后重建以来，伊拉克各届政府努力推进国家重建进程，但总体看该国在政治重建、经济重建、安全重建和社会重建四方面举步维艰，均未取得预期效果，面临着政治失序、经济低迷、民生困顿、安全形势堪忧、教派关系紧张等困境，国家重建任重道远。伊拉克国家重建陷入困境的根源伊拉克战后重建长期处于困境，既有外来干涉和介入的影响，又有伊拉克自身历史和社会进程之缘由。这两方面因素互动，共同影响着伊拉克战后重建的进程。 ( 一) 美国主导的重建与伊拉克国家利益不一致损害了重建的基础一般来说，一个国家的重建主要是通过其自身主导来完成的，但是有些国家的重建也可能是在外国干预下完成的，最终建成与干预国倡导的政治制度。③ 2003 年，美国通过伊拉克战争彻底摧毁萨达姆政权及其统治机器，致使伊拉克重建的基础即该国政府本应享有的重建主导权不复存在。由此，美国以自身利益为出发点，主导伊拉克政权建构、军事安全、经济恢复等方面的战后重建。实际上，美国主导的重建与伊拉克的国家利益并不一致，这是伊拉克重建陷入混乱和动荡的根源所在。第一，伊拉克重建初期带有明显的外部主导性，“外部干预性重建”给伊拉克重建带来持续性负面效应。从2003 年重建开始到2005 年底伊拉克政府产生前，伊拉克处于无政府状态，成为“主权暂时缺失的国家”。在此情况下，伊拉克被迫接受美国在其领土上进行的“干预性重建”。美国于2003 年5 月成立了“联军临时管理局”( Coalition Provisional Authority) ，最高行政长官由保罗·布雷默担任，全面管理伊拉克战后重建事务。然而，美国选派的在伊拉克执行重建任务的美方人员对当地的情况不够了解，在决策上犯了一系 ·107· ① ② ③ 魏玉栋、程帅朋: 《解放半年，摩苏尔战争创伤难愈》，载《参考消息》2018 年1 月10 日。参见联合国难民署网站: https: / /www. unhcr. org /iraq － emergency. html，2019 － 02 － 21。江涛: 《后冲突时代的秩序重塑———美国在海外的国家重建行动研究》，世界知识出版社， 2009 年版，第31 页。西亚非洲2019 年第3 期列错误。① 在“联军临时管理局”工作的人中，只有一位行政官员懂阿拉伯语，忽视了当地文化、历史或社会的复杂性。美国驻伊拉克官员实施的诸多举措不利于伊拉克战后重建的开展。后来，按照美国倡导而建立的伊拉克民主政权，亦未充分考虑到伊拉克的历史文化和社会结构等现实条件，给伊拉克统一的多民族国家建构带来负面影响。当前，美国主导下的伊拉克政治重建是以权力分享为核心的“合作性民主”，而这种政治模式需要以统一的民族国家认同为前提，成熟的公民社会为基础，② 而这些是伊拉克目前所不具备的。另外，在美国的主导之下，伊拉克在战后确立的永久宪法确认了逊尼派、什叶派和库尔德人三方势力进一步分立的状态，扩大了库尔德地区政府的自治权，致使伊拉克库尔德人的分离倾向日益明显，中央政府的权力进一步弱化。第二，美国清除复兴党( de － Baathification) 的政策激发了教派矛盾。清除复兴党的计划最终演变为“去逊尼派”行动，这引起逊尼派官员和士兵的强烈不满。事实证明，最初草率以教派来区分政治派别的方式，促使个人的政治参与热情转化成了个人的教派认同，③ 由此产生了尖锐的教派对立。也就是说，美国制定的重建政策不仅没有促进民族、教派和解，反而加剧了伊拉克政府内部的严重分化，影响了伊拉克社会的重新整合。另则，以复兴党成员为主的军事武装力量被清除后，还使伊拉克安全重建严重滞后。一方面，仓促组建的新政府军战斗力薄弱，短期内无法有效运转，被迫依靠数量有限的美占领军，但美军军力不足，无法有效遏制伊拉克国内暴力活动; 另一方面，被解散的伊拉克复兴党武装人员，由于无法找到工作，许多人便重新拿起武器寻求报复，对社会安定造成破坏，也增加了安全重建的困难。第三，伊拉克经济重建之初受制于美国的安排，国家经济利益没有得到根本保障。一方面，伊拉克议会被迫通过美国参与起草的石油法，名义上是为了公平分配石油收益，实际上则为美国石油公司控制伊拉克石油提供法律保障，从根本上摧毁了伊拉克经济基础。另一方面，用于重建的拨款被挪用，致使工期延误，伊拉克经济生活没有及时恢复运转，民众的基本生活无法保障。虽然美国国会在重建之初拨款184 亿美元用于伊拉克经济重建，但这笔 ·108· ① ② ③ ［美国］塔比特A. J. 阿卜杜拉: 《伊拉克史》，张旭鹏译，商务印书馆，2013 年版，第176 页。魏亮: 《浅析美军撤离后伊拉克政治重建的安全环境》，载《西亚非洲》2012 年第4 期，第86 页。 Benjamin Isakhan，The Legacy of Iraq From the 2003 War to the “Islamic State”， Edinburgh University Press，2016，pp. 23 － 24. 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路钱更多被用作五角大楼办公用品采购以及美在伊军事基地修筑上。① 事实证明，美国主导的经济重建无法实现伊拉克石油工业自主发展。正是由于重建之初伊拉克主导权缺失，美国对伊拉克战后制度的安排为伊拉克国内教派、族群之间权力争夺埋下了伏笔，不利于战后伊拉克建立一个强有力的政府。美国的一些智囊曾提出，把中东按照族群和教派分割成若干更小的单位，使之相互征战，有利于美国对中东的控制。② 虽然此后美国将主导权逐步转移给伊拉克政府，但美国在马利基政府的产生和连任中施加了重要的影响③。由此可见，美国的直接干预损害了伊拉克重建的基础。 ( 二) 政治权威的缺失严重阻碍伊拉克政治重建进程政治权威④是国家实现其统治的基础，也是伊拉克现代民族国家建构的前提。对于战后重建的伊拉克而言，主要政治力量分化与相互牵制是影响政治权威形成的主要因素。若政府没有足够的政治权威，则无法取信于民众，很多政策就无法有效实施。加之，伊拉克战后确立的政治架构以及教派和民族多元化社会结构制约着政治权威的重塑。第一，以教派和族群为基础的政治架构削弱了伊拉克政治权威的形成。伊拉克的联邦制是在美国推动下确立的。然而，联邦制就像硬币一样，兼具两面性。联邦制在包容自治方面获得成功的同时，也鼓励了少数民族的分离要求。伊拉克历史上长期形成的库尔德问题在联邦制度下被激发为分离主义。联邦制扩大了库尔德地区政府( 库尔德自治政府) 自治的权力，为伊拉克库尔德人独立提供了空间。对于教派和族群关系复杂的伊拉克而言，联邦政府缺乏一定政治权威，对伊拉克战后民主政体的巩固构成严峻挑战。因此，这种外来移植的政治体制与多元的社会结构之间相互作用制约着政治权威重塑。 2006 年后，伊拉克什叶派凭借美国的扶持和人口优势主掌了议会。⑤ 以教派和族群为划分基础的政体形式似乎实现了权力的公平分配，但什叶派和 ·109· ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ［美国］约瑟夫·E. 斯蒂格利茨、琳达·J. 比尔米斯: 《三万亿美元的战争: 伊拉克战争的真实成本》，卢昌崇等译，中国人民大学出版社，2013 年版，第151 页。田文林: 《伊斯兰国: 一个原教旨极端组织的崛起》，载《现代军事》2015 年第10 期，第40 页。 Ali Khedery，“Why We Stuck with Maliki － and Lost Iraq”，The Washington Post，https: / /www. washingtonpost. com/opinions /why － we － stuck － with － maliki － and － lost － iraq，2018 － 07 － 30. 权威与权力有本质的不同，权威是使对象自愿服从的能力; 权力强调的是主体对客体的强制性作用力，本质上是一种强制力量; 而且权威是具有合法性的权力，是使对方信从的影响力。参见俞可平: 《权力与权威: 新的解释》，载《中国人民大学学报》( 社会科学版) 2016 年第3 期，第40 页。刘月琴: 《伊拉克战后的政治发展》，载《西亚非洲》2005 年第6 期，第17 页。西亚非洲2019 年第3 期逊尼派的对立加剧了各派对权力的争夺①，不利于国家政治权威的重塑。事实上，在美国推翻萨达姆政权之前，伊拉克教派矛盾并不突出，什叶派和逊尼派民众能够和平共处。伊拉克战后，以选举为主要形式的政治动员转化为以族群和教派为基础的权力争夺，教派利益直接转换成政党利益，形成政党教派化，进而弱化伊拉克的政治权威与政府的合法性。第二，伊拉克政府治理缺乏有效性，不利于政治权威重塑。其一，在伊拉克重建初期，以什叶派为主的政府官员大多是从国外流亡回来的，治国理政经验不足，加之政府和军队内部的腐败问题也损害了政府在民众心中的公信力。其二，马利基政府没能有效团结逊尼派和库尔德人等少数政治派别，影响政府公共权威重塑。2011 年底美军撤离后，马利基政府极力巩固什叶派在政权中的主导地位，在权力和石油财富分配上采取排他性政策，对逊尼派穆斯林进行武力打压，进而导致伊拉克国内教派冲突加剧。此后，两派的分化已经深入到社会、军队等各个层面。其三，什叶派政权自身凝聚力不足、分化严重，之前的达瓦党已经分裂为以前总理阿巴迪和马利基为首的两大政治力量，特别是2018 年大选后主要党派在政府组阁问题上存在严重分歧，由此可见什叶派执政联盟内部的分裂将阻碍其政治权威重塑。 ( 三) 国家认同的弱化制约伊拉克现代民族国家重建战后伊拉克民众凝聚力不足，按教派、族群划分的政治架构削弱了国家认同，实际上是对复兴党时期建立起来的民族国家认同的解构。加之，掌管议会的什叶派政府自身治理能力不足，政治权威还未形成，民众在心理上缺乏对国家的认同与信任。传统上，伊拉克民众的国家认同相对较弱。安东尼·史密斯( Anthony D. Smith) 曾提出，在第一次世界大战后亚洲一些国家虽然开启了现代“民族构建”过程，但由于这些国家还存在固有的“族群”的模式，主要表现为对家族血统和谱系的认同超越对国家的认同; 对本部族文化传统的认同超过法律。这种认同带有强大的感召力和动员效果，不利于国家整合和现代民族国家的建构。历史上，伊拉克最初由巴格达、巴士拉和摩苏尔三个省份人为组合而成，政区安排及居民主体与中南部脱节，社会形态属于传统的混合部落制度，社会处于 ·110· ① NemirKirdar，Saving Iraq: Ｒebuilding a Broken Nation，London: Weidenfeld＆ Nicolson，2009，p. 137. 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路分散状态，全民整体凝聚力差。① 加之，位于伊拉克南部的什叶派阿拉伯人主张泛伊斯兰主义，中部的主体居民是逊尼派阿拉伯人，坚持阿拉伯民族主义②，北部的库尔德人长期自治，这对伊拉克战后重构政治认同形成很大负面影响。伊拉克战争后，该国形成了按教派、族群划分的政治认同，不利于伊拉克战后向现代民族国家转型所必需的公民身份和国家认同的形成，战后受到外力解构的社会文化更不利于国家认同的重塑。一方面，伊拉克战后确立的分权政治架构强化了民众的民族或宗教身份，固化了其身份认同，社会结构进一步分裂。③ 国家认同源自政府的合法性，而合法性的基础是政府具有广泛代表性和处理国家事务的公正性。伊拉克逊尼派和什叶派以及什叶派内部各个政治力量分化明显，甚至相互制衡，民众对国家公共权威缺少信任，严重侵蚀国家向心力和政治认同。在选举过程中，民众的教派和族群认同差异被政治精英所利用，各政治派别为赢得更多选票而人为强化民众的宗教和民族认同。另一方面，伊拉克民众国家认同弱化受制于战后政治权威缺失。2006 至2007 年，伊拉克国内暴力冲突升级，孱弱的政府既无力维护国内秩序，也无法保证民众基本的生存需求。在此情况下，一些民众开始寻求所属教派的保护，有些人还加入了教派武装，由此教派作为一种政治认同得到进一步强化。④ ( 四) 极端主义和恐怖主义蔓延直接危及重建进程美国发动伊拉克战争打破萨达姆强人统治下政治秩序的同时，却没有建立一个能够平衡各派利益的新秩序，最终酿成极端组织“伊斯兰国”崛起，随之而来的各种极端思想和恐怖主义迅速蔓延，不仅对伊拉克的社会秩序构成严重冲击，而且严重威胁伊拉克政治体系建构。 “伊斯兰国”在伊拉克发展起来是内外多种因素相互作用的结果。一方面，美国对伊拉克的占领和伊拉克战后该国政治和社会生态遭到破坏，为 “基地组织伊拉克分支”生根发芽提供了土壤。事实上，在伊拉克政治秩序重构遭遇严重挫折时，面对大国的干涉，伊斯兰极端主义思潮开始兴起。最初 ·111· ① ② ③ ④ 刘月琴: 《列国志·伊拉克》，社会科学文献出版社，2007 年版，第187 页。韩志斌: 《美国在伊拉克的战略进展与局限》，载《西亚非洲》2006 年第2 期，第19 页。 Nussaibah Younis，“Set up to Fail: Consociational Political Structures in Post － war Iraq，2003 － 2010”，Contemporary Arab Affairs，Vol. 4，No. 1，2011，p. 2. 李福泉: 《伊拉克教派冲突的特点、缘由与前景》，载《哈尔滨工业大学学报》( 社会科学版) 2006 年第6 期，第35 页。西亚非洲2019 年第3 期美国主导伊拉克战后重建时，逊尼派的政治影响力骤然下降，在正面抗击无法实现的情况下，他们中的一部分试图通过暴力手段结束美军的占领，这些人成为该恐怖组织招募的对象。另一方面，始自2010 年底的阿拉伯剧变使中东地区局势持续动荡，来自“基地”组织的极端分子开始向伊拉克渗透，“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”在此背景下发展起来，加之伊拉克国内被各种极端思想裹挟的各派别间冲突加剧，恐怖袭击不断，2014 年“伊斯兰国”迅速坐大，对伊拉克战后秩序重建产生破坏性影响，其表现为: 其一，“伊斯兰国” 异军突起阻断伊拉克国家重建进程。2014 年以来极端组织通过攻城略地，一度控制了摩苏尔、提克里特和费卢杰等主要城市，占领伊拉克近1 /3 的领土。 “伊斯兰国”在伊拉克扩展其影响后，甚至谋求在伊拉克建立一个政教合一的 “哈里发国”。到2015 年年初，“伊斯兰国”已初具国家架构，在其实际控制的省份按国家的方式实行管理，① 一度威胁到伊拉克政权的存亡。可以说， “伊斯兰国”的出现是伊拉克政府在战后重建中面临的最大挑战，使伊拉克重建一度陷入停滞，甚至倒退。其二， “伊斯兰国”重建所谓“哈里发国”的主张对伊拉克国家体系重建构成挑战。“伊斯兰国”不承认现有国家边界，信奉“圣战萨拉菲主义”的意识形态，即通过发动“圣战”等暴力手段，推翻现政权，试图建立横跨世界的伊斯兰帝国，② 这严重威胁到伊拉克政治秩序和现代国家体系重建。正如一些学者所言，世俗化、法制化是现代民族国家政治建构的标志。回归传统的伊斯兰政治文化将成为当代伊斯兰国家进行现代化和民主化的障碍，③ 也会阻碍伊拉克现代民族国家建构进程。因此，意识形态缺失和国家认同弱化影响国内凝聚力，制约伊拉克国家重建。其三，“伊斯兰国”极端主义思想的传播阻碍了伊拉克战后统一意识形态的构建，不利于国家民族主义的重新确立。即使目前“伊斯兰国”已经被击溃，但“只要这种伊斯兰极端主义生存土壤依旧存在，这种极端势力就不会被根除。”④ ( 五) 地缘政治博弈和地区国家的介入影响伊拉克重建进程与走势就地缘政治而言，地处中东心脏地带、石油产量丰富的伊拉克对大国而 ·112· ① ② ③ ④ 曾向红、陈亚洲: 《“伊斯兰国”的资源动员和策略选择》，载《国际展望》2015 年第3 期，第109 页。刘中民: 《当代中东国际关系中的伊斯兰因素研究》，社会科学文献出版社，2018 年版，第337 页。王林聪: 《略论伊斯兰传统政治文化对民主实践的双重影响》，载《西亚非洲》2006 年第7 期，第20 页。田文林: 《伊斯兰极端主义的表现、根源和困境》，载《阿拉伯世界研究》2018 年第4 期，第17 页。伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路言拥有重要战略价值。加之，美国在中东战略收缩促使地区大国加快了对伊拉克介入和争夺的步伐，特别是近两年来，中东地区大国间主导权争夺已经渗透到伊拉克国家重建之中。沙特与伊朗之间以教派分野为背景的地缘政治角逐，使一些正在重建中的国家难免受到牵连。① 目前，伊朗在伊拉克的影响力已经渗透到政治、军事和经贸等多个层面。在政治方面，以哈迪·阿米里( Amiri) 为核心的巴德尔( Badr) 组织得到伊朗的有力支持，在2018 年伊拉克议会组阁期间组成征服联盟，该政治联盟是伊拉克第二大政治力量。在军事方面，美国占领伊拉克期间，伊朗曾向伊拉克什叶派民兵提供支持。两伊的军事合作在2014 年到2017 年伊拉克打击“伊斯兰国”的过程中更为紧密。在经济层面，伊朗对伊拉克的影响力与日俱增。据统计，伊朗每年向伊拉克出口逾60 亿美元的商品，其中包括食品、建材和消费品等，伊朗已成为伊拉克第三大进口来源国。近年来，双方在石油领域的合作日渐深入，并于2017 年底签署了6 万桶/天的石油互换协议。② 与此同时，沙特与伊拉克的关系在近年已逐渐缓和。沙特与伊拉克的互动也是为平衡伊朗在伊拉克的影响力。由于伊拉克经济重建亟需巨额资金投入，2017 年以来，沙特通过“支票外交”，实现了两国之间的互访。沙特于 2018 年2 月份在伊拉克重建国际捐助会议上承诺为伊拉克重建提供更多资金支持。两国还组建了协调委员会，讨论扩大双边经贸往来。除经济方面与伊拉克加强合作外，沙特声称在2018 年伊拉克议会选举中为非什叶派和民族主义候选人提供资金和外交支持。正如一些学者所指出的，伊拉克教派冲突的背后是一场在中东地区出现的意识形态的分化，是境内外各种政治力量和宗教势力之间为夺取地区政治和宗教文化主导权的博弈。③ 由此可见，伊拉克重建难免受到地区国家在地缘政治和地区主导权争夺的影响。目前，以伊朗为首的什叶派新月地带逐渐扩大，加之什叶派政权在伊拉克重新赢得主导权，沙特与伊朗对伊拉克的争夺随之升温，在一定程度上影响着伊拉克重建的进程和走势。 ·113· ① ② ③ 王林聪: 《中东安全问题及其治理》，载《世界经济与政治》2017 年第12 期，第12 页。 Http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx? articleid = 1196542703＆Country = Iraq，2018 － 02 － 15. 李伟建: 《伊拉克教派冲突背后的宗教文化博弈及对地区形势影响》，载《西亚非洲》2008 年第3 期，第48 页。西亚非洲2019 年第3 期伊拉克国家重建的出路最初由美国主导下确立的政治架构和“去复兴党政策”致使伊拉克内部教派和族群矛盾激增，加剧了社会分裂。加之，伊拉克政府缺乏有效的治理能力，经济和安全重建滞后，制约伊拉克政府政治权威重塑。如何摆脱困境、加快重建进程，这是伊拉克现政权亟待解决的问题。2018 年初，伊拉克政府公布了《重建与发展框架》，具体包含国家治理、政治和解与秩序构建、经济社会发展、基础设施建设等优先解决的重建问题①，该框架为增强该国政府治理能力、恢复重建提供了路线图。实际上，伊拉克重建首先在于实现政治派别间相互妥协、提升政府治理能力、增强民众对国家的信任和认同，在处理好与周边国家关系的同时推进自主重建之路。 ( 一) 平衡域内外大国关系，走自主重建之路从国际体系视角看，伊拉克作为一个主权国家，重建过程中不仅要平衡域外大国的关系，更取决于自身力量的增强。第一，美国出于牵制伊拉克的战略考虑，不希望伊拉克什叶派政府做大、做强，更不希望其他大国和伊拉克走近。事实上，美国对其他大国介入伊拉克事务持警惕态度，不希望其他大国与美国争夺在伊的影响力或参与伊经济重建。2018 年2 月，当伊拉克时任外交部长称有兴趣购买俄罗斯的“S － 400”地空导弹防御系统时，美国根据2017 年制裁法案便向伊拉克发出警告。由此可见，美国试图通过军事和经济干预，为伊拉克自主重建设置障碍。2014 年伊拉克安全部队在面临“伊斯兰国”威胁时，不得不倚重外部力量，尤其是美国的安全援助，而这种安全靠外力的重建策略是难以持久的，无法保证自主重建。目前，虽然美国在伊拉克的影响力有所缩减，但美国的情报人员和军事顾问以及特遣部队将近5 000 人仍在伊拉克边境附近执行清除“伊斯兰国”军事据点的行动，对伊拉克安全重建的影响一直都存在。第二，尽力减少美国在伊重建中的影响以增强自主重建能力。2018 年以 ·114· ① The World Bank，http: / /www. worldbank. org /en /news /press － release /2018 /02 /13 ，2018 － 02 － 22. 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路来，随着美国日益加强对伊朗的战略挤压，美国政府致力于组建所谓的“中东战略联盟”( Middle East Strategic Alliance) ，以打击伊朗在该地区扩张，由此伊拉克成为美国拉拢的对象，对伊拉克战后重建的影响进一步增加。2018 年12 月26 日，特朗普总统对美军驻伊拉克的阿萨德空军基地进行突访后提出将通过基地监视伊朗。伊拉克总统萨利赫对此立即予以回应，强调根据 “美伊战略框架协议”( US － Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement) ，美国已同意不将伊拉克作为攻击其他国家的中转地，① 因此，伊拉克政府未允许美国从伊拉克基地监视伊朗。伊拉克政府的回应引发美国的高度关切。2019 年3 月6 日，美国国务卿蓬佩奥与伊拉克总理迈赫迪就美军在伊拉克的合法地位问题进行了磋商。双方都证实驻伊美军的唯一任务是打击“伊斯兰国” 和训练伊拉克军队，此举表明伊拉克政府正积极应对美国对伊拉克重建的影响，力求削弱美国在本国的影响，以实现自主重建。与此同时，伴随着美国对伊朗制裁的升级，美国进一步向伊拉克施压，要求其终止从伊朗进口天然气和电力②，这将严重制约伊拉克的经济重建。面对美国的要求，伊拉克政府仍坚持与伊朗的合作。可以说，伊拉克新一届政府在战后重建中对美国的干预由被动接受转为主动应对，不愿意屈从于美国或牺牲其经济利益而影响国家重建。因此，伊拉克在努力摆脱对美国等外部势力的依赖的同时，仍需借助与域内大国发展经贸关系，平衡美国对伊拉克重建的干预，才能逐步增强自身在重建中的主导作用。 ( 二) 促进政治派别间妥协，提高治理能力，重塑政治权威政治重建是伊拉克战后重建的基础，其根本在于建立一个让民众信服、治理有效的政府。第一，实现教派和解、提高政府公信力和治理能力是重塑政治权威的关键。一方面，建立避免派系纷争和外部干预的和解政府是伊拉克政治重建的方向。另一方面，提高政府治理能力和打击腐败是增强民众对政府信任的基本前提。2018 年10 月25 日新一届政府成立，新上任的阿德尔·阿卜杜勒·迈赫迪总理得到什叶派两大政治联盟的支持，他在意识形态方面具有灵活性，并且在国内与各个教派、政党和在国外与伊朗、美国都保 ·115· ① ② Matthew C. Weed，“U. S. － Iraq Strategic Framework and Status of Forces Agreement: Congressional Ｒesponse”，https: / /fas. org /sgp /crs /natsec /ＲL34568. pdf，2018 － 08 － 28. Http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx? articleid = 167627400＆Country = Iraq，February 3，2019. 西亚非洲2019 年第3 期持良好的关系，因此迈赫迪将尽力平衡各派政治诉求，① 为实现各派间和解创造条件。新一届政府组建进程中，为防止教派利益政党化，萨德尔要求独立候选人而不是党派候选人填补政府中的空缺职位。他试图创建一个避免派系纷争和外部干预的、由技术专家组成的政府，这将有利于政府在经济、安全重建中发挥引领作用，为战后重建提供必要的公共服务。当然要真正实现各派别权力和资源合理分配需要更长的时间。第二，安全秩序的重建是提高政府治理能力、遏制腐败、重塑政府权威的有效保障。安全重建的关键是重新整合军队各派力量，特别是什叶派民兵武装。有效解决政府军内部教派分化和军队官员腐败问题，不仅可以增强军队的战斗力和凝聚力，实现安全秩序重建，而且可以为经济重建提供一个安全的环境，以积极吸引外国投资，同时也将加强伊拉克政府自主重建能力、保障民众的生活不受安全威胁。第三，资源的公平合理分配有利于政治权威的重塑。对伊拉克政府而言，经济重建将成为伊拉克政府今后工作的重点。“伊斯兰国”毁坏了大量基础设施，政府急需资金进行重建。随着伊拉克石油产量的增加，政府在石油收入分配上从国家整体利益出发，重点实现桥梁、住房、电力等基础设施重建，并注意在石油财富分配上平衡各派利益。在2018 年伊拉克重建国际会议上，各方承诺认捐总额约300 亿美元，其中260 亿美元主要用于投资和扩大信贷额度。② 实际上，在获得世界银行、海湾国家等各方支持的同时，伊拉克政府必须加强自身的“造血”功能，促进石油产业和非能源产业的发展，以提供大量就业机会，切实解决民生问题，促进恢复经济社会发展，为增强民众对政府的信任创造有利条件。 ( 三) 确立公民身份认同，促进国家认同构建超越教派、族群认同的国家认同是一个长期的过程，也是伊拉克重建中必须面对的问题。在伊拉克，民众对国家认同经历了一个反复的过程。在萨达姆当政时期，大多数民众对自我身份的定位是伊拉克人。然而，伊拉克战争后，由于教派冲突引发社会长期动荡，民众的安全感缺失，国家认同 ·116· ① ② “Signs Point towards Consensus over Premiership”，http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx? articleid = 607199044＆Country = Iraq，2018 － 10 － 12. The Economist Intelligence Unit，“Pledges worth US $ 30bn Made in Kuwait for Iraq Ｒeconstruction”， http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx? articleid = 1116434495＆Country = Iraq＆topic，2018 － 02 － 18. 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路趋于弱化，特别是在农村，普通民众对传统家族部落和教派的认同更明显。相对而言， “西方民族国家是观念性的，得到民族主义意识形态的支持。”① 与西方民族主义国家不同，伊拉克是建立在共同家族、教派、族群联系基础上的。伊拉克战后建构现代民族国家需要构建民众的现代公民身份认同，这意味着伊拉克政府想要增强民众的公民国家意识，既要在社会层面充分尊重主体民众的伊斯兰认同和其他少数族群的宗教信仰，又要借助国家民族主义这一意识形态凝聚民心，建立现代公民身份认同。总体来说，在社会层面维持民众原有教派、族群认同的基础上，在政治意识形态层面形成超越教派的国家认同是伊拉克建设现代国家的必由之路。 ( 四) 发挥重建主体作用，推动周边国家共同参与重建伊拉克战后重建的出路在于发挥重建主体作用和平衡周边国家关系，进而营造和平的周边安全环境，推动地区国家参与伊拉克经济重建。第一，积极开展平衡外交，助力经济重建。一方面，在沙特与伊朗之间建立一种平衡外交关系有利于伊拉克发挥重建主体作用和维护重建主导权。2019 年3 月11 ～13 日，伊朗总统鲁哈尼访问巴格达，这是他2013 年就任总统后首次到访伊拉克，伊拉克总统萨利赫和总理迈赫迪分别高规格地接待了鲁哈尼。两伊签署了一系列有关能源、运输、农业、工业的协议，包括建设一条连接两国城市的铁路，预计这些合作将双边贸易额从目前130 亿美元提高到200 亿美元。两伊加深经贸往来既有助于伊拉克战后经济重建，也有助于伊朗抵御美国的高压制裁。伊拉克在与伊朗深入开展贸易合作的同时，加强与沙特的经贸往来，既可以实现平衡外交又能在重建中维护自身利益。伊拉克政府于2016 年1 月重新开放了曾关闭20 多年的沙特驻巴格达大使馆。随后，2017 年7 月，伊拉克什叶派领导人萨德尔还与沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼会面。2019 年3 月 14 日，伊拉克总统萨利赫接见了到访的沙特阿拉伯贸易和投资代表团。实际上，近年来，沙特越来越看重伊拉克在地区战略格局中的地位，积极参与伊拉克的战后经济重建。另一方面，加强与周边国家的合作有助于伊拉克筹集经济重建的资金。 2018 年2 月，在科威特举行的伊拉克重建国际捐助会议得到周边国家的积极 ·117· ① ［美国］格罗斯: 《公民与国家———民族、部落和族属身份》，王建娥、魏强译，新华出版社， 2003 年版，导言第9 页。西亚非洲2019 年第3 期响应和参与，有助于伊拉克重建工程的启动。在重建大会上最多的国家捐助来自土耳其、科威特、沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔和阿联酋等国家。① 第二，扩大与周边国家的安全合作，有利于为伊拉克重建营造一个稳定的周边环境。重建工作启动以来，伊拉克政府积极与伊朗、土耳其、约旦等周边国家加强军事合作。在伊拉克库尔德公投事件中，伊朗和土耳其在库尔德问题上坚定支持伊拉克。在伊拉克库尔德区公投前，土耳其和伊朗分别与伊拉克进行了联合军事演习。同时，土耳其关闭边界并切断伊拉克库尔德地区通往土耳其的石油通道。在伊朗和土耳其的支持下，伊拉克成功阻击了伊拉克库尔德人独立的倾向，并对伊拉克收复对边境地区的控制权起到了促进作用。2018 年5 月，时任伊拉克外交部长贾法里与约旦外长萨法第举行会谈，双方为防止两国边境地区遭受恐怖主义势力威胁，商讨建立联合军事委员会。这些事例说明，有效改善周边关系、创造良好与和平的周边环境，有利于伊拉克社会经济重建。总之，伊拉克的重建应建立在主权独立基础之上，通过平衡与域内大国之间的关系，加强与地区大国的合作与友好关系，确保重建进程中有一个安全的周边环境，进而充分利用周边国家的投资与援助，提高自主重建的能力和重建目标的实现。结语伊拉克重建历经漫长而反复的过程，美国主导下确立的以教派和族群为基础的政治架构不仅不利于伊拉克政治权威的重塑，而且强化了教派认同和族群认同，加深了社会结构的分裂。另外，不同派别之间的权力争夺使国家政治重建的基础遭到削弱，特别是主掌议会的什叶派政府内部的分化也削弱了政治权威，不利于战后伊拉克政府治理能力的加强。而伊拉克军队内部分化则制约着安全重建，无法提供经济重建所需的安全环境。目前，伊拉克在现代民族国家建构尚未完成、政治生态依旧脆弱的情况下，亟需各政治派别达成妥协、提升民众的国家认同感，以重塑政治权威。历史经验表明，只有具有一定权威和合法性的政府才能够推动安全和经济重建，增加民众的安全感和归属感。因此，伊拉克各个政治派别只有以国家利益为重，实现相互和解，才能建立一个具有 ·118· ① The Economist Intelligence Unit，“Pledges Worth US $ 30bn Made in Kuwait for Iraq Ｒeconstruction”， http: / /country. eiu. com/article. aspx? articleid = 1116434495＆Country = Iraq，2018 － 02 － 18. 伊拉克国家重建困境的根源及出路包容性的、合法有效的政府。在此基础上伊拉克政府通过提高自身治理能力，大力恢复石油工业，同时充分利用外部投资和信贷实现经济社会重建，重新赢得民众对政府的信任，加强内部团结与统一，才能顺利完成重建任务。与此同时，伊拉克国家重建问题在某种程度上反映了一些中东国家在经历战争或冲突后重新探寻其发展道路的一种新的尝试，且具有一定的普遍性。因为伊拉克所面临的战后重建诸问题，同样是中东地区处于战乱的国家或正在进行重建国家共同面临的问题。因此，从更广阔的视野看，伊拉克战后重建问题及其解决途径乃是一种特殊背景下启动的21 世纪探索中东现代民族国家建构的独特方式和发展道路。 The Ｒoots of the Predicament of Iraq Ｒeconstruction and Its Way Out Wang Liying ＆ Wang Lincong Abstract: Ｒeconstruction is an urgent problem to be solved in Iraq’s post － war development process. Iraq reconstruction is carried out against the background that Iraqi modern nation － state building has yet to be accomplished and the governance is confronted with predicament. The lack of dominant power，the weakening of national identity，the political structure based on religious and ethnic groups，the diversified social structure，and the involvement of regional countries constrain the process of Iraq reconstruction. External interventions，sectarian conflicts，ethnic separation，terrorism and geopolitical games，etc. are important factors that lead to the predicament of Iraq reconstruction. The key to solving the predicament of Iraq reconstruction lies in the independent reconstruction under the premise of balancing the relations between neighboring countries and major powers outside the region. Key Words: National Ｒeconstruction; Iraq; Ethnicity; Sect; National Identity; Political Authority ( 责任编辑: 樊小红责任校对: 詹世明) ·119·	Translation - English The roots of Iraq’s reconstruction predicament and the way out WANG Liying,* WANG Lincong Abstract National reconstruction is an issue in urgent need of resolution in the course of Iraq’s post-war development. The national reconstruction of Iraq is being carried out against the backdrop of a country whose development as modern nation-state is incomplete, and whose governance faces a difficult situation. At present, Iraqi reconstruction is mired in predicaments: the country’s political system has difficulty functioning effectively, it has yet to achieve social integration, and its economic and social reconstruction is unable to wholly commence. U.S.-led reconstruction, geopolitical games and the involvement of countries in the region are external factors in the troubles miring Iraqi reconstruction. As for internal roots, religious sectarianism within political parties and poor governance have weakened Iraqi political authority and the legitimacy of the government. Meanwhile, the Iraqi population has historically lacked unity, with the division of its political structure along religious and ethnic lines weakening national identity. The spread of extremism and terrorism are also direct threats to the reconstruction process. The key to resolving Iraq’s reconstruction predicament lies in seeking balance between the major powers inside and outside the region, with the aim of taking the path of autonomous reconstruction. Keywords national reconstruction, Iraq, ethnicity, religious sects, national identity, political authority Author profiles WANG Liying, Ph.D candidate at the Department of West Asia and Africa Studies, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China (Beijing 102488). WANG Lincong, Assistant to the Director at the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, and Director and Researcher at the International Relations Division of the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China (Beijing 100007). National reconstruction forms a major part of modern state-building. It has been 15 years since Iraq’s post-war reconstruction began in 2003. In the early post-war period, the United States claimed that it was building Iraq into a democratic and stable country. However, after repeated setbacks, divisions between the political factions of present-day Iraq are intensifying, while economic and social reconstruction are struggling to advance. Particularly with the rise of the ‘Islamic State’ in 2014, national reconstruction has for a time been interrupted. Even following the defeat of the ‘Islamic State’ in 2017, the progress of Iraqi reconstruction has stalled. With Iraq an important producer of oil in the Middle East, possessing relative advantages in its economic resources and other areas, why has reconstruction faltered? What are the roots of Iraq’s reconstruction predicament? How can all the challenges of reconstruction be resolved? This is an important topic in urgent need of investigation by the academic community. This paper intends to cover the many issues of Iraqi reconstruction, to analyze the roots of Iraq’s post-war reconstruction predicament, and to search for a way out of Iraq’s reconstruction predicament. Concept explanation and research overview 1. Definition and connotations of national reconstruction Simon Chesterman defines national reconstruction as “extended international involvement, directed at reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security”. A report published by the World Bank referred to national reconstruction as the re-establishment of a country’s social and economic systems, and the construction of a peaceful society that ensures these systems function effectively. From the first definition, we can see that Chesterman’s understanding of national reconstruction places particular emphasis on the involvement of external forces, while not attaching importance to reconstructing the target country’s economic and social conditions, or how to play an active role in reconstructing the country. Meanwhile, under the World Bank’s definition of national reconstruction, Iraq’s currently re-established political systems cannot be considered entirely effective, having not yet achieved the stated goals of an orderly society and economic reconstruction. In terms of the connotations of Iraqi reconstruction, it refers in this paper primarily to ‘the reconstruction of the regime and state institutions, economic recovery, and reconstruction of social order’. Although the Iraqi regime and the mechanisms of the state have already been established, according to these standards of national reconstruction, complete reconstruction can be regarded as achieving normal military, economic and social operation on the basis of laws and regulations which function normally and in a stable manner, as well as the restoration of national identity. Therefore, Iraq’s reconstruction is still far from complete. What needs to be emphasized here is that national reconstruction is not merely the re-establishment of a set of institutions, but the question of how to make new institutions operate effectively. It is not merely reliance on external military forces, but a country whose own army is capable of independently ensuring a secure and stable society. Governments are not only capable of promoting the integration of social forces and restoring economic development, but in terms of values and ideology can also achieve a return of national identity among the populace. This will be a formidable and long-term task. 2. Related research Overall, the academic world’s research into the issues of Iraqi reconstruction primarily extends from a few aspects: the scope of reconstruction and external interference; the division of religious sects and national identity; governance and struggles for power. The academic world’s research concerning post-war reconstruction at first revolved primarily around changes to the scope of reconstruction and the intervention of the external forces leading reconstruction. David Ekbladh notes that in comparison to post-World War II national reconstruction, the scope of national reconstruction expanded somewhat during the Cold War. No longer was reconstruction the internal affair of one country; post-Cold War Iraqi and Afghan reconstruction was primarily carried out under the leadership of a major power, with the reconstruction of the target country’s political system and the direction of its development exhibiting noticeable changes. Regarding the impact of external intervention on the target country’s reconstruction, Nemir Kirdar believes the United States’ policies on Iraq’s post-war reconstruction caused the country to fall into disrepair. Yueqin Liu notes that the differences between the United States’ and Iraq’s objectives and interests for reconstruction meant that Iraqi reconstruction failed to safeguard Iraq’s own interests. Bo Wang explores policy faults in the United States government’s political reconstruction of Iraq, and the negative effects these produced. Tao Jiang believes the United States’ reconstruction of Iraq was a violation of its internal affairs, and ran counter to international law and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in international relations. The above research places particular emphasis on analyzing the negative influence of U.S.-led reconstruction on Iraq’s national interests. The effect of historical sectarian relations, ethnic relations, and popular identity on reconstruction has also become an issue of note in the academic community. William R. Polk stresses the diversity of Iraq’s social groups, and that the United States’ reconstruction policies placed emphasis on systematic arrangements and those in power while neglecting the rebuilding of social relations. Toby Dodge notes that it was the United States’ lack of understanding of Iraq’s social structures that meant Iraq could not escape the fate of failed nation-building. Huang Minxing believes that acute and long-standing ethnic conflicts between Kurds and Arabs, sectarian disputes between the Sunnis and Shias, long-standing relations between traditional tribes in rural and even urban areas and their values have, to varying degrees, affected the construction of Iraq as a modern nation-state. Furthermore, some scholars have tried to analyze the constraints of Iraqi cultural identity, as well as its denominational and ethnic relations, on the reconstruction of the Iraqi regime from a historical and social perspective. Outside of these examples, the government’s administrative capabilities have gradually become an important angle from which the academic community has analyzed constraints on Iraq’s reconstruction. Francis Fukuyama notes that the United States government did not anticipate the true problems of handing over the task of reconstruction to a government so lacking in administrative capability. He believes that when a “weak government”, lacking unity and the necessary capacity to govern, faces a divided society, it is very difficult to form a political community. Zaid al-Ali emphasizes that government authority has not received widespread recognition during Iraq’s state-building, and that at present the Iraqi government is administratively ineffective. Han Zhibin believes that state-building primarily refers to the process by which a developing country establishes the political authority of a new state, spreads the power of the state to the whole of society from the top down, and constructs a modern political system—conditions which Iraq’s state-building does not yet fulfill. Therefore, some scholars believe that Iraqi reconstruction still faces a lack of legitimacy and a lack of administrative capability in the government. Considering the above findings, most existing research concerns the stage-by-stage results of the early period of Iraqi reconstruction. However, systematic reviews are lacking when it comes to questions such as why national reconstruction is still struggling to move forward following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 and the defeat of the ‘Islamic State’. In light of this, this paper will focus on analyzing the deep-seated causes of the predicaments currently facing Iraqi reconstruction and will attempt to investigate a way out for Iraq’s autonomous reconstruction. Difficulties currently facing Iraqi reconstruction From June 2003, Iraq entered a period of post-war national reconstruction, continuing up till early 2019. National reconstruction went through the following stages: The first stage was the transfer of political power (2003-2006). Following the invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was established in June 2003. The United States’ Paul Bremer, who was responsible for reconstruction, held veto powers over the IGC. Sunnis and some Shias in Iraq fiercely opposed occupation by the United States. Statistics show that at that time, an average of 70 attacks per day were directed at U.S. occupation in Iraq. In June 2004, Ayad Allawi’s interim government was established and took over executive power. In October 2005, Iraq’s ‘permanent constitution’ was passed, affirming Iraq as an Islamic, democratic, and federal parliamentary republic. Because the 2005 parliamentary election had suffered initial boycotts by Sunni Muslims, in December of the same year a second parliamentary election produced 275 national parliament members. On May 20, 2006, the first Iraqi government, led by Nouri al-Maliki, was formally established. The second stage was the reconstruction of a post-war order (2006-2011). This was a period in which the Iraqi order transitioned from chaos to governance. 2006 to 2007 was the most severe period for sectarian conflict in Iraq during this time. Statistics show that approximately 3000 people were dying each month from sectarian conflict. From 2008 onward, Iraq’s domestic security situation improved somewhat and began trending toward stability. During the January 2009 election, Iraqi security forces were able to assume the task of maintaining social order. Reconstruction of the Iraqi economy was also slowly commencing. It was against this background that, at the end of 2011, the United States completed its withdrawal of troops from Iraq. The third stage was a relapse into the chaos of war (2011-2017). Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, the fragile political balance was immediately broken, and conflict between the various factions of Iraq progressively escalated. Religious extremist forces used Iraq’s chaotic domestic situation as an opportunity for rapid expansion, initially developing under the banner of ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’. In 2014, the ‘Islamic State’ began attacking cities and seizing territory, for a time posing a mortal threat to the Iraqi regime. Iraq’s re-established post-war order had once again fallen apart, and the country lay on the brink of civil war. Iraqi militias, Kurdish armed forces and government forces fought together in the struggle against the ‘Islamic State’. In the process, each of the armed forces grew stronger, and in September 2017 the Iraqi Kurdistan Region held a referendum. In response, Iraqi government forces attacked with strength, striking an effective blow against the Kurdish armed forces and seizing the initiative for a new round of national reconstruction. The fourth stage was the recommencing of national reconstruction (2017-Present). In December 2017, following the final defeat of the ‘Islamic State’, then Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that government forces had recaptured all ‘Islamic State’-controlled territory in Iraq. At the end of 2017, the Iraqi government again launched reconstruction efforts, laying out its Reconstruction and Development Framework, which emphasized working toward political reconciliation, in order to carry out autonomous reconstruction in many areas including the economy, society, legal system, and security. At present, most Iraqis want the country to return to stability and achieve ethnic and religious reconciliation. But the games being played by various political forces persist. In May 2018, during Iraq’s parliamentary elections, the ‘Saairun Coalition’, consisting of the Sadrist Movement led by nationalist Shiite religious figure Muqtada al-Sadr, the leftist Iraqi Communist Party, and others, won 54 seats out of 329, surpassing all other competing alliances. Since then, with each political faction undergoing a difficult restructure, the formation of a new government is essentially complete. The weak government will face the formidable task of advancing reconstruction under the checks and balances of each of these factions. Looking at the course of over ten years of post-war reconstruction in Iraq, we see a period woven with contradictory relationships between religion and ethnicity, between national sovereignty and external interference. The complex and cyclical nature of this period has surpassed the international community’s expectations prior to the Iraq War, with the reconstruction process experiencing twists and turns, as well as relapses. 1. Division of political forces and the checks and balances among factions Since the political reconstruction of Iraq, the country has essentially formed a political structure with Shia leaders in charge of the parliament, Kurds assuming the role of president, and Sunnis figures as parliamentary speakers. However, with the lack of tolerance between these three main political forces, it has been difficult to reach consensus. Meanwhile, after splitting apart and re-forming, the various Shiite factions once more hold the balance of power between them. After the 2018 parliamentary election, the fierce games of the various Shiite political forces in Iraq finally resulted in five major political factions being formed—the ‘Sadrist Movement’ led by Muqtada al-Sadr, the ‘Badr Organization’ led by Hadi al-Amiri, the ‘Victory Alliance’ established by then Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, the ‘State of Law Coalition’ led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the ‘Hikma Movement’ (also called the National Wisdom Movement) established by Ammar al-Hakim of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. On the issue of forming a government, each faction aimed to expand its own power within parliament, not willing to concede or accept the leadership of other political alliances. At present, a state of balance has emerged in the Iraqi government between two main Shiite camps—the Saairun Coalition led by Sadr and the Conquest Alliance with Hadi al-Amari at its center. To achieve a delicate balance between each side, the politically independent Adil Abdul-Mahdi was finally nominated to be Prime Minister and form a government. Today, Iraq is yet to form a strong central government, and many reconstruction policies could be blocked by the various interest groups. 2. Failure to carry out economic reconstruction, and prominent quality of life issues Following the defeat of the ‘Islamic State’, quality of life issues have become the main problem facing the Iraqi government in post-war reconstruction. From 2014 to 2017, the ‘Islamic State’ attacked cities and took hold of territory, causing varying degrees of damage to infrastructure including Iraqi oil pipelines. In 2016, Iraq had a gross national product (GNP) of US$170.6 billion, still below its 1990 level of US$179.9 billion. Due to a lack of security, foreign businesspeople have left the country in droves. The gap in funding needed for Iraq’s reconstruction is huge, with reconstruction funds currently obtained by Iraq accounting for less than 2% of those needed, severely impacting the country’s economic reconstruction. The damage to the economic and social ecology wrought by the perennial chaos of war has resulted in many difficulties for Iraq’s post-war reconstruction. Due to the lag in economic reconstruction, quality of life issues have become all the more prominent for Iraq’s people. In early September 2018, the worst protests of recent years broke out in Basra, a population center for Shias in southern Iraq, as well as other cities. Protests broke out due to the poor state of public services (including power cuts and contamination of running water), unemployment, and other issues, during which angry demonstrators hit government office buildings directly, an expression of the intensifying crisis of public trust toward the government. In fact, in the many post-war years, neither the Maliki government nor the Abadi government has been able to effectively resolve and respond to these quality of life issues during reconstruction. To consolidate their own power, they have spent considerable energy on political wrestling matches with Sunni political forces and other political camps. In addition, the decreasing value of oil, reduced incomes and the high cost of fighting a war with the ‘Islamic State’ have exacerbated the government’s budgetary deficit. All of these have left the Iraqi government with no way to satisfy the people’s demands for economic recovery and improving quality of life, leading to a reduction in the faith of the people towards their government and a loss of national unity. 3. Lagging security reconstruction and continuing social unrest The continuing social unrest since reconstruction began shows that Iraq still lacks a strong security force to achieve reconstruction in the area of security. On one hand, remnant forces of the ‘Islamic State’ are still capable of launching localized terrorist attacks, posing a threat to Iraqi security. Although the ‘Islamic State’ extremist group as an entity has been defeated as of the end of 2017, there are still countless remnant forces operating in the border regions between Iraq and Syria. In early 2019, terrorists conducted a car bomb attack in the Syria-Iraq border region, resulting in dozens of casualties. Iraq’s security situation remains gloomy. At present, a unified and effective political order has not yet been established in Iraq, with remnant forces and extremist ideologies still posing a threat to Iraq’s national security. Working to achieve reconciliation between the various factions, eliminating breeding grounds for terrorist organizations, and cracking down on forces of religious extremism are still the main tasks for Iraqi reconstruction. On the other hand, government forces have had difficulty controlling the various armed factions, and the army’s unity and effectiveness in combat have weakened further, posing challenges to the government’s ability to ensure national security. In 2014, due to the rapid expansion of the ‘Islamic State’ extremist group, and the fact that the Iraqi government forces could not independently turn the crisis around, Iraqi religious leader Ali al-Sistani called on all forces to fight together against the ‘Islamic State’. In response, Shiite militia groups, Sunni armed forces, and other ethnic minority groups such as Yazidis and Turkmens formed interdenominational, interethnic armed groups, such as the ‘Popular Mobilization Forces’ (PMF), which arose as needed and expanded further in the course of fighting the ‘Islamic State’. However, after the destruction of the ‘Islamic State’, the armed forces of the PMF remained, their factions set against one another yet not controlled by government forces, and with internal divisions becoming increasingly apparent. The PMF has constituted a relatively independent armed force, contending to an extent with security forces. The Iraq’s central government has now passed a law which brings the PMF into its own security forces, recognizing the PMF as a legal armed entity. However, the PMF has refused to give up its weapons, and has insisted on using its uniform and flag. In light of this, how can government forces be strengthened? How can the various armed factions be integrated and controlled? How can local security be maintained? Difficult questions still face the current government. 4. Ethnic and denominational barriers, and unrealized social integration Since national reconstruction began, on the one hand, while Iraqi nationalism and Islamic ideology have been intertwined, they have not formed into a unified political consensus. On the other hand, sectarian and ethnic identities have grown stronger, exacerbating divisions between populations, affecting the ability of refugees to return home, and affecting social integration. Since the 2018 parliamentary election, due to clear differences in political positions among the Shias controlling the parliament, mainstream values among the people have become similarly divided. The political forces led by Sadr have emphasized nationalist ideology, opposed external interference, and won the approval of many people. The influence of Islamic authoritarianism, with Sistani as its representative, has grown. Other Shia leaders have publicly expressed their allegiance to Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei, claiming to be in pursuit of a Khomeini-style model of government. As some scholars have said, in the building of Middle Eastern nation-states, Arab nations suffer the most from dual identity. Islamic ideology naturally builds ties on the basis of religion between culture, society and national politics. Meanwhile, in the eyes of Arab nationalists, culture and language are the pillars of political identity—in state, society and citizenship. As a result, Arab nationalism is seen as a secular ideology. Since Iraqi reconstruction began, these two identities have been intertwined. Especially since the Iraqi constitution explicitly defined Iraq as an Islamic country, and Islam as the state religion, the influence of Islam on the nation’s identity has grown continually stronger. Because of this, “Religious ideology has had widespread influence via political Islam and other forms, directly influencing the ideology of the Iraqi people.” In addition, sectarian and ethnic tensions have to some extent affected the return of Iraqi refugees. The ‘Islamic State’ has deliberately incited sectarian conflicts, attacking Shia civilians and ethnic minorities. These actions have led to division and antagonism towards others on the basis of personal identity , and a deepening of the fissures between people of differing denominations and ethnicities. In 2014, ‘Islamic State’ terrorists attacked northern Iraq, causing tens of thousands of Yazidis in the Mount Sinjar region to leave their homes. The hatred between Sunni Arabs and Yazidis, as well as some Christians, sparked by the mass killings of the ‘Islamic State’ is something that will be difficult to heal in a short period of time. Some Sunni refugees returning to their homes worry that they may face retaliation, with ethnic conflicts remaining one of the main obstacles to returning refugees. According to statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of April 30, 2018, approximately 2.1 million Iraqis had been displaced. In summary, since post-war reconstruction began in 2003, despite the efforts of each Iraqi government to promote the national reconstruction process, the country has struggled to make progress. Looking at the four areas of political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, security reconstruction and social reconstruction, in no area have the anticipated results been achieved. Facing political disorder, economic downturn, poor life circumstances, a worrying security situation, sectarian tensions and other predicaments, national reconstruction has a long road ahead. The roots of Iraq’s national reconstruction predicament Iraq’s post-war reconstruction has faced long-term difficulties, such as the effects of foreign interference and intervention, as well as causes stemming from the course of Iraq’s own history and society. The interaction of these two factors has affected the progress of post-war reconstruction in Iraq. 1. Inconsistencies between U.S.-led reconstruction and Iraq’s national interest, and the damage to the foundations of reconstruction Generally speaking, a country’s reconstruction is accomplished primarily under its own leadership. However, there are countries whose reconstruction can also be accomplished under foreign intervention, eventually constructing a political system initiated alongside the intervening country. With the Iraq War in 2003, the United States completely destroyed the regime of Saddam Hussein and the mechanisms of his rule, meaning that the foundation of Iraqi reconstruction—the position of leadership in reconstruction that its government should have held—no longer existed. Therefore, the United States led the post-war reconstruction of the Iraqi regime, its military security, its economic recovery and other areas, according to its own interests. In reality, U.S.-led reconstruction was not consistent with Iraq’s national interests, and this is the root cause of Iraqi reconstruction’s descent into chaos and turmoil. Firstly, the early period of Iraqi reconstruction displayed clear signs of external leadership, with ‘foreign intervention reconstruction’ creating persistent negative effects for Iraqi reconstruction. From the beginning of reconstruction in 2003 until the end of 2005, prior to the emergence of the Iraqi government, Iraq existed in a state of anarchy, becoming a country temporarily deficient in authority. It was under these circumstances that Iraq was forced to accept the ‘intervention reconstruction’ carried out by the United States on its territory. In May 2005, the United States established the Coalition Provisional Authority, with Paul Bremer as its administrator, to manage all post-war reconstruction in Iraq. However, the U.S. personnel appointed to carry out reconstruction tasks in Iraq did not have a sufficient understanding of the local situation and made a series of policy errors. Of those working for the Coalition Provisional Authority, only one official understood Arabic, overlooking the complexity of the local culture, history and society. Many of the measures implemented by U.S. officials in Iraq were not conducive to the development of Iraq’s post-war reconstruction. Afterwards, the Iraqi regime established according to the United States’ proposals did not sufficiently take into account the actual conditions of Iraq’s history, culture and social structure. This had a negative impact on the construction of a unified, multi-ethnic Iraq. Currently, Iraq’s political model reconstructed under the United States is a ‘cooperative democracy’ with power-sharing at its core, however this political model presupposes the foundation of a unified nation-state identity and a mature civil society, things that Iraq presently lacks. Furthermore, under the direction of the United States, the permanent constitution established by Iraq after the invasion affirmed a state of further separation, with a tripartite of Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish forces. It also expanded the autonomy of the Kurdistan Regional Government, making the separation of Kurds in Iraq more apparent, and further weakening the authority of the central government. Secondly, the U.S.’s ‘de-Ba’athification’ policy sparked sectarian conflicts. The de-Ba’athification plan ultimately evolved into anti-Sunni measures, causing extreme dissatisfaction among Sunni officials and soldiers. As it turns out, the initial model of haphazardly separating political factions along denominational lines caused an ardent transformation of individual political participation into personal religious identity, and from this arose intense sectarian antagonism. In other words, the reconstruction policies formulated by the United States not only failed to advance religious and ethnic reconciliation, they also exacerbated divisions within the Iraqi government, affecting the reintegration of Iraqi society. Furthermore, the dissolution of the military, primarily composed of Ba’ath Party members, was a serious detriment to Iraq’s security reconstruction. On one hand, the new government’s hastily formed army lacked skill in combat. Unable to operate effectively in such a short period of time, they were forced to rely on the limited occupying forces of the United States. However, with the military forces of the Americans insufficient, they were unable to contain the violence happening inside Iraq. On the other hand, many of the dismissed military personnel of the Ba’ath Party, unable to find work, once again took up arms and sought revenge. This damaged social stability and heightened the difficulties of security reconstruction. Thirdly, the beginning of Iraq’s economic reconstruction was subject to U.S. arrangement, with no fundamental guarantee that this would be done according to Iraq’s national economic interests. On one hand, Iraq’s parliament was forced to pass an oil bill which the United States was involved in drafting, nominally for the fair distribution of oil earnings. In reality, however, it was a legal guarantee that U.S. oil companies would control Iraq’s oil supply, and fundamentally destroyed the basis of Iraq’s economy. On the other hand, funds allocated for reconstruction have been misappropriated, causing delays. The economic life of Iraq has failed to resume promptly, with no guarantees for the basic livelihoods of its people. Although at the beginning of reconstruction the United States Congress allocated US$18.4 billion for Iraq’s economic reconstruction, this sum was largely used for the purchase of Pentagon office supplies and for the construction of U.S. military bases in Iraq. Evidently, that there was no way that U.S.-led economic reconstruction could achieve the autonomous development of Iraq’s oil industry. It is precisely because of the lack of Iraqi control at the beginning of reconstruction that the United States’ arrangement of Iraq’s post-war systems laid the groundwork for religious and ethnic power-scrambles, and was not conducive to the establishment of a strong government in post-war Iraq. Some American think tanks have suggested that the division of the Middle East into several smaller units, causing them to wage war against one another, benefits American control of the Middle East. Although the United States gradually transferred control to the Iraqi government, the U.S. exerted significant influence in the formation and re-election of the Maliki government. Thus it can be seen that the direct intervention of the United States damaged the foundations of Iraq’s reconstruction. 2. A lack of government authority and the severe hindrance to Iraqi political reconstruction Political authority is the foundation of a country’s rule and is also a prerequisite for the construction of a modern nation-state in Iraq. With regards to Iraq’s post-war reconstruction, division and mutual obstruction among primary political forces is the main factor affecting the formation of political authority. If a government lacks sufficient political authority, it cannot obtain the trust of the people, and many policies will therefore have no way to be effectively implemented. In addition, the political structure established in post-war Iraq, as well as the ethnically and denominationally pluralistic social structure, has restricted the reconstruction of political authority. Firstly, using sects and ethnicities as the basis of its political structure has weakened the formation of political authority in Iraq. Iraq’s federalism was established under the impetus of the United States. However, there are two sides to the federalist coin. While federalism has been successful in the aspects of inclusion and autonomy, it has also encouraged the division of ethnic minorities. Under federalism, Iraqi history’s long-standing Kurdish issues have sparked into separatism. Federalism has expanded the autonomy of the Kurdistan Regional Government, providing space for the independence of Iraqi Kurds. For Iraq, with its complex denominational and ethnic relations, a federalist government lacks definite political authority, posing grave challenges for a post-war democratic system. Therefore, the interplay between this transplanted political system and pluralistic social structure has restricted the reconstruction of political authority. After 2006, Iraq’s Shias took control of the parliament thanks to the support of the United States and demographic advantages. A system of government divided along the lines of denomination and ethnicity seemed to achieve a fair distribution of power, but antagonism between Shias and Sunnis has exacerbated struggles for power between each group, and is not conducive to the reconstruction of national political authority. In fact, before the U.S. toppled of the regime of Saddam Hussein, sectarian conflict was not a prominent issue in Iraq, with Shias and Sunnis able to coexist peacefully. After the invasion of Iraq, the interests of denominations were directly converted into political party interests, forming parties along the lines of denomination, and weakening Iraq’s political authority and the legitimacy of its government. Secondly, the lack of effective governance in Iraq is not conducive to the rebuilding of political authority. In the early period of Iraqi reconstruction, most of the predominantly Shiite government officials had just returned from exile. Their insufficient experience in running a country, in addition to corruption issues within the government and army, damaged the government’s credibility in the minds of the people. Furthermore, the Maliki government was not able to effectively unite the political factions of the Sunnis, Kurds, and other minorities, affecting reconstruction of the government’s public authority. After the withdrawal of the U.S. military at the end of 2011, the Maliki government spared no effort to solidify the dominant position of Shias in the regime, adopting exclusionary policies in the distribution of power and oil riches and using force to suppress Sunni Muslims, exacerbating sectarian conflict in Iraq. Divisions between the two sects have since spread to all levels of society and the military. There are also serious divisions and a lack of unity within the Shia regime itself. The earlier Dawa Party has split into two major political factions, with former Prime Ministers Abadi and Maliki as their leaders. Especially after the 2018 general election, the major political parties have been extremely divided on the issue of cabinet formation. From this, it can be seen that the divisions within the Shiite coalition will hinder the reconstruction of its political authority. 3. The weakening of national identity as an impediment to the reconstruction of a modern Iraqi nation-state The lack of unity among the people of post-war Iraq, with national identity weakened by a political structure divided along religious and ethnic lines, is in reality a deconstruction of the national identity established during the time of the Ba’ath Party. In addition, the Shiite government in control of the parliament lacks sufficient capability to govern, while political authority has failed to take shape and psychologically the people lack trust and identification with their country. Traditionally, national identity among the people of Iraq has been relatively weak. Anthony D. Smith has suggested that although some Asian countries began the process of ‘nation-building’ after World War I, because these states had an intrinsically ‘ethnic’ model, this manifested primarily as an identification with blood relations and pedigrees that surpassed identification with the country, in which people’s identification with the culture and traditions of clans outstripped the law. Such identity had great appeal and impetus and was not conducive to national integration and the construction of a modern nation-state. Historically, Iraq was at first artificially composed of the three provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The arrangement of its political districts and its principal inhabitants were disconnected from the central and southern regions, its social makeup was a traditional system of commingling tribes, its society was decentralized, and its people lacked overall unity. Additionally, Shiite Arabs located in southern Iraq advocated Pan-Islamism, the main population of central Iraq was Sunni Arabs who adhered to Arab nationalism , while the Kurds of northern Iraq had long held autonomy. These factors had a significant negative impact on the reconstruction of a political identity in post-war Iraq. After the invasion of Iraq, the country formed a political identity divided along religious and ethnic lines, which was not conducive to the formation of a sense of citizenhood and national identity necessary for the transformation of post-war Iraq into a modern nation-state. The deconstruction of social culture by external forces after the invasion was a further detriment to the rebuilding of a national identity. On one hand, the division of power established in Iraq’s post-war political structure strengthened the ethnic and religious identities of the populace, solidified their personal identities, and split the social structure further. National identity stems from the legitimacy of the government, while the basis of its legitimacy lies in broad representation and fairness in the handling of national affairs. Divisions among Sunnis, Shias, and the various Shiite political forces are apparent, with these forces even countering one another. Meanwhile, the people’s lack of faith in public authority is severely eroding unity and political identity. In elections, differences in religious and ethnic identity are exploited by the political elite, with each political faction artificially strengthening people’s religious and ethnic identities in order to win more votes. On the other hand, the weakening of national identity among the Iraqi people has been impacted by the lack of post-war political authority. From 2006 to 2007, violent conflict in Iraq escalated, with its frail government both unable to safeguard the domestic order and unable to guarantee the basic survival needs of the people. Under these conditions, many people began seeking protection from their religious affiliations, with some even joining sectarian armed forces. As a result, the phenomenon of religious sects as political identity was further strengthened. 4. The direct threat of spreading extremism and terrorism to the reconstruction process While the United States initiated the Iraq War to break the political order under Saddam’s rule, they failed to build a new political order that could balance the interests of all parties, eventually leading to the rise of the extremist organization known as the ‘Islamic State’. The rapid spread of terrorism and the extremist ideologies that ensued not only severely impacted Iraq’s social order, but also seriously threatened the construction of Iraq’s political system. The development of the ‘Islamic State’ in Iraq was the result of interactions between many internal and external factors. On one hand, the United States’ occupation of Iraq and the destruction of Iraq’s post-war political and social ecology provided the soil which allowed ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’ to take root. In fact, as the reconstruction of Iraq’s political order encountered serious setbacks, facing interference from major powers, Islamic extremist tendencies began to emerge. When the United States first led reconstruction after the invasion of Iraq, the political influence of the Sunnis suddenly decreased. With no way to confront this change directly, some tried to end the U.S. military occupation by violent means, and these people became targets for recruitment by terrorist organizations. On the other hand, the upheaval of the Arab world from the end of 2010 meant that the turbulent situation in the Middle East continued, while Al-Qaeda extremists began spreading into Iraq. It was in this context that the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ emerged. In addition, conflicts intensified between factions inside Iraq swept up by extremist ideologies, and terrorist attacks continued. In 2014, the presence of the ‘Islamic State’ grew rapidly and had a devastating impact on the reconstruction of Iraq’s post-war order. This can be seen in the following: Firstly, the ‘Islamic State’ swiftly emerged to obstruct the process of Iraq’s national reconstruction. Since 2014, extremist organizations have sieged, captured and controlled major cities such as Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah, occupying close to a third of Iraq’s territory. After spreading its influence across Iraq, the ‘Islamic State’ even sought to establish a ‘caliphate’ with no separation between state and religion. By the beginning of 2015, the ‘Islamic State’ had already begun to display the structure of a state, with the provinces under its actual control governed in the manner of a state, for a time threatening the survival of the Iraqi regime. It could be said that the emergence of the ‘Islamic State’ was the greatest challenge facing the Iraqi government in post-war reconstruction, causing Iraqi reconstruction to come to a standstill and even regress. Secondly, the proposal of the ‘Islamic State’ to rebuild the so-called ‘caliphate’ posed a challenge to the reconstruction of the Iraqi national system. The ‘Islamic State’ did not recognize national borders, believing in the ideology of ‘jihadist-Salafism’, that is, the toppling of current regimes by way of ‘jihad’ and other violent means in an attempt to establish a global Islamic empire. This was a serious threat to Iraq’s political order and the reconstruction of a modern national system. As some scholars have said, the spread of secularity and legal systems are markers of the political framework of a modern nation-state. A return to traditional Islamic political culture would be an obstacle to the modernization and democratization of contemporary Islamic countries, and could also hinder the process of constructing a modern Iraqi nation-state. Therefore, a lack of ideology and the weakening of national identity have affected the unity of the country and restrict Iraq’s national reconstruction. Thirdly, the spread of the extremist ideology of the ‘Islamic State’ has hindered the construction of a unified ideology in post-war Iraq, and is not conducive to the reestablishment of Iraqi nationalism. Even if the ‘Islamic State’ has now been defeated, “As long as the soil for Islamic extremism still exists, such extremist forces will not be rooted out.” 5. The impact of geopolitical games and the involvement of regional countries on the process and direction of Iraqi reconstruction In terms of geopolitics, oil-rich Iraq, located in the heart of the Middle East, holds significant strategic value for major powers. In addition, the contraction of U.S. strategic presence in the Middle East has prompted regional powers to step up the pace of their involvement and rivalry in Iraq. Particularly over the past two years, the struggle for dominance between the major powers of the Middle East has seeped into the national reconstruction of Iraq. A geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over sectarian divisions has made it difficult for some countries undergoing reconstruction to avoid being drawn in. At present, Iran’s influence in Iraq has spread into many areas including its politics, military and trade. On the political front, the Badr Organization lead by Hadi al-Amiri has gained significant support from Iran. In 2018, during the formation of Iraq’s parliamentary cabinet, they formed the Conquest Alliance, becoming the second-largest political force in Iraq. On the military front, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iran provided support to Iraq’s Shiite militias. From 2014 to 2017, as Iraq struck blows against the ‘Islamic State’, military cooperation between Iraq and Iran grew even stronger. On the economic front, Iranian influence over Iraq increases daily. Statistics show that every year Iran exports over US$6 billion worth of commodities to Iraq, including food products, construction materials and consumer goods, and has become Iraq’s third-largest source of imports. In recent years, cooperation on oil between the two countries has grown continually stronger, and at the end of 2017 Iran and Iraq signed an oil swap agreement of 60,000 barrels per day. Meanwhile, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq have gradually settled in recent years. Interactions between Saudi Arabia and Iraq have also balanced Iran’s influence in Iraq. Because Iraq’s economic reconstruction urgently requires massive investment, since 2017 Saudi Arabia has carried out ‘checkbook diplomacy’ visits between the two countries. In February 2018, at an international donor conference for the reconstruction of Iraq, Saudi Arabia pledged to provide more financial support. The two countries also formed a coordination committee to discuss the expansion of bilateral trade and exchange. Aside from strengthening economic cooperation with Iraq, Saudi Arabia declared during Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections that it would provide financial and diplomatic support to non-Shiite and nationalist candidates. As some scholars have pointed out, behind the sectarian conflict in Iraq is an ideological split in the Middle East, as well as the games being played between the various political and religious forces inside and outside of the country, with each party vying for dominance over the politics of the region and over religious culture. From this it can be seen that it is difficult for Iraqi reconstruction to avoid the impacts of the geopolitics and power struggles of countries in the region. At present the Shiite Crescent, with Iran at its center, is gradually expanding, with a Shiite regime regaining dominance in Iraq. As a result, contention between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Iraq has increased, affecting to an extent the process and direction of Iraqi reconstruction. The way out for Iraq’s national reconstruction The political structure and anti-Ba’ath policies first established under the direction of the United States caused a surge in sectarian and ethnic conflicts and exacerbated social divisions. In addition, a lack of effective governance from the Iraqi government, as well as lagging economic and security reconstruction, has hindered the rebuilding of the Iraqi government’s political authority. How to break free of this predicament and hasten the reconstruction process is a question the Iraqi regime urgently needs to solve. At the beginning of 2018, the Iraqi government published its Reconstruction and Development Framework, which covered such areas as governance, political reconciliation and creating order, economic and social development, and the building of infrastructure as priority issues for reconstruction. The framework provides a roadmap to strengthening recovery efforts and the capability of the government. In reality, the reconstruction of Iraq lies firstly in achieving compromise between its current political factions, enhancing the capability of the government, strengthening the people’s trust and identification with their country, and promoting a path of autonomous reconstruction while effectively handling relations with neighboring countries. 1. Balancing the relations between major powers inside and outside the region, and taking the road of autonomous reconstruction From an international perspective, as a sovereign state Iraq must, in the course of reconstruction, not only create balance between the major powers in and outside of the region, but also depend on the force of its own strength. Firstly, the United States, out of strategic interests in containing Iraq, does not want Iraq’s Shiite government to grow too strong, and furthermore does not want other major powers approaching Iraq. In fact, the United States is wary of other major powers becoming involved in Iraq’s affairs, not wanting them to compete with the United States for influence in Iraq or participate in Iraq’s economic reconstruction. In February 2018, as Iraq’s then foreign minister expressed interest in purchasing the Russia’s ‘S-400’ surface-to-air missile defense system, the U.S. issued a warning to Iraq on the basis of the 2017 Sanctions Act. Thus it can be seen that the United States has used military and economic intervention to create obstacles for Iraq’s autonomous reconstruction. In 2014, when Iraq’s security forces faced the threat of the ‘Islamic State’, they were forced to rely on external forces, particularly the security assistance of the United States. This reconstruction strategy, which relies on the security of external forces, is difficult to sustain and cannot ensure autonomous reconstruction. At present, although the United States’ influence in Iraq has been reduced, nearly 5,000 United States intelligence personnel, military advisors and special task force members are still carrying out operations to eliminate ‘Islamic State’ military strongholds near Iraq’s borders, meaning the impact on Iraq’s security reconstruction has remained. Secondly, doing everything possible to reduce the influence of the United States in Iraqi reconstruction will increase the capacity for autonomous reconstruction. Since 2018, in keeping with the ever-increasing strategic pressure placed on Iran by the United States, the U.S. government has devoted itself to forming the so-called ‘Middle East Strategic Alliance’ to combat Iran’s expansion in the region. As a result, Iraq has become a target for the United States as it attempts to draw the country over to its side, further increasing its influence over Iraqi reconstruction. On December 26, 2018, after making a surprise visit to Iraq’s Al Asad Airbase, where U.S. troops were stationed, President Donald Trump suggested using the base to monitor Iran. Iraqi President Barham Salih responded immediately, emphasizing that under the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement the United States had already agreed not to use Iraq as an intermediate point for attacks on other countries. Consequently, the Iraqi government has not permitted the United States to monitor Iran from Iraqi bases. The Iraqi government’s response caused a great degree of concern for the United States. On March 6, 2019, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi held consultations on the legal status of U.S. troops in Iraq. Both sides agreed that the only task of the U.S. military in Iraq was to combat the ‘Islamic State’ and train Iraqi troops. This move indicates that the Iraqi government is actively responding to United States influence over Iraqi reconstruction and is striving to weaken U.S. influence in the country in order to achieve autonomous reconstruction. At the same time, with the escalation of U.S. sanctions against Iran, the United States is exerting further pressure on Iraq, demanding that it end its natural gas and electricity imports from Iran. This will be a severe restriction on Iraq’s economic reconstruction. Facing the demands of the United States, the Iraqi government still insists on cooperating with Iran. It could be said that the new Iraqi government has shifted from passively accepting U.S. intervention in its post-war reconstruction to actively responding to it, not willing to submit to the United States or sacrifice its economic interests and thereby affect national reconstruction. Therefore, while Iraq is working to break free of its reliance on the United States and other external forces, it must still depend on the development of economic ties with major powers in the region. Only by offsetting U.S. interference in Iraqi reconstruction can Iraq gradually strengthen its role as the leader of its own reconstruction. 2. Promoting compromise between political factions, improving governance and rebuilding political authority Political reconstruction is the foundation of Iraq’s post-war reconstruction, the essence of which lies in building a government that has the conviction of the people and governs effectively. Firstly, achieving religious reconciliation, improving governance, and improving the government’s public credibility are key to rebuilding political authority. On one hand, building a conciliatory government without factional disputes or external interference is a necessary direction for Iraq’s political reconstruction. On the other hand, improving governance and fighting corruption is a fundamental prerequisite for strengthening the people’s faith in government. On October 25, 2018, a new government was formed, and the newly appointed Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi gained the support of the two major Shiite political coalitions. He was ideologically flexible, having good relations with each political party and denomination at home, and with both Iran and the United States abroad. Therefore Abdul-Mahdi will do all he can to balance the demands of the various political factions in order to create the conditions for reconciliation between them. As the new government was being formed, in order to prevent sectarian interests from transforming into divisions along party lines, al-Sadr asked that independent candidates fill vacant positions in the government, rather than candidates belonging to a party. He aimed to create a government of experts that would avoid factional disputes and external interference. This would allow the government to play a leading role in the reconstruction of its economy and security, and to provide the public services necessary for post-war reconstruction. Of course, to truly achieve equitable distribution of power and resources among the various factions will require yet more time. Secondly, rebuilding security is an effective guarantee to improve governance, check corruption, and rebuild the government’s authority. The key to security reconstruction is reintegrating the various military forces, particularly the Shiite militias. Effectively resolving the sectarian divisions and corruption of military officials in the government army could not only strengthen the force and unity of the military, helping to achieve security reconstruction, but could also provide a safe environment for economic reconstruction. This would actively attract foreign investment, and would also strengthen the Iraqi government’s capacity for autonomous reconstruction and ensure that the lives of its people are not subjected to security threats. Thirdly, the fair and equitable distribution of resources is conducive to the rebuilding of political authority. Going forward, economic reconstruction will become the focus of the Iraqi government’s work. The ‘Islamic State’ destroyed a great deal of infrastructure, and the government urgently needs funds to carry out reconstruction. As Iraq’s oil production increases, the government is allocating the revenue according to the overall national interest, with an emphasis on rebuilding infrastructure such as bridges, houses and electricity. It is also focused on ensuring that the distribution of wealth from oil balances the interests of all parties. In 2018, at the International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq, those attending pledged a total of roughly US$30 billion, of which US$26 billion was committed primarily toward investment and the expansion of credit lines. In truth, as Iraq gains support from the World Bank, the Gulf countries, and others, it must also strengthen its own ‘potential-tapping’ capacity, advancing the development of the oil industry and non-energy industries. This will provide a host of employment opportunities, effectively resolve problems preventing people from making their livelihoods, and promote the recovery of economic and social development, thus creating conditions that will strengthen the trust of the people in their government. 3. Establishing an identity of citizenhood and promoting national identity Constructing a national identity that goes beyond sectarian and ethnic identities is a long-term process and a problem which must be faced in the course of Iraq’s reconstruction. National identity in Iraq has waxed and waned over time. Under Saddam Hussein, most people self-identified as Iraqi. However, following the invasion of Iraq, due to the long-term social turmoil brought on by sectarian conflict, the public lacked a sense of security and national identity began to weaken. This was particularly so in villages, as identification with traditional families, tribes and religious denominations among ordinary people grew more apparent. Relatively speaking, Western nation-states are conceptual in nature, and supported by nationalist ideology. Unlike Western nationalist countries, Iraq is built on the shared links of family, denomination and ethnicity. To build a modern nation-state in post-war Iraq requires the building of a modern identity based on citizenhood. This means that if the Iraqi government wants to strengthen the people’s sense of citizenhood and state, at the social level it must fully respect the Islamic identity of the majority and the religious beliefs of minority groups, while also using nationalism to bring public sentiment together, creating a modern identity of citizenhood. Overall, the road Iraq must follow to build a modern nation is to form a national identity that goes beyond religious sects, on a foundation of maintaining the existing religious and ethnic identities of the people. 4. Playing the principal role in reconstruction and promoting neighboring countries to participate The way out for Iraq’s post-war reconstruction lies in playing the principal role in reconstruction and keeping relations with neighboring countries in balance. This will create a peaceful security environment around the country and promote participation from regional countries in Iraq’s economic reconstruction. Firstly, actively working toward balance in Iraq’s diplomatic relations will assist economic reconstruction. On one hand, building balanced diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will assist Iraq to play a principal role in reconstruction and safeguard its leadership in reconstruction. From March 11 to March 13, 2019, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Baghdad. This was his first visit to Iraq since assuming the presidency in 2013. Rouhani was received with high standards by Iraqi President Salih and Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi respectively. Iran and Iraq signed a series of agreements on energy, shipping, agriculture and industry, including the construction of a rail line linking the cities of the two countries. This cooperation is expected to increase bilateral trade volume from US$13 billion at present to US$20 billion. The increase in economic exchanges between the two countries assists the economic reconstruction of post-war Iraq, and also helps Iran to withstand the high pressure of sanctions from the United States. As Iraq deepens its cooperation on trade with Iran, strengthening economic exchange with Saudi Arabia could achieve balance in diplomacy while also safeguarding Iraq’s own interests in reconstruction. In January 2016, the Iraqi government re-opened the Saudi Arabian embassy in Baghdad, after being closed for over 20 years. Later, in July 2017, Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr also met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. On March 14, 2019, Iraqi President Salih received a visiting Saudi Arabian delegation on commerce and investment. In fact, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has placed greater and greater importance on the position of Iraq in the regional strategic landscape, actively participating in Iraq’s post-war reconstruction. On the other hand, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries will assist Iraq in raising funds for economic reconstruction. In February 2018, the international donor conference held in Kuwait for Iraqi reconstruction received energetic responses and participation from neighboring countries, helping Iraq to set its reconstruction project in motion. The greatest national contributions at the reconstruction conference came from countries such as Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. Secondly, expanding security cooperation with neighboring countries is conducive to constructing a stable regional environment for Iraq. Since work on reconstruction began, Iraq has actively strengthened military cooperation with neighboring countries such as Iran, Turkey and Jordan. During Iraq’s Kurdish referendum incident, Iran and Turkey firmly supported Iraq on the Kurdish issue. Before the referendum in Iraq’s Kurdish region, Turkey and Iran each separately conducted joint military exercises with Iraq. Meanwhile, Turkey closed its border and cut the oil lines from Iraq’s Kurdish region to Turkey. With the support of Iran and Turkey, Iraq successfully halted the Iraqi Kurds’ trend toward independence, with Iran and Turkey also playing a role in promoting the return of Iraqi control to the border area. In May 2018, Iraq’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ibrahim al-Jaafari held talks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, with the two sides discussing the establishment a joint military committee in order to prevent the threat of terrorist forces in the border regions between the two countries. These examples illustrate that effectively improving Iraq’s relationships with neighboring countries and creating a positive and peaceful regional environment is conducive to the reconstruction of Iraq’s society and economy. In summary, the reconstruction of Iraq should be based on sovereign independence. By keeping relations between the major powers of the region in balance, strengthening cooperation and friendly relations with regional powers, and ensuring a secure regional environment during the reconstruction process, Iraq can then make full use of investment and assistance from neighboring countries, improving its capacity for autonomous reconstruction and achieving reconstruction objectives. Conclusions The course of Iraqi reconstruction has been long and fraught with relapses. The political structure established under the United States on the basis of religious sects and ethnicities not only failed to assist Iraq in rebuilding political authority, but also strengthened sectarian and ethnic identities and deepened divisions in Iraq’s social structure. Furthermore, power struggles between the sects have weakened the foundations of national political reconstruction. In particular, divisions within the Shia government controlling the parliament have weakened political authority. This is not conducive to strengthening Iraq’s post-war governance. Divisions within Iraq’s armed forces have also re
Chinese to English: Manufacturing's surburbanization of America before the Second World War: An exploration of the relationship between urbanization and suburbanization General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: History
Source text - Chinese 《美国研究》2020 年第1 期第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化① ———兼论美国郊区化与城市化的关系王宇翔〔内容提要〕从19 世纪中叶开始，随着生产规模的扩大、生产技术的进步和生产流程的优化，工厂对空间的需求越来越大，再加上重工业对资源、能源的需求，使得美国制造业产生了向郊区发展的动力。工业地产商的开发活动和铁路的出现也使工业在郊区的发展成为可能。在多种因素作用下，1879～1954 年间，美国郊区制造业的发展速度和新增制造业就业岗位的绝对数量都超过了中心城市，呈现出郊区化的态势。在19 世纪末20 世纪初，美国城市兼并郊区的过程中，制造业郊区化的部分成果被城市化吸收，从而促进了美国城市化在1920 年的基本实现。关键词: 美国经济制造业第二次世界大战前郊区化城市化兼并第二次世界大战结束后，由于高速公路的大量修建、小汽车的普及和产业的升级等原因，美国出现了明显的制造业郊区化和老工业基地去工业化现象，并受到学界的 ① 感谢《美国研究》编辑部老师和匿名评审专家提出修改意见，本文文责自负。本文是国家社会科学基金重大项目“20 世纪世界城市化转型研究”( 16ZDA139) 和国家社科基金青年项目“洛杉矶少数族裔的郊区化及其影响研究”( 17CSS018) 的阶段性成果，以及山西省高校哲学社会科学项目“美国城市化和郊区化关系新探及其对中国的启示”( 2019W142) 的阶段性成果。关注。在大都市区层面，对芝加哥、克利夫兰、波士顿等城市的个案研究表明，①其制造业在战后经历了显著的郊区化过程。在全国层面，老工业基地的去工业化和工业在地区间的转移，②以及工业郊区化或工业向其他地区转移后中心城市或老工业基地的转型，也是学界关注的焦点。③ 研究者把美国制造业的郊区化、分散化追溯到第二次世界大战前后，并且认为交通的改善对制造业的分散起到了重要作用，至于战前的情况则很少涉及，或者认为战前特别是1920 年之前，美国制造业经历了一个持续集中的过程，为战后制造业的分散奠定了基础。研究者普遍认为，先有城市化的集中过程，后有郊区化的分散过程，城市化和郊区化的时间分界线是美国基本实现城市化的1920 年。④ 本文从制造业和城市地域扩大的角度思考郊区化与城市化的关系，梳理第二次世界大战前美国制造业郊区化的历史进程，以期为城市化和郊区化关系的讨论增加新的视角。本文首先从理论上概括了第二次世界大战前工业郊区化的推动因素，继而通过个案和统计数据展示了战前特别是1920 年之前美国制造业郊区化的进程，最后从制造业的角度重新思考城市化和郊区化的关系。 ·142· 美国研究 ① ② ③ ④ Martin Ｒeinemann，“The Pattern and Distribution of Manufacturing in the Chicago Area，”Economic Geography， Vol． 36，No． 2，( Apr．，1960) ，pp．139～ 144; Carol Simon，“Analysis of Manufacturer Location and Ｒelocation in the Cleveland Metropolitan Area: 1966～ 1971，”The American Economist，Vol． 24，No． 2，( Fall，1980) ，pp．35～ 42; Gerald Manners，“Decentralization in Metropolitan Boston，”Geography，Vol． 45，No． 4，( Nov．，1960) ，pp． 276～ 285．关于20 世纪40 年代美国制造业向东北部、南部、中南部和太平洋沿岸的分散和转移，参见Coleman Woodbury， ed．，The Future of Cities and Urban Ｒedevelopment( Chicago: University of Chicago Press，1953) 。关于20 世纪70、80 年代美国制造业从冰雪带向阳光带的转移，参见王旭《美国“阳光带”城市的崛起述评》，载《世界经济》，1990 年第12 期; 韩宇:《美国“冰雪带”现象成因探析》，载《世界历史》，2002 年第5 期; 孙群郎: 《美国现代城市郊区化初探》，载《世界历史》，2003 年第1 期; Jurgen Essletzbichler，“The Geography of Job Creation and Destruction in the U．S． Manufacturing Sector，1967～ 1997，”Annals of the Association of American Geographers， Vol． 94，No． 3，( Sep．，2004) ，pp．602～ 619。参见James Lincoln，“The Urban Distribution of Headquarters and Branch Plants in Manufacturing: Mechanisms of Metropolitan Dominance，”Demography，Vol． 15，No． 2，( May，1978) ，pp．213～ 222; 韩宇:《美国中西部城市的衰落及其对策》，载《东北师范大学学报》，1997 年第5 期; 王旭:《产业结构转型与区域经济复兴的个案研究》，载《史学月刊》，2003 年第7 期; 韩宇、李素英: 《波士顿产业转型研究》，载《城市问题》，2008 年第10 期; 韩宇:《战后美国东北部服务业发展研究》，载《美国研究》，2006 年第3 期; 韩宇:《战后美国老工业基地马萨诸塞经济转型研究》，载《世界历史》，2006 年第6 期; 王旭: 《美国传统工业大州“去工业化”( 1950 ～ 1990) 》，载《世界历史》，2016 年第5 期; 王旭、韩宇、苏宁:《美国制造业的两次重大调整与区域增长格局的变迁》，载《史学月刊》，2017 年第11 期; 陈恒、李文硕:《全球化时代的中心城市转型及其路径》，载《中国社会科学》，2017 年第12 期。参见王旭《美国城市史》，北京·中国社会科学出版社，2000 年版，第3、175 页; 顾朝林:《经济全球化与中国城市发展: 跨世纪中国城市发展战略研究》，北京·商务印书馆，1999 年版，第200 页; 杨艳萍:《浅析美国城郊化及其影响》，载《辽宁大学学报》，1999 年第1 期，第41 页。一对交通决定论的超越 ( 一) 交通技术决定论的出现关于制造业在第二次世界大战前不断向城市集中的历史叙述，源于德国经济学家、社会学家和文化理论家阿尔弗雷德·韦伯( Alfred Weber) 的理论。这种理论认为，影响大都市区内工业集中的主要因素是交通成本和聚集经济，①简言之，制造业区出现在中心城市是因为那里到城市市场、港口、铁路等交通枢纽的交通成本是最低的。在制造业发展之初的一段时间里，高昂的交通成本将它们限制在中心城市，这一点成为学者们的共识。与这一理论在逻辑上相洽的是交通驱动的工业分散理论。该理论认为，第二次世界大战以后，卡车和小汽车的普及极大地降低了交通成本，降低了城市制造业对铁路、港口的依赖。小汽车、卡车、高速公路以前所未有的速度将工人、商品乃至制造业本身带到了郊区。这一理论同样强调交通因素对制造业位置的重要性，是韦伯理论的自然延伸。② ( 二) 新郊区史的突破随着新郊区史研究在20 世纪90 年代的兴起，诞生于第二次世界大战之前的工人郊区( working-class suburbs) 开始成为学术研究的新热点。这类研究发现，1850 ～ 1940 年间，工人郊区曾在美国历史上普遍存在过，③其出现的原因之一是郊区存在大量制造业，制造业郊区于是进入学者们的视野。对制造业郊区的研究突破了韦伯等人的理论框架。这种突破可以概括为以下几个方面。首先，交通对于制造业郊区化的重要性毋庸置疑，但是现有的研究对不同时代交通技术的进步并未同等对待，主要强调第二次世界大战后卡车、小汽车、高速公路对制造业分散现象的影响，对19 世纪的铁路这一革命性的交通技术及其对制造业位置的影响则很少关注。实际上，19 世纪的铁路对制造业郊区化的推动堪比后来的卡车、小汽车和高速公路。所不同的是，1 9 世纪的铁路主要由私人资本进行投资，而20 世纪的高速公路修建是由联邦政府牵头完成的。第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·143· ① ② ③ Carl Joachim Friedrich，ed．，Alfred Weber’s Theory of the Location of Industries ( Chicago: Chicago University Press，1929) ． Gerald Manners，“Decentralization in Metropolitan Boston，”pp．276～ 285; Pierre De Vise，“The Suburbanization of Jobs and Minority Employment，”Economic Geography，Vol． 2，No． 4，( Oct．，1976) ，pp．348～ 362; Carol Simon，“ Analysis of Manufacturer Location and Ｒelocation in the Cleveland Metropolitan Area: 1966～ 1971，”pp．35 ～ 42．王旭、王宇翔:《美国的新郊区史研究及其对芝加哥学派的超越》，载《史学理论研究》，2016 年第3 期，第49 ～ 51 页。其次，交通成本固然是企业要考虑的重要因素，但传统理论认为企业为降低交通成本往往选择市中心，以靠近市场、交通枢纽和劳动力，这种观点给人以一叶障目之感。在工业化开始之前，制造业和手工生产的确集中在城市中心和滨水区域，然而，随着工业化的进行、新的生产技术和更专业的劳动分工的出现，以及工作场所规模的扩大，手工生产逐渐被机器生产所取代，制造业开始从手工生产转变为机器生产，这就带来了建造新工厂的需要。在这个过程中，许多新工厂建在了城市的边缘地带，因为工业化绝不仅仅意味着交通成本的最小化，其本质是新的生产技术取代旧的生产技术，以及新的生产组织方式不断取代旧的生产组织方式。生产技术的进步和生产组织方式的改进，可能会使新产品的价格比旧产品的成本还要低。总之，生产过程的标准化、合理化、机械化和自动化，是工业革命以来现代企业得以发展的关键。在工业化进程中，相比于生产技术的进步和新的生产组织方式的运用，降低交通成本只是一个次要的问题。① 制造业的分散从根本上来说，是工业化的内在需求。在工业化进程中，会不断出现新的生产和就业中心，推动城市向郊区发展。工业投资是波浪式起伏的，每次投资浪潮都会催生新的产业，造就新的就业中心。多次投资浪潮叠加的结果是在城市中形成了许多工业中心，而不会是仅有中心城市这一个中心。② 更何况，随着铁路在19 世纪的出现，就交通的便利性而言，郊区已经可以比肩中心城市。随着生产规模的扩大以及流水线、标准化大生产的出现，制造业对空间的需求越来越大。再加上铁路带来的通达性，许多制造业在19 世纪后半叶来到郊区选址。在东部，它们为了扩大生产规模而从中心城市迁往郊区，或者作为新兴产业为了靠近资源和能源产地而诞生在郊区; 在西部，它们往往直接在郊区建立大规模的分厂。再次，工业地产开发商对19 世纪美国制造业郊区化的影响巨大，但以往的研究没有充分揭示这种影响。居住性的地产开发商对人口郊区化的推动作用已经得到学界的充分关注，但工业地产开发商的作用却很少被关注。其实，这两类地产开发商秉持着同样的理念，即投资于土地，以期从土地的升值中获益。它们都推动了制造业的郊区化，而且在某些地方，工业地产开发的重要性远远超过了居住性地产开发的重要性。它们的土地开发活动加速了19 世纪制造业的郊区化，在有的地方还形成了纯工业区，类似第二次世界大战后的工业园区。同样，这些19 世纪的工业地产开发活动也是由私人资本或私人资本团体投资的，没有第二次世界大战后工业园区开发中那么多的政府色彩。 ·144· 美国研究 ① ② Ｒichard Walker and Ｒobert Lewis，“Beyond the Crabgrass Frontier: Industry and the Spread of North American Cities， 1850～ 1940，”Journal of Historical Geography，Vol．27，No．1，2001，pp．3～ 19．Ｒichard Harris and Ｒobert Lewis，“The Geography of North American Cities and Suburbs，1900 ～ 1950: A New Synthesis，”Journal of Urban History，Vol． 27，No． 3，( March，2001) ，pp．261～ 292．最后，在19 世纪末、20 世纪初，重工业的发展是美国工业化的重头戏，而重工业需要大量的原料和燃料，因而它们往往选择靠近原料和燃料产地设立工厂，以降低成本。所以，原料和燃料的地理位置对重工业的分布和位置影响很大。由于资源和能源产地往往分散在大都市区的不同地方，所以造成了重工业的分散发展。大量个案研究证实，交通技术的进步并不是制造业郊区化的决定性因素。在19 世纪中叶，巴尔的摩、多伦多、匹兹堡、旧金山等城市的制造业在空间上已经极其分散，在其城市周围形成了大量的工业郊区。当时，交通技术的革命性进步尚未出现，所以这种分散与交通技术的进步无关。巴尔的摩的市中心在1833 ～ 1860 年间减少了100 家制造业企业，其中央商务区( CBD) 所占的制造业份额从47%降到了15%。到1860 年，只有16%的制造业工人就业于中央商务区，巴尔的摩市的六个工业区中有四个不在或不靠近市中心。① 在19 世纪80 年代的多伦多，有轨电车网络尚未出现，也没有电力机车，更没有小汽车和卡车，但其工业分布已经类似于20 世纪的大都市，即劳动密集型的小企业多位于市中心，资本密集型的大企业多位于郊区。② 匹兹堡在小汽车和卡车广泛使用之前的1870～1900 年间，工业的向外发展已经使其成为一个大都市。③ 从19 世纪中期开始，旧金山的工业就开始向外扩展，在其郊区形成了就业和工人居住的中心，然后在南旧金山和东湾( East Bay) 越出了旧金山市界。湾区的半岛、奥克兰( Oakland) 、康曲柯士达( Contra Costa) 等地的制造业郊区化是在工业化带动下完成的，与交通模式的进步基本无关。④ 本文重点关注19 世纪末到第二次世界大战期间美国制造业的郊区化。在这一时期，除了交通技术的进步、工业化的内在需求、工业地产商的开发、资源和能源的分布等因素外，中心城市的劳资冲突⑤和私人资本对铁路的大量投资也是制造业郊区化的推动因素。所有这些因素结合在一起，共同发挥作用。第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·145· ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ Edward Muller and Paul Groves，“The Emergence of Industrial Districts in Mid-Nineteenth Century Baltimore，” Geographical Ｒeview，Vol． 69，No． 2，( Apr．，1979) ，pp．159～ 178． Gunter Gad，“Location Patterns of Manufacturing: Toronto in the Early 1880s，”Urban History Ｒeview，Vol． 22， No． 2，( June 1994) ，pp．113～ 138． Edward Muller，“Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh，1870～ 1920，”Journal of Historical Geography，Vol．27，No．1 ( 2001) ，pp．58～ 73．Ｒichard Walker，“Industry Builds the City: The Suburbanization of Manufacturing in the San Francisco Bay Area， 1850～ 1940，”Journal of Historical Geography，Vol．27，No．1 ( 2001) ，pp．36～ 57．中心城市强大的工会与劳工运动是推动企业向郊区迁移的一个重要因素，因为这些工会和运动经常提出增加工资、改善劳动条件等要求，并举行罢工，从而影响了企业的生产活动。参见孙群郎《美国城市郊区化研究》，北京·商务印书馆，2005 年版，第172 页。二工业化的内在需求对制造业郊区化的促进在工业化的过程中，新技术和新的生产方式不断涌现，工业基础、核心工业部门也随之不断变化，快速增长的工业部门会突然出现在新的地方，旧产业也会不时地进行重组。这种变化带来了空间上扩张的需求，改变着城市的工业地貌，使工业不断向未开发的地域扩展。下面通过几个代表性城市来展示美国制造业向郊区发展的历程。 ( 一) 芝加哥芝加哥的肉类包装业是随着工业化的发展从中心城市迁到郊区的代表性产业。美国内战期间，由于南部港口被封锁，军队的需求量大，芝加哥成为全国肉类包装业的中心。但是，空间的限制和肉类包装业带来的污染，使得该产业在芝加哥市的发展困难重重。为此，芝加哥猪肉包装协会( Chicago Pork Packers Association) 在1864 年联合九家铁路公司，在芝加哥市南边五英里处的莱克镇( Town of Lake) 建立了一个新的肉类包装中心，采用流水线的生产方式进行生产，将屠宰一头猪分成126 道工序，这是美国最早的流水线之一。① 到1877 年，莱克镇已有44 家肉类包装公司。在19 世纪70 年代，芝加哥的肉类包装业每年能加工100 万头生猪，每小时能加工500 头。由于肉类包装业的重要地位，这里被称为包装城( Packingtown) 。这种流水线生产需要足够大的平面空间，只有在土地便宜的郊区，这种生产方式才能降低成本，体现其生产效率高的优势。芝加哥市界西边的西塞罗( Cicero) 因为其便宜的地价，②也受到众多寻求横向发展的企业的青睐。1891 年，格兰特铁路机车公司( Grant Locomotive Works) 来到这里; 1902 年，西部电气公司( Western Electric) 也出现在这里，其雇员达1．5 万人。到 1922 年，西塞罗已有115 家工厂。③ 曾经与制造业保持密切联系的印刷业也从市中心向外发展。1881～1924 年间，芝加哥的中心商业区卢普区占全市印刷业的份额从 ·146· 美国研究 ① ② ③ Elaine Lewinnek，The Working Man’s Ｒeward: Chicago’s Early Suburbs and the Ｒoots of American Sprawl( New York: Oxford University Press，2014) ，pp．70～ 74．芝加哥地产商、美国住房经济学家霍默·霍伊特( Homer Hoyt) 1933 年发表的著作显示，在1905 年，卢普区南边的工业用地每平方英尺价值20 美元左右，其附近的克林顿( Clinton) 和麦迪逊( Madison) 地价为十美元一平方英尺，而在芝加哥市界西边的西塞罗( Cicero) 和第22 街，地价降到了微不足道的五美分一平方英尺。参见Homer Hoyt，One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago: 1830～ 1933( Chicago: Chicago University Press，1933) ，p．214。转引自Ｒichard Harris，“Chicago’s Other Suburbs，”p．398。 Elaine Lewinnek，The Working Man’s Ｒeward: Chicago’s Early Suburbs and the Ｒoots of American Sprawl，p．75． 83%降至33．9%，而郊区的几个印刷业中心的份额则从12%升至52．8%。① ( 二) 旧金山 19 世纪80 年代开始，旧金山的新产业先后向南、东、东北方向扩展到南旧金山、阿拉梅达县( Alameda) 的奥克兰、康曲柯士达县等地。南旧金山地区的工业化主要是从芝加哥迁来的肉类包装业带动起来的。阿拉梅达县的三大产业是食品加工业、金属加工和机器制造业、汽车业，它们都采用大规模、标准化、流水线的生产方式。另外，作为最新的产业部门，电气工业也在20 世纪10 年代来到了阿拉梅达县的奥克兰。化工产业和石化产业等新产业则奠定了康曲柯士达县在工业上的重要地位。凭借着新产业的快速发展，到1900 年，该县的工业产出已超过了阿拉梅达县。到1920 年，该县港口的吞吐量已占整个湾区的一半以上。② 在这个过程中，旧金山的工业中心不断转移。1870 年，旧金山的工业中心在市场南区( South of Market) ，到19 世纪 90 年代移到更南边的工业区。1910 年，位于东湾的阿拉梅达县的制造业就业和产值超过了旧金山市，而东湾的工业本身也在从阿拉梅达县向康曲柯士达县扩展。③ 工业中心转移的原因在于新产业不断出现在新的地方，以及旧产业不断升级重组。反观旧金山市，虽然它曾在早期的加利福尼亚州工业化进程中处于领先地位，但随着工业化的推进，进入20 世纪后，它的重要性逐渐下降。究其原因，一方面是因为新产业大部分出现在郊区，另一方面是因为市中心的老产业在新的工业时代逐渐没落了。旧金山曾经赖以立足的产业要么被新的生产技术和产品彻底取代———如四轮马车先后被铁路、小汽车、卡车取代，煤炭被石油取代，煤气被甲烷取代，煤气灯被电灯取代; 要么逐渐丧失了重要地位———如煤矿设备业、皮具制造业、木桶制造业等都走向衰落。到1919 年，旧金山只有为数不多的几个优势产业，包括印刷出版、咖啡和香料、巧克力、雪茄、手提包、船坞维修等，但这些产业没有一个是当时的新兴产业。可见，在新的技术、新的生产流程和新兴产业不断出现的过程中，在生产环节，郊区比市中心更受工业的青睐。 ( 三) 洛杉矶洛杉矶的工业中心也随着新兴产业的出现而不断转移。1919 年固特异( Goodyear) 在洛杉矶市以南建了一个大轮胎厂之后，玻璃、钢铁、汽车、化学企业的建立和第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·147· ① ② ③ Ｒobert Lewis，“Industrial Districts and Manufacturing Linkages: Chicago’s Printing Industry，1880～ 1950，”The Economic History Ｒeview，Vol． 62，No． 2，( May 2009) ，table 2．Ｒichard Walker，“Industry Builds Up the City: The Suburbanization of Manufacturing in the San Francisco Bay Area，”Journal of Historical Geography，Vol． 27，No． 1，( 2001) ，pp．36～ 57．Ｒichard Walker，“Industry Builds Up the City: The Suburbanization of Manufacturing in the San Francisco Bay Area，” pp．36～ 57．发展使得南洛杉矶地区成为新的制造业中心。这一地区靠近长滩港，所以长滩港是当时工业郊区化的方向。① 20 世纪20 年代，洛杉矶郊区的多个油田附近形成了诸多石油开采和冶炼中心。② 此后的20 世纪30 年代末和40 年代，在航空、造船、钢铁等国防工业的引领下，洛杉矶进入到一个工业投资的新阶段。这三个产业中，航空业集中在距离市中心十英里的环形地带，造船业位于洛杉矶近海的特米诺岛( Terminal Island) ，钢铁厂更是远在洛杉矶地区的东北角了。③ 在这个过程中，洛杉矶的制造业先从长滩分散到洛杉矶县中南部，最后分散到了整个大都市区。 ( 四) 匹兹堡工业化的需要和能源、自然资源的分布，也将匹兹堡的制造业带到了郊区。19 世纪60 年代，匹兹堡钢铁业的快速发展带来了对木炭以外的其他能源的需求，由此促成了煤炭资源丰富的康奈斯威利( Connellsville) 煤田的开发。到1900 年，这里的焦煤产量已占到全国的一半。从19 世纪70 年代开始，钢铁业的多个生产流程被整合到了一个工厂。由于工厂规模扩大了，匹兹堡的钢铁业选择匹兹堡市南部的郊区作为其新的中心。因为同样的原因，电子设备业集中到了距匹兹堡市12 英里的特特尔溪谷( Turtle Creek Valley) 。从19 世纪80 年代开始，匹兹堡大都市区之外的天然气田附近出现了采用流水线生产的一体化大型玻璃制造工厂，在此建厂是为了就近利用那里的天然气资源。20 世纪初，匹兹堡地区的玻璃业产能占到全国的25%，玻璃厂大部分建在匹兹堡的郊区。1902 年，匹兹堡市还有15 家玻璃工厂，到1907 年，匹兹堡市的最后一家窗玻璃工厂也关闭了。而在郊区，出现了玻璃制造业的重镇———珍妮特( Jeannette) 。美国铝业公司( Aluminum Company of America) 也在1891 年迁到了匹兹堡市北部20 英里处的新肯辛顿( New Kensington) 。这里有铝业生产所需的天然气和煤炭能源。到1919 年，新肯辛顿成了一个工业中心，工人总数近1．8 万人。1919 年，匹兹堡地区的黏土矿周围出现了36 家耐火砖制造厂，有工人数千 ·148· 美国研究 ① ② ③ James Clifford Findley，“The Economic Boom of the Twenties in Los Angeles，”Ph．D． Dissertation，Claremont Graduate School，1958． Fred Viehe，“Black Gold Suburbs: The Influence of the Extractive Industry on the Suburbanization of Los Angeles， 1890～ 1930，”Journal of Urban History，Vol． 8，No． 1，( Nov．，1981) ，pp．3～ 26． Mike Davis，City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles( London: Verso，1990) ; Ｒobert Fogelson，The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles，1850 ～ 1930 ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press，1967) ; Greg Hise， “Home Building and Industrial Decentralization in Los Angeles: The Ｒoots of the Postwar Urban Ｒegion，”Journal of Urban History，Vol． 19，No． 2，( February，1993) ，pp．95 ～ 125; Greg Hise，Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press，1997) ; Greg Hise，“Nature’s Workshop: Industry and Urban Expansion in Southern California，1900～ 1950，”Journal of Historical Geography，No． 1， ( 2001) ，pp．74～ 92．名。另外，黏土矿周围的陶瓷业也有所发展。① 于是，匹兹堡的制造业先后从不同的地方向郊区转移。芝加哥、旧金山、洛杉矶、匹兹堡的发展历史表明，在工业化的过程中，新旧产业之间有一个新陈代谢的过程，有利于工业发展的区位条件不是固定不变的，这种变化不断使新兴产业出现在新的地点。譬如，生产技术的提高和生产方式的改进使得大规模流水线一度最有利于提高效率，于是许多产业纷纷在地价便宜的郊区建设占地面积巨大的横向延伸的单层工厂; 新能源( 如煤、天然气、石油) 、新资源( 如黏土、矿石) 的开发利用，则使得能源、资源产地成为新工业中心。可见，工业离开中心城市向外扩展是工业化本身的需要，也是工业化的必然结果。三工业地产开发和铁路公司对制造业郊区化的推动工业固然有向外扩散以寻找更大发展空间和靠近能源、资源产地的需要，但是，没有工业地产开发商提供的一系列配套基础设施，这一过程也无法实现。19 世纪芝加哥工业的向外发展，与一系列的土地投机活动密不可分。工业地产开发商在郊区获得了巨大的成功。以19 世纪、20 世纪之交为界，个人投资者、合伙人、投资集团以及铁路公司先后将工业用地推向了市场，为工业在郊区发展提供了所需的基础设施。 ( 一) 工业地产开发商对制造业郊区化的促进芝加哥的大克罗斯因( Grand Crossing) 工业区是居住性郊区海德帕克( Hyde Park) 的开发商保罗·康奈尔( Paul Cornell) 开发的，到1876 年，那里已有12 家工厂，每天至少有150 趟火车停靠。位于芝加哥南部的“南部制造业分厂集中区”( South Branch Manufacturing Area) 是地产开发商塞缪尔·沃克( Samuel Walker) 凭一己之力建立起来的。他于1854 年在滨河地带购买了1500 英亩的一片区域，将其用于发展工业，并为这里修建了一条铁路，疏浚、扩大了港口。因为这些基础设施的存在， 1873 年，麦克考米克斯( McCormicks) 兄弟将他们的大型收割机工厂搬到了这里，该厂是当时世界上最大的农业机器生产工厂。到1873 年底，芝加哥最大和最重要的几家钢铁工厂都来到了这里，它们雇佣的总人数超过了3000 人。卡卢迈特( Calumet) 工业区的开发超出了单个投资者的能力范围，它是由多个投资者合伙投资开发的。卡卢迈特位于芝加哥南部郊区，地理位置优越，一度被认为是一个比芝加哥更适合发展城市的地方。1868 年，投资商科洛内尔·鲍恩( Colonel James Bowen) 组织了一个投资人团体，先后在卡卢迈特港口附近购买了6000 英亩的第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·149· ① Edward Muller，“Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh，1870～ 1920，”pp．58～ 73．土地。他们在卡卢迈特河和芝加哥之间铺了一条碎石路，平整了街道，疏浚了河道。在他们的努力下，有多条铁路通到这里。到1873 年，这里已经有了不少的制造业工厂。1881 年，资本家乔治·普尔曼( George Pullman) 在卡卢迈特的罗斯兰( Ｒoseland) 建造了一家规模巨大的卧铺车厢工厂和美国最早的公司城镇( Company Town) 。到 1900 年，罗斯兰至少有五家钢铁公司。到20 世纪初，卡卢迈特成为芝加哥钢铁工业的中心。卡卢迈特的工业发展还越出了州界，带动了1903 年印第安纳港和1906 年制造业城市加里( Gary) 的出现。① 1889 年，芝加哥木材商人托马斯·哈维( Thomas Harvey) 也在卢普区以南18 英里处的卡卢迈特河沿岸开发了一个制造业郊区，三年之内，这里就有了十家大型工厂和5000 名居民。② 可以说，卡卢迈特工业的发展最初是由工业地产开发商推动的。为了吸引制造业，开发商为企业落户提供了各种优惠。1891 年，位于匹兹堡的美国铝业公司迁往由一家工业地产开发公司开发的新肯辛顿，该公司免费提供了四英亩土地和一万美元现金，促成了美国铝业公司的搬迁。1894 年，匹兹堡的一个投资者群体在匹兹堡市以南30 英里处购买了一块土地并进行了开发。之后，他们免费为企业主威廉·唐纳( William Donner) 提供了20 英亩的土地和一万美元的现金，促成了唐纳的新工厂于1898 年在此建成。到1903 年，该厂成为全美最大的轧板机厂。最终，这里形成了一个新的工业城市———莫内森( Monessen) 。该市除了威廉·唐纳的轧板机厂，还有铸造和机器厂、钢箍厂、棒线材厂、管道工厂，以及一个有3500 名工人的高度一体化的钢铁工厂。到1916 年，莫内森的居民超过了1．8 万人。③ ( 二) 铁路对制造业郊区化的推动工业地产开发常常将铁路作为一项吸引工业落户的重要基础设施，其实铁路对制造业郊区化的推动是多方面的。首先，铁路本身是钢铁业、铁路设备业的消费者，它的发展增加了对钢铁的需求，带动了钢铁产业的能源从木炭向焦煤的转变，进而又带动了煤炭业的繁荣，引起了连锁反应。其次，铁路在当时是一种革命性的交通进步和交通基础设施，它的出现满足了采用流水线批量生产的工厂巨大的原料和产品运输需求，大大便利了工业在郊区的发展，同时将分散在大都市区各地的工业和市中心的管理服务业连结为一个整体。再次，在19 世纪、20 世纪之交，铁路公司取代了之前的私人投资者，成为主要的工业地产开发商，在郊区开发了许多“有组织的工业 ·150· 美国研究 ① ② ③ 孙群郎:《美国城市郊区化研究》，第95 页。 Mary Beth Pudup，“Model City? Industry and Urban Structure in Chicago，”in Ｒobert Lewis，ed．，Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Home on Metropolitan Fringe( Philadelphia: Temple University Press，2004) ，chapter 4． Edward Muller，“Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh，1870～ 1920，”pp．58～ 73．区”，甚至将有的区域开发为纯工业区。虽然其目的往往是增加铁路运输量，但带动了制造业在郊区的发展。在铁路出现之初的1850 年前后，铁轨、车厢、铁路设备、桥梁对钢铁的大量需求极大地扩大了钢铁市场，并最终迫使钢铁公司寻找制造大批量廉价钢材的办法，以取代硬度不够、稳定性不佳的铁轨( iron rail) 。工业家安德鲁·卡内基( Andrew Carnegie) 完善了贝斯曼钢( Bessemer steel，也叫“酸性转炉钢”) 的生产流程。1872 年，卡内基选择距匹兹堡九英里的地方建了一个一体化的贝斯曼钢轨工厂。1875 年，在投入生产后的几个月内，该厂生产的铁轨既耐用，产量又高，成为这一行业的标杆，促使其竞争者纷纷改进生产，用钢轨取代铁轨。钢铁需求量的攀升使得用木炭冶炼钢铁的传统方法变得过时，促使工业家们找到了煤炭这一新能源，并进而促成了匹兹堡康奈斯威利煤田和克朗代克( Klondike) 煤田的开发。铁路的建设方便了制造业在郊区的发展。旧金山地区的奥克兰最初只是环湾区的几个小城镇之一，交通瓶颈的突破对于奥克兰的工业发展非常重要。1869 年太平洋铁路的通车是其发展的重大转折点。在其后的20 年里，这里新增了30 家工厂，人口在19 世纪70 年代从1．05 万人增加到3．5 万人。到1890 年，西部最大的制衣工厂、罐头工厂、清洁剂工厂和马车工厂都位于这里。1900 年圣菲( Santa Fe) 铁路和 1910 年西太平洋铁路的到来降低了运费，再加上港口的建立，刺激了奥克兰的进一步发展。1900～1930 年间，奥克兰是美国发展最快的三个城市之一，人口从6．7 万增加到28．4 万，形成了四个工业区，而且其工业还外溢到附近的伯克利等四个城镇。奥克兰的发展依靠的是铁路和港口，而非卡车和汽车。① 在芝加哥，通往芝加哥市的七条铁路中，除了一条滨湖铁路，其他六条铁路的沿线都有工业。在紧挨铁路沿线的两边，特别是货运站附近，形成了带状工业区，位于其中的是那些需要铁路运输服务但规模没有大到可以负担起专门的铁路支线的企业。这类工业区的宽度有时候可以达到几英里。② 在19 世纪末的纳什维尔，在城市边缘的铁路沿线也出现了制造业区，它们对铁路运输的需求使这里出现了大量的铁路支线，以至于形成了“由支线和中转站构成的迷宫”。③ 铁路网的形成将整个大都市区连为一体。匹兹堡密集的铁路网将分散在各地的工厂连结到一个大都市区中，在工业分散的状态下，将整个大都市区整合为一体。匹兹堡密集的铁路网包括六大干线、无数支线，以及24 个工业铁路中转站。铁路干线第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·151· ① ② ③ Edward Muller，“Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh，1870～ 1920，”pp．58～ 73． Mary Beth Pudup，“Model City? Industry and Urban Structure in Chicago，”pp．53～ 75．Ｒobert Lewis，“Ｒunning Ｒings around the City，”in Ｒichard Harris and Peter Larkham eds．，Changing Suburbs: Foundation Form and Function( New York: Ｒoutledge，1999) ，chapter 7，pp．146～ 167．将一个企业的数家工厂及众多的制造业企业连接到了一起。与之相配合的是12 家修理工厂或中转调车场，在1902 年，它们的雇员人数达到4500 人。1922 年，除了有轨电车和市间铁路，在下城和40 英里半径内的卫星城市之间每天有368 趟通勤火车，这些卫星城在一个小时之内就可以到达下城。① 铁路公司早期的策略是尽可能远、尽可能广地扩展其线路。随着全国铁路网的形成和业内竞争的加剧，赚钱的线路减少了，铁路公司的投资变得更加多元化。其中，开发和运营工业区是铁路公司一个重要的投资活动。芝加哥的制造业集中区 ( Central Manufacturing District) 和克利宁( Clearing) 工业区都是由铁路公司创建的。② 如果说制造业分散到郊区是工业化的内在需求，那么郊区工业地产的开发和铁路的存在则让这种需求得以满足。在这个过程中，铁路对制造业郊区化的推动是多方面的: 作为新兴产业，它带动了钢铁业和煤炭的开发，这两个产业往往集中在城市之外的煤炭产地周围; 作为交通基础设施，它为制造业迁往郊区提供了便利; 作为投资主体，它开发的工业地产带动了制造业在郊区的发展。与制造业的郊区化同时发生的，是中心城市从制造业向服务业的转型。在湾区，随着新兴产业在郊区的出现，旧金山市因其在金融、管理等方面的重要性，成为新产业的公司总部所在地。标准石油公司( Standard Oil) 、泽勒巴克纸品公司( Zellerbach) 以及卡索库克食品公司( Castle ＆ Cooke) 的工厂虽然位于郊区，但它们的总部都位于旧金山市。由12 家罐头公司合并形成的加州水果罐装联盟( California Fruit Canners Association) ，其总部最初位于奥克兰，1899 年也迁到了旧金山。③ 在19 世纪末的芝加哥，与制造业的郊区化同时出现的，是其市中心的卢普区成为美国第二大金融、零售、商业中心。④ 在匹兹堡的大型工厂不断向郊区发展的同时，公司办公室、投资银行、法律服务却在匹兹堡下城扎下了根。⑤ 四城市对制造业郊区的兼并如果说美国制造业自19 世纪中叶以来开启了郊区化历程，而没有向城市集中，那么通常所说的制造业在第二次世界大战之后的分散化岂不是无源之水? 对这个问 ·152· 美国研究 ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ Edward Muller，“Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh，1870～ 1920，”pp．58～ 73．Ｒichard Harris，“Chicago’s Other Suburbs，”pp．394～ 410; Mary Beth Pudup，“Model City? Industry and Urban Structure in Chicago，”pp．53～ 75．Ｒichard Walker，“Industry Buildsup the City: The Suburbanization of Manufacturing in the San Francisco Bay Area，”pp．36～ 57． Mary Beth Pudup，“Model City? Industry and Urban Structure in Chicago，”pp．53～ 75． Edward Muller，“Industrial Suburbs and the Growth of Metropolitan Pittsburgh，1870～ 1920，”pp．58～ 73．题的回答，涉及到美国城市发展中的兼并现象，即城市边界的不断扩大导致之前的郊区被并入城市。通过这种兼并，大量位于郊区的制造业源源不断地向城市“集中”， 19 世纪出现的公司城镇( 如芝加哥的普尔曼) 和制造业郊区( 如芝加哥的包装城莱克镇) ，也随之被城市兼并。这些原本属于地理意义上的郊区，就这样进入了政治边界扩大的城市之中。在城市地域扩大的过程中， 19 世纪中期出现的分散的制造业逐渐向城市集中，最终促使美国在1920 年基本实现了城市化。 ( 一) 制造业向城市的“集中” 在工业郊区化的研究中，涉及到中心城市和郊区这一对相对的概念。大多数研究将城市、郊区视为静态的地理范围，而实际上， 1850 年的纽约、芝加哥、费城与它们各自在1898 年、1889 年、1854 年的地理范围相去甚远。在美国城市史研究中，超越城市边界的研究视角深化了既有的研究，得出了新的结论。如在工人郊区研究方面，美国社会学者詹森·金迪奇( Jason Jindrich) ①突破以城市边界划分城市、郊区的做法，深入到城市市界之内，发现即便在市界之内，工人也更多地居住在城市边缘而非中心，这将已有的工人郊区研究推进到了一个新的层次。在考察第二次世界大战爆发前美国制造业的分散和集中情况时，关注城市边界的扩大如何将曾经的郊区变为城市的一部分，有利于深入认识城市化和郊区化的关系。城市作为一个政治单位和人口统计数据中的统计单位，其对应的地域范围绝非一成不变，总的趋势是随着时间的演进而不断扩大。在19 世纪末20 世纪初的几十年里，美国城市的这种扩张尤其显著。这种急剧的扩张反映在人口统计数据中，就是美国的城市人口最终在1920 年超过了总人口的50%，实现了城市化。这通常给人一种人口、经济活动在19 世纪末、20 世纪初迅速向城市集中的印象，而让人忽略了城市这一政治和统计单位实际对应的地理范围在当时急剧扩大的事实。从19 世纪中期美国进入工业化时期开始，工业成为创造财富的最大产业，整个社会对工业的发展莫不孜孜以求。工业的发展是当时最令人兴奋的事件。个人的就业机会、社会财富的创造、政府税收的获得，都和工业化的进程息息相关。对城市来说，工业意味着繁荣和税收，是城市最重要的税源，更是城市间竞争的重要砝码。工业还意味着大量的人口，为了增强自己的经济实力，提高自己在全国的地位，乃至争夺、保卫最大城市的地位，美国城市在19 世纪末开始了长达数十年的兼并竞赛。对郊区而言，有建制的郊区城市( incorporated suburb) 为了建设供水、排水、天然气等方面的基础设施，经常负债累累。与母城合并是郊区避免高税收同时保持甚至提高市第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·153· ① Jason Jindrich，“Suburbs in the City: Ｒeassessing the Location of Nineteenth-Century American Working-Class Suburbs，”Social Science History，Vol． 36，No． 2，( Summer，2012) ，pp．147～ 167．政服务水平的方法，因而受到青睐。对于未建市的郊区( unincorporated suburb) 来说，并入城市可以享受城市的种种市政服务，何乐而不为? 而且，当时兼并与否更多地取决于州议会而非公众的投票，而州议会受“越大越好”的观念影响，往往对兼并持支持态度。① 通过大量的兼并与合并，在1870 ～ 1930 年间，美国24 个大城市的地域面积从 347 平方英里增加到2161 平方英里，增幅达522．77%。② 如果将当时城市化、工业化发展缓慢的南部城市排除在外，③只考察东北部、中西部、西部的代表性城市，则它们的地域面积从1870 年的84 平方英里增加到了1930 年的1603 平方英里，增长率高达1808%( 见表1) 。其中，纽约从22 平方英里增加到299 平方英里; 芝加哥从十平方英里增加到207 平方英里; 费城从二平方英里增加到130 平方英里; 匹兹堡从二平方英里增加到51 平方英里( 见表1) 。在这一过程中，原本位于城市边缘地带的工业郊区被大量并入城市之中，城市的面积急剧扩大，人口迅速增加，工业实力显著提高。在兼并盛行的1879～1919 年间，美国16 个大城市的生产工人增加了168．3 万人。而在兼并停滞的1919 ～ 1954 年间，这16 个城市的生产工人仅增加了21．6 万人( 见表 2) 。表1 美国部分城市地域面积增长情况( 1870 ～ 1930 年) ( 单位: 平方英里) 城市1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 纽约22 22 44 299 299 芝加哥10 36 169 185 207 费城2 130 130 130 130 巴尔的摩13 13 30 30 79 波士顿5 13 39 39 44 密尔沃基13 17 23 41 克利夫兰5 12 28 46 71 匹兹堡2 23 27 40 51 底特律6 13 22 41 138 洛杉矶29 29 85 440 ·154· 美国研究 ① ② ③ 〔美〕肯尼思·杰克逊:《马唐草边疆》( 王旭等译) ，北京·商务印书馆，2017 年版，第八章; Ｒichardson Dilworth， The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy( Cambridge: Harvard University Press，2005) 。〔美〕肯尼思·杰克逊:《马唐草边疆》( 王旭等译) ，表8－1，8－2。美国南部的城市化、工业化进程滞后于东北部和中西部。参见王旭: 《19 世纪美国南部城市化特点及其影响》，载《东北师范大学学报》，1989 年第4 期; 王旭:《美国城市化的区域差异与比较》，载《扬州大学学报》， 2005 年第6 期。圣路易斯14 61 61 61 61 旧金山5 42 42 42 42 总计84 407 638 1021 1603 数据来源: 〔美〕肯尼思·杰克逊: 《马唐草边疆》( 王旭等译) ，第八章，表8－1，8 －2。表2 美国16 个大都市区就业的变化( 1879 ～ 1954 年) 大都市区就业变化( %) 就业变化( 万) 1879～ 1919 1919～ 1954 1879～ 1919 1919～ 1954 城市郊区城市郊区城市郊区城市郊区洛杉矶1117 839 322 1688 4．3 1．3 15．2 24．5 纽约181 219 16 41 41．1 28．7 10．5 17．3 芝加哥409 1132 16 115 32．4 10．7 6．5 13．3 底特律937 2141 16 115 15．1 9．4 6．5 10．4 克利夫兰626 1113 －2 213 13．6 2．7 －0．2 6．2 圣路易158 484 13 52 6．6 3．7 1．4 2．3 布法罗321 731 －13 13 5．8 3．6 －1 4．6 巴尔的摩74 135 －8 276 4．1 0．7 －0．8 3．7 密尔沃基251 799 －2 54 7．3 3．7 －0．2 2．3 辛辛那提28 346 －3 62 1．5 3．3 －0．2 2．7 旧金山71 1582 －16 52 2 5．3 －0．8 3 布里奇波特359 89 －17 41 8．1 2．8 －1．8 2．5 匹兹堡126 781 －35 15 4．6 14．3 －2．9 2．4 费城52 370 －16 0 9．6 14．5 －4．6 0 普罗维登斯188 139 －32 －25 8．6 5．2 －4．2 －2．2 波士顿50 102 －19 －27 3 14．3 －1．7 －7．7 总计184 277 8 50 168．3 124．5 21．6 85．4 注: 洛杉矶的数据从1889 年开始统计。资料来源: Ｒobert Lewis，“The Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing，1870 ～ 1950，”Journal of Urban History，Vol．28，No．5，July，2002，Table 9。 ( 二) 19 世纪美国规模最大的三次城市兼并 19 世纪规模最大的城市兼并发生在当时美国最大的三座城市———纽约、芝加哥和费城，每次兼并都将郊区的大量制造业纳入城市之中。1854 年，费城市将其所在的费尔德拉维亚县( Philadelphia) 的剩余部分全部兼并，面积一举从二平方英里增加到130 平方英里。被兼并的这些郊区拥有发达的纺织业。1850 年，老城的纺织业只第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·155· 占全县的12．4%，郊区则占87．6%，①兼并在一夜之间让费城获得了规模庞大的纺织业。芝加哥最大的兼并行为出现在1889 年。是年，芝加哥的面积从36 平方英里增加到了169 平方英里，被并入的土地中有建于1881 年的普尔曼公司城镇，还有工业集中区卡卢迈特的大克罗斯因和南芝加哥等郊区工业城镇，以及包装城莱克镇。因为肉类包装业的快速发展，莱克镇是当时库克县增长最快的区域。在19 世纪70 年代，其人口从3360 人增加到1．8 万人，到1889 年被芝加哥兼并时，已有8．5 万人。② 在1890 年的人口统计数据中，莱克镇已经消失了，它的相关数据成为了芝加哥市数据的一部分。这一时期，美国的城市化突飞猛进，但大量像莱克镇这样消失在人口统计数据中的郊区城镇及其工业成就很少受到关注。浙江师范大学孙群郎教授认为， “郊区化也推动了城市化的发展，成为城市化的基本方式之一。”③“郊区化是城市化的一种方式”，④就制造业来说，这句话同样适用。制造业在种种因素的作用下来到郊区发展，为郊区带来了就业岗位、人口和必要的基础设施，使其初步具备了城市的某些特征和面貌。后来，在中心城市兼并郊区的过程中，一部分这样的制造业郊区被并入城市，融入城市化进程之中。所以制造业的郊区化也推动了城市化的发展。为了在1900 年的人口统计数据中保住自己美国第一大城市的地位，纽约市在 1898 年进行了美国历史上最大规模的兼并，兼并了当时美国的第四大城市布鲁克林 ( Brooklyn) ，以及昆斯( Queens) 、斯塔滕岛( Staten Island) 和布朗克斯( Bronx) ，⑤面积从44 平方英里增加到299 平方英里。兼并的部分中，布鲁克林是一个拥有多种产业的工业基地。1860～1890 年间，其工业发展很快，工业工人从1．3 万增加到了11 万。到1890 年，布鲁克林的肉类包装业已经仅次于芝加哥，其糖类提纯产量和谷物贮藏量也都是世界上最大的。另外，它还拥有大型制帽厂、化工厂、铸铁厂、糖果公司以及咖啡厂和糖浆厂。1860～ 1890 年间，昆斯和里士满( Ｒichmend) 的工人也从3200 人增加到了1．7 万人。而实施兼并前的纽约，也就是曼哈顿岛，其制造业的就业比例早在19 世纪70 年代就开始下降; 1890 年以后，就业的绝对数量也增加很少。与这次 ·156· 美国研究 ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ Ｒobert Lewis，“The Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing，1870 ～ 1950，”pp． 573 ～ 598; Ｒobert Lewis，“Ｒunning Ｒings around the City，”table 7．4． Elaine Lewinnek，The Working Man’s Ｒeward: Chicago’s Early Suburbs and the Ｒoots of American Sprawl，p．73．孙群郎:《试析美国城市郊区化的起源》，载《史学理论研究》，2004 年第3 期，第53 页。孙群郎:《城市空间周期论驳论———兼议聚集扩散理论》，《河南师范大学学报》，2019 年第1 期，第82 页。受资料所限，昆斯、斯塔滕岛、布朗克斯当时是不是郊区城市不能确定，也有可能是未建市的郊区。城市对郊区的兼并也包括未建市的郊区。兼并相关的是，纽约的郊区在19 世纪90 年代减少了6．9 万个制造业岗位，减少了四分之一; 中心城市则增加了十万个以上，增加了近三分之一。① 此外，波士顿在1867 年和1874 年分别兼并了罗克斯伯里( Ｒoxbury) 和查尔斯顿( Charleston) ，面积从五平方英里增加到39 平方英里。巴尔的摩在1888 年兼并了工业郊区伍德伯里( Woodberry) 和很多工厂村庄( mill villages) ，在1918 年兼并了拥有该地区最为密集的铁路和船运设施以及众多工厂的工业郊区坎顿( Canton) ，其面积先从13 平方英里增加到 30 平方英里，继而增加到92 平方英里。② 这一时期城市地域扩大得如此之快，以至于许多地方虽然被纳入到城市的政治边界，成为城市统计数据的一部分，但以人口密度、基础设施、市政服务水平等标准来衡量，它们与建筑密集区( built-up area) 相距甚远，以至于成为了“城市中的郊区”。③ 在这次兼并浪潮中落后的城市则迅速被其他城市超过。旧金山的工业在美国内战后开始迅猛发展，在19 世纪70 年代，其制造业产值工人数量都翻了一番。到 1880 年，旧金山市的制造业工人数量占到该市总就业人数的1 /3 和整个加州制造业就业人数的2 /3，产值也占到加州制造业总产值的2 /3，并且超过了西部所有其他城市的制造业产值之和。到1900 年，旧金山已成为全国第七大城市。但是，自1870 年以后，旧金山的政治边界就再也没有扩大过，一直保持在42 平方英里的范围内。进入20 世纪，洛杉矶取代旧金山成为西部最大的城市。其实，就旧金山大都市区( 简称湾区) 而言，它在1900～1920 年间发展很快，人口增加了87%，就业增加了163%，制造业产值增加了617%。就全国大都市区而言，湾区在1869～1935 年间的总就业人数排名从第17 名上升到了第16 名，其制造业增加值从第15 名上升到了第10 名。迟至1938 年，湾区港口运输的货物价值位列西部第一，在全国仅次于纽约，洛杉矶大都市区仅排在第6 名。在1879 ～ 1919 年间，旧金山市的就业率增长了71%，郊区的就业率增长了1582%( 见表2) 。旧金山市和旧金山大都市区的这种悬殊差异，正是制造业郊区化后中心城市的兼并没有跟上造成的。④ ( 三) 兼并浪潮下郊区制造业的快速发展 19 世纪末、20 世纪初美国中心城市对工业郊区的大规模兼并，彻底改变了郊区第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·157· ① ② ③ ④ Ｒobert Lewis，“The Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing，1870～ 1950，”pp．573～ 598; 〔美〕肯尼思·杰克逊:《马唐草边疆》( 王旭等译) ，第33 页。Ｒobert Lewis，“The Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing，1870～ 1950”，pp．573～ 598． Jason Jindrich，“Suburbs in the City: Ｒeassessing the Location of Nineteenth-Century American Working-Class Suburbs，”pp．147～ 167．旧金山大都市区等于旧金山市加上郊区。城市兼并郊区相当于在大都市区内部，将郊区部分的份额转到了城市。在旧金山市没有兼并郊区和洛杉矶市兼并了大量郊区的情况下，洛杉矶市超过了旧金山市。但因为旧金山郊区制造业的发展，旧金山大都市区在全国的排名反而上升了。工业发展的势头。在1879 ～ 1919 年的40 年间，因为中心城市的不断兼并，所有大都市区新出现的制造业就业岗位中有57．5%都位于中心城市。此后，由于中心城市大规模兼并郊区活动的停止，情况出现了反转，在1919 ～ 1954 年间，79．8%的新制造业就业岗位出现在郊区。从绝对数量来看，1 879～1919 年间，中心城市新增的制造业岗位达168．3 万个，超过了郊区的124．5 万个。而在1919 ～ 1954 年间，郊区新增加85．4 万个制造业岗位，远高于中心城市的21．6 万个。可以认为，1919 年之前中心城市的大规模兼并是这一时期其新增制造业就业岗位超过郊区的关键。兼并的影响还表现在，在大规模兼并结束的1920 年前后，很多城市的制造业就业岗位达到了峰值。人口统计数据显示，美国最大的16 个中心城市中，有八个城市的制造业就业岗位在 1919 年达到顶峰。在其后的1919 ～ 1954 年间，有四个大都市区和11 个中心城市出现了就业岗位减少的情况，开始了负增长( 见表2) 。尽管中心城市经过大量的兼并扩大了地域，发展了自己的制造业，但郊区制造业发展的速度仍然超过了中心城市。1899 ～ 1909 年间，美国12 个工业大都市区中，中心城市的工人数量增加了40．8%，郊区增加了97．7%。① 1879～1919 年间，美国16 个大都市区中，郊区的就业率增长了277%，中心城市的就业率仅增长了184%。而在中心城市兼并基本停止的1919～1954 年间，中心城市和郊区的就业率增长差距更为显著，分别为8%和50%。郊区的人口增速也超过了中心城市。20 世纪头十年，有 28 个中心城市人口在20 万以上的大都市区，其郊区人口的增速为32．7%，超过了中心城市25．1%的增幅。② 在整个1879 ～ 1954 年间，尽管中心城市兼并了大量的工业郊区，郊区的制造业就业仍然增加了467%，远高于中心城市207%的增幅。如果以绝对数量计算，在被兼并的郊区计入中心城市的情况下，郊区新增的制造业岗位为 209．9 万个，也超过了中心城市的188．9 万个( 见表3) 。所以，在1879～ 1954 年间，中心城市的生产工人在大都市区的比重，依然呈下降之势( 见表3) 。1899 ～ 1919 年间，中心城市生产工人在大都市区的比率从68．3%下降到了61．9%，相应地，郊区生产工人的比重从31．7%增加到38．1%。同样，中心城市的生产工人在整个美国就业中的比重从39．5%下降到了36．1%，而郊区生产工人的这一比例则从18．3%上升到了22． 2%( 见表3) 。 ·158· 美国研究 ① ② Graham Ｒ． Taylor，Satellite Cities: A Study of Industrial Suburbs ( New York: D． Appleton and Company) ， pp．5～ 6． Harlan Douglas，The Suburban Trend( New York ＆ London: The Century Company，1925) ，p．41．表3 美国大都市区的制造业就业情况( 1899 ～ 1947 年) 生产工人在美国总就业中的比重生产工人在大都市区就业中的比重大都市区非大都市区年份城市郊区合计城市郊区合计 1899 39．5 18．3 57．8 42．2 68．3 31．7 100．0 1919 36．1 22．2 58．3 41．7 61．9 38．1 100．0 1929 35．1 21．1 56．2 43．8 62．4 37．6 100．0 1939 32．0 23．0 55．0 45．0 58．2 41．8 100．0 1947 32．2 22．2 54．4 45．6 59．2 40．8 100．0 数据来源: Ｒobert Lewis，“Ｒunning Ｒings around the City，”table7．1。可见，美国制造业的郊区化可以追溯到1879 年。从那年起，郊区制造业的发展速度开始超过中心城市，并且在1919 年后，郊区新增制造业的绝对数量也超过了中心城市。所以，在1879 年到第二次世界大战爆发这段时间，美国制造业的郊区化和城市化是齐头并进的。在19 世纪末至20 世纪初的中心城市兼并大潮中，许多制造业发达的郊区被并入城市中，向城市化转变，两者呈现出交织和合流的状态。在这一阶段，兼并增强了城市制造业的实力，制造业郊区化的部分成果为城市化做出了贡献。制造业在郊区的分散及其向城市的“集中”，统一于城市地域扩大这一过程之中。结语综上所述，在第二次世界大战之前，由于工业化的内在需要、工业地产商在郊区的开发活动、铁路的大规模铺设及其带动作用，以及能源、资源所在地多位于郊区等原因，美国制造业的郊区化已经大规模地出现了。由于在横向延伸的单层工厂中进行大规模流水线生产可以大幅降低成本，促使制造业纷纷在郊区寻找更大的生产空间。工业地产商在郊区的开发活动则为制造业在郊区的发展提供了便利。铁路的出现也加速了制造业的郊区化———轨道由铁轨向钢轨的进步带来了钢铁业的变革; 钢铁产业对能源的需要带动了煤炭业的发展; 满足了采用流水线批量生产的工厂巨大的原料和产品运输需求; 铁路公司参与到郊区工业地产的开发之中———这些都刺激了制造业在郊区的发展。事实证明，推动制造业郊区化的因素并不是第二次世界大战结束后才出现的。由于工业化对空间、资源的需求，以及工业地产开发活动和铁路的推动，从19 世纪50 年代以来，地理意义上的制造业郊区化一直在进行。由于19 世纪末、20 世纪第二次世界大战前美国制造业的郊区化 ·159· 初中心城市政治边界的扩大，许多郊区的制造业和人口被纳入城市数据统计之中。郊区制造业和人口向城市的迅速“集中”，助推美国在1920 年基本实现了城市化。因此，城市化的完成是两个“集中”过程合力促成的: 其一是通常意义上的人口和就业岗位向城市的集中; 其二是城市对周围郊区的兼并，它使得郊区人口和就业岗位被 “集中”于城市。尽管出现了大规模的兼并，但扩大边界后的城市的制造业岗位增速乃至绝对数量在1879～1954 年间仍然低于郊区。虽然有大量郊区被并入城市，使城市在人口统计数据中的份量得以提升，但未被兼并的郊区在1879 ～ 1919 年间的制造业岗位增速超过了中心城市，其新增就业岗位的绝对数量在1919 ～ 1954 年间也超过了扩大后的中心城市。所以，即使从统计层面来看，美国制造业的郊区化在19 世纪末到第二次世界大战爆发前也已经十分明显了。美国一部分制造业先郊区化，后来又在中心城市的扩大中城市化，这说明制造业的城市化和郊区化并不是一个有着明确时间分界线的前后相继的过程。在一段时间里，美国制造业的郊区化和城市化是同时进行的，且郊区化的速度快于城市化。在之后的中心城市兼并郊区的过程中，制造业的郊区化部分地向城市化转化。在1919 年之后，有四个大都市区和11 个中心城市的制造业的绝对数量开始减少，出现了负增长。所以，美国中心城市的“去工业化”进程早在第二次世界大战爆发之前就已开启。在制造业郊区化的同时，金融业、保险业、地产业、管理业、生产服务业等产业在第二次世界大战之前就已经向中心城市集中。因此中心城市从制造业向生产服务业的转型也早在第二次世界大战之前就已经开始。第二次世界大战后制造业的郊区化和中心城市的转型并不是一个新的现象，而是在第二次世界大战前就已开始的一个历史过程在战后的延续。王宇翔: 太原师范学院历史系讲师 ( 本文责任编辑: 罗伟清) ·160· 美国研究 American History Eric Foner: A Portrayal of a Great American Academic Era Wang Xi ………………………………………………………… ( 122) Based on the study of the landmark works written by American historian Eric Foner，this essay offers an in-depth and analytic review of Foner’s scholarly career of more than half a century． It places his work within the context of the evolution of a“New American History，”focusing on the interactions between his academic creativity and the background of the time in which his scholarship has been produced，including both the changing American society and the historical profession in the United States． The essay intends to demonstrate how the generation of American historians who were intellectually baptized by the social politics in the 1960s，as represented by Foner，have made effective use of diverse historiographic traditions to rediscover“the usable past，”craft the scholarship of“New American History，”reinterpret the nation’s past，and reconstruct a new collective national memory for a multicultural United States． Manufacturing’s Suburbanization of America before the Second World War: An Exploration of the Ｒelationship between Urbanization and Suburbanization Wang Yuxiang …………………………………………………… ( 141) After the mid-19th century，with the expansion of the scale of production， the demand for space in factories increased，and the demand for resources and energy in heavy industry generated the impetus for the development of American manufacturing in the suburbs． The development of industrial property and the emergence of railways also made possible the development of industry in the suburbs． Under the influence of various factors， from 1879 to 1954，the American suburban manufacturing industry outpaced the central city both in the growth rate and in the absolute number of new manufacturing jobs，showing a trend towards suburbanization． At the turn of the 20th century，in the process of American cities’consolidation with suburbs，some fruits of manufacturing suburbanization were absorbed by cities，thus promoting the realization of American urbanization in 1920．	Translation - English Manufacturing’s suburbanization of America before the Second World War: An exploration of the relationship between urbanization and suburbanization WANG Yuxiang Abstract From the mid-19th century, with the expansion of the scale of production, the progress of production technologies, and the optimization of the production process, the space required for factories grew ever greater. In addition, the demand for resources and energy in heavy industry generated the impetus for the development of America’s manufacturing in the suburbs. The development of industrial property and the emergence of railways also made the development of industry in the suburbs possible. Under the influence of many factors, from 1879 to 1954, manufacturing in American suburbs outpaced central cities both in the rate of growth and in the absolute number of new manufacturing jobs, showing a trend toward suburbanization. At the turn of the 20th century, in the course of American cities’ annexation of suburbs, the gains of manufacturing’s suburbanization were partially absorbed by cities, thus leading to the primarily urbanized America of 1920. Keywords American economy, manufacturing, Second World War, suburbanization, urbanization, municipal annexation After the end of the Second World War, the construction of highways, the spread of automobiles, and industrial expansion caused the suburbanization of manufacturing and the de-industrialization of old industrial bases to emerge as distinct phenomena in the United States, also receiving attention from the academic community. At the metropolitan level, case studies of cities such as Chicago, Cleveland, and Boston show that manufacturing in these areas experienced significant suburbanization after the war. At the national level, the de-industrialization of old industrial bases and the shifting of industry between different areas has been a focus of academic attention, as well as the transformation of central cities and old industrial bases after the suburbanization of industry or the shifting of industry to other areas. Researchers have traced the suburbanization and decentralization of American manufacturing to around the Second World War, and improvements in transport are considered to have played a major part in the decentralization of manufacturing. The situation before the war is rarely touched on, or else it is believed that prior to the war, and particularly prior to 1920, American manufacturing experienced continuous centralization, laying the foundation for the decentralization of post-war manufacturing. Researchers generally believe that there was first a process of urbanized centralization, and later a process of suburbanized decentralization, and that the dividing line between the urbanizing and suburbanizing periods was 1920, when the United States had mostly achieved urbanization. This paper considers the relationship between suburbanization and urbanization from the perspective of manufacturing and urban expansion. It sorts through the history of American manufacturing’s suburbanization prior to the Second World War in the hope of adding a new perspective to the discussion of the relationship between urbanization and suburbanization. This paper will firstly give a theoretical summary of the driving factors of industrial suburbanization prior to the Second World War. It will then present via case studies and statistical data the course of American manufacturing’s suburbanization prior to the war, and especially prior to 1920. Finally, it will reconsider the relationship between urbanization and suburbanization from the perspective of manufacturing. 1. Beyond transportation determinism 1. The emergence of the determinist theory of transportation The historical narrative regarding manufacturing’s continued centralization in cities prior to the Second World War originated from the theory of German economist, sociologist, and cultural theoretician Alfred Weber. This theory holds that the primary factors influencing the concentration of industry in metropolitan areas are the cost of transport and the agglomeration economy. In short, manufacturing areas emerge in the central city because the cost of transportation to city markets, harbors, railways, and other transport hubs is the lowest. During the initial period of development in the manufacturing industry, high transport costs restricted development to the central city, a point that has gained consensus among scholars. Logically consistent with this theory is the theory of transport-driven industrial decentralization. This theory holds that after the Second World War, the spread of trucks and automobiles massively reduced the cost of transportation, reducing urban manufacturing’s reliance on railways and ports. The speed which had been lacking prior to automobiles, trucks, and highways brought workers, goods, and even manufacturing itself into the suburbs. This theory similarly emphasizes the importance of transportation factors to the location of manufacturing, and is a natural extension of Weber’s theory. 2. A breakthrough in the history of new suburbs With research into the history of new suburbs first emerging in the 1990s, the creation of working-class suburbs prior to the Second World War became a new focus of academic research. Such studies found that between 1850 and 1940, working class suburbs were widespread in American history. One of the reasons for their emergence was the significant prevalence of manufacturing in suburban areas, and thus manufacturing suburbs came into academics’ field of view. Research into manufacturing suburbs has moved beyond the framework of Weber and others. These breakthroughs can be summarized in the below areas. Firstly, the significance of transport in the suburbanization of manufacturing is unquestionable. However, existing research does not equally approach the progress of transport technology in different eras, mainly emphasizing the impact of trucks, automobiles, and highways on the dispersal of manufacturing, with little attention given to the revolutionary transportation technology of railway in the 19th century and its impact on manufacturing locations. In reality, the driving force of railway in the suburbanization of manufacturing in the 19th century is comparable to that of the later trucks, automobiles, and highways. What is different is that the railways of the 19th century were mainly funded by private capital, whereas the construction of 20th century highways was led by the federal government. Secondly, although the cost of transportation is undoubtedly a major factor considered by businesses, with traditional theories holding that businesses often choose the city center to reduce transport costs by being close to markets, transport hubs and the labor force, this view loses sight of the greater picture. Prior to industrialization, manufacturing and artisanal production were indeed concentrated in urban centers and waterfront areas. However, with the advancement of industrialization, new production technologies, the emergence of more specialized divisions of labor, and the expanding scale of worksites, artisanal production was gradually replaced by mechanical production. As manufacturing began its transformation from artisanal production to mechanical production, this brought with it the need to construct new factories. In the process, many new factories were built on the outer fringes of cities, as industrialization did not mean the minimization of transportation costs. In essence, new production technologies replace old production technologies, and new methods of organizing production continually replace old methods of organizing production. As production technologies advance and methods of organizing production are improved, this can cause the price of the new product to be even lower than the cost of the old product. In brief, the standardization, rationalization, mechanization, and automation of the production process has been the key to a business’s development since the Industrial Revolution. In the course of industrialization, compared to the advancement of production technologies and the application of new methods of organizing production, reducing transportation costs is only a secondary issue. The decentralization of manufacturing is in essence an intrinsic requirement of industrialization. In the course of industrialization, new centers of production and employment continue to emerge, pushing the development of cities into the suburbs. Industrial investment comes in waves, and each wave of investment spawns new industries and creates new centers of employment. The overlapping of multiple waves of investment results in many industrial centers forming within a city, not just in the central city. Moreover, following the emergence of railway in the 19th century, suburbs could already rival city centers in terms of transport convenience. With the expanding scale of production and the emergence of assembly lines and standardized mass production, the manufacturing industry’s need for space grew ever greater. Coupled with the accessibility brought by railway, this drove many manufacturers to choose locations in suburban areas during the second half of the 19th century. In the East, they relocated from central cities to the suburbs in order to expand the scale of their production, or else emerged as newly developing industries in the suburbs in order to be close to resources and energy sources. Meanwhile in the West, they would often set up large branches directly in the suburbs. Thirdly, industrial property developers had a massive impact on the suburbanization of 19th century American manufacturing. However, previous studies have not sufficiently brought this impact to light. The role of residential property developers in driving the suburbanization of the population has already received ample attention from the academic community, yet the role of industrial property developers has been scarcely noted. In fact, the two adhere to the same philosophy, that is, investing in land with the hope of profiting from its appreciating value. Both drove the suburbanization of manufacturing, and in some places the importance of industrial property development far exceeded the importance of residential property development. Their land development activities accelerated the suburbanization of manufacturing in the 19th century, and in some places formed pure industrial areas, similar to industrial parks after the Second World War. These industrial property development activities in the 19th century similarly received investment from private capital or private capital groups and were less government-tinted than the development of industrial parks after the Second World War. Finally, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the development of heavy industry was the highlight of American industrialization. Heavy industry required a large amount of raw materials and fuel, and so developers frequently chose to establish factories near to production sites for raw materials and fuel in order to reduce costs. Thus, the geographic position of raw materials and fuel had a great impact on the distribution and positions of heavy industry. The scattered distribution of natural resources and energy sources across different parts of a metropolitan area led to the decentralized development of heavy industry. Many case studies have confirmed that advances in transportation technology was not the decisive factor in the suburbanization of manufacturing. In the mid-19th century, the manufacturing industries of cities such as Baltimore, Toronto, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco were extremely decentralized, with a great number of industrial suburbs forming around each city. At that time, revolutionary advances in transportation technology were yet to emerge, so this decentralization was not related to advances in transportation technology. Baltimore’s city center lost 100 manufacturing companies between 1833 and 1860, reducing its Central Business District’s share of manufacturing from 47% to 15%. By 1860, only 16% of manufacturing workers were employed in the CBD, and of the City of Baltimore’s six industrial areas, four were not located in or did not rely on the city center. In the 1880s, Toronto’s streetcar network had not yet emerged, nor were there electric locomotives, cars or trucks. However the distribution of its industry was already similar to that of a 20th century metropolis, with small, labor-intensive enterprises mostly located in the city center, and large, capital-intensive enterprises mostly located in the suburbs. Between 1870 and 1900, before the widespread use of cars in Pittsburgh, the outward development of industry had already turned the city into a metropolis. From the mid-19th century, San Francisco’s industry began expanding outward, forming centers of employment and workers’ residences in its suburbs, eventually crossing the San Francisco city limits in South San Francisco and East Bay. The suburbanization of manufacturing in parts of the Bay Area such as the Peninsula, Oakland, and Contra Costa was driven by industrialization, unrelated to advances in modes of transport. This paper focuses on the suburbanization of American industry in the period from the late 19th century to the Second World War. During this period, aside from factors such as advances in transportation technology, the intrinsic requirements of industrialization, development by industrial property developers, and the distribution of resources and energy, labor conflicts in central cities and the large-scale investment of private capital into railway were also factors that drove the suburbanization of manufacturing. All of these factors came into play together. 2. The accelerating effect of industrialization’s intrinsic demands on the suburbanization of manufacturing In the course of industrialization, new technologies and new methods of production continually come into view. The industrial base and core industrial sectors change constantly. Fast-growing industrial sectors may suddenly appear in new places, and old industries will also often undergo restructuring. These changes created the need for spatial expansion, transforming the industrial landscape of a city, and causing industry to continually expand into undeveloped areas. The following shows the course of American industry’s development into the suburbs through several representative cities. 1. Chicago Chicago’s meatpacking industry is an example of an industry which moved from the central city to the suburbs with the development of industrialization. During the American Civil War, due to the blockade of Southern ports and the massive demands of troops, Chicago became the center of the national meatpacking industry. However, spatial restrictions and the pollution brought by the meatpacking industry made the industry’s expansion in Chicago difficult. Because of this, in 1864 the Chicago Pork Packers Association joined nine railway companies in establishing a new meatpacking center in the Town of Lake, five miles south of Chicago. Using the assembly line production method, they divided the butchering of a pig into a 126-step process, making this one of the earliest assembly lines in the United States. By 1877, there were 44 meatpacking companies in the Town of Lake. In the 1870s, Chicago’s meatpacking industry could process 1 million pigs per year, or 500 per hour. Due to the importance of the meatpacking industry here, this area was called Packingtown. This kind of assembly line production required large, flat spaces, and only in the suburbs where land was cheap could this production method reduce costs and display the advantages of its high production efficiency. West of the city limits of Chicago, Cicero, with its cheap land, was also favored by many companies seeking area-intensive development. In 1891, Grant Locomotive Works arrived here. In 1902, Western Electric also emerged here, with its employees numbering 15,000. By 1922, Cicero had 115 factories. The printing industry, which once maintained close ties to the manufacturing industry, also developed outward from the city center. Between 1881 and 1924, the share of the city’s printing industry accounted for by the Loop, Chicago’s CBD, fell from 83% to 33.9%, while the share of the several printing industry centers in the suburbs rose from 12% to 52.8%. 2. San Francisco At the beginning of the 1880s, San Francisco’s industries expanded one after the other toward the south, east, and northeast, reaching South San Francisco, Oakland in Alameda County, and Contra Costa County. The industrialization of the South San Francisco area was mainly driven by the meatpacking industry that moved there from Chicago. The three main industries of Alameda County were food processing, metal processing and machinery manufacturing, and the automotive industry. All used large-scale, standardized assembly line production methods. In addition, the newest industrial sector, the electrical industry, came to Oakland in the 1910s. Meanwhile new industries such as the chemical and petrochemical industries established Contra Costa County’s important place in industry. With the rapid development of new industries, by 1900 the county’s industrial output had surpassed that of Alameda County, and by 1920 the cargo travelling through its ports was more than half that of the entire Bay Area. In the process, the industrial center of San Francisco continued to shift. In 1870, the industrial center of San Francisco was in South of Market. By the 1890s it had shifted to the industrial area further south. In 1910, the employment and output value of Alameda County in East Bay exceeded that of the City of San Francisco, while the industry of East Bay itself was expanding from Alameda County into Contra Costa County. The reason for the shifting of industrial centers is that new industries continually emerge in new areas, and old industries continually upgrade and reorganize. In contrast, although the City of San Francisco had a leading role in the industrialization process of early California, as industrialization advanced into the 20th century its importance gradually waned. The reasons for this are, firstly, that new industries mostly emerged in the suburbs, and secondly, that in the new industrial era the city center’s old industries gradually declined. The industries that San Francisco had relied on to establish itself were either completely replaced by new technologies and products (such as the replacement of carriages by railway, cars, and trucks successively; coal by oil; coal gas by methane; and gas lamps by electric lamps), or else gradually lost their importance (such as the decline in the manufacturing of coal mining equipment, leather items, wooden barrels, et cetera). By 1919, San Francisco was dominant in only a few industries, including printing, coffee and spices, chocolate, cigars, handbags, and ship maintenance. However, none of these was a burgeoning industry. Evidently, as new technologies, new production processes, and rising industries continue to emerge, considering links in the production chain, suburbs are more favored by industry than city centers. 3. Los Angeles The industrial center of Los Angeles also continued to shift with the emergence of new and burgeoning industries. In 1919, after Goodyear built a large tire factory south of the City of Los Angeles, the establishment and development of glass, steel, automobile, and chemical companies turned the South Los Angeles area into a new manufacturing center. This area relied on the Port of Long Beach, so the Port of Long Beach became the direction of industrial suburbanization at that time. In the 1920s, many oil extraction and smelting centers formed near the many oil fields on the outskirts of Los Angeles. Later, in the late 1930s and 1940s, led by defense-related industries such as aircraft, shipbuilding, and the steel industry, Los Angeles entered a new stage of industrial investment. The aircraft industry was concentrated in a circular zone ten miles from the city center, the shipbuilding industry was located on Terminal Island off the coast of Los Angeles, and the steel factories were farther still in the northeastern corner of the Los Angeles region. In the course of this development, the manufacturing industries of Los Angeles spread first from Long Beach into southern-central Los Angeles County, and finally into the whole of the greater metropolitan area. 4. Pittsburgh The demands of industrialization and the distribution of energy and resources also brought Pittsburgh’s manufacturing industry into the suburbs. In the 1860s, the rapid development of Pittsburgh’s iron and steel industry created the demand for an energy source other than charcoal, leading to the development of coalfields in coal-rich Connellsville. By 1900, it accounted for half of the country’s coking coal output. From the 1870s onward, the many production processes within the iron and steel industry were consolidated into a single factory. Due to the expanding scale of factories, Pittsburgh’s iron and steel industry chose the southern suburbs of the city as its new center. For the same reason, electronic equipment industries were concentrated in the Turtle Creek Valley, 12 miles from the city center of Pittsburgh. From the 1880s, large, integrated glass manufacturing plants using assembly line production appeared near to the natural gas fields outside of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. The plants were built here in order to utilize the nearby natural gas resources. In the early 20th century, the production capacity of the glass industry in the Pittsburgh area accounted for 25% of the whole country, and most glass factories were built in the suburbs of Pittsburgh. In 1902, there were 15 glass factories in the City of Pittsburgh, and by 1907, the last window glass factory in the City of Pittsburgh had closed. Meanwhile, in the suburbs, Jeannette emerged as a major center of glass manufacturing. In 1891, the Aluminum Company of America also moved to New Kensington, 20 miles north of the City of Pittsburgh, as the natural gas and coal energy needed for aluminum industry production could be found here. By 1919, New Kensington had become an industrial center, with a total of nearly 18,000 workers. In 1919, 36 refractory brick manufacturing plants appeared around the clay mines in the Pittsburgh area, with workers numbering in the thousands. In addition, the ceramics industry also saw development around the clay mines. As a result, one after another, the manufacturing industries of Pittsburgh shifted from various locations to the suburbs. The history of development in Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Pittsburgh indicates that in the course of industrialization, there is a metabolic process between old and new industries, with the geographic conditions favorable to industrial development not fixed or immutable. These changes continually cause new and emerging industries to appear in new locations. For instance, improved production technologies and methods made large-scale assembly lines most conducive to improving efficiency, and as a result many industries constructed single-story factories occupying vast areas in the suburbs where land was cheap. Meanwhile, the development and exploitation of new sources of energy (such as coal, natural gas, and oil) and new resources (such as clay and ore) turned the sites of these resources into new industrial centers. Thus, it is clear that the outward expansion of industry away from the central city is a requirement of industrialization itself, as well as an inevitable outcome of industrialization. 3. The driving force of industrial real estate development and railway companies on the suburbanization of manufacturing There is no doubt that industry must expand outward in order to find more space for development and must be close to sources of energy and resources. However, without the supporting infrastructure provided by industrial property developers, this process cannot be achieved. In the 19th century, the outward expansion of Chicago’s industry was inseparable from a series of land speculation activities. Industrial property developers achieved massive success in the suburbs. At the turn of the 20th century, one after another, individual investors, partners, investment groups, and railway companies brought industrial land to market and provided the infrastructure needed for industry’s development in the suburbs. 1. The driving force of industrial real estate developers on the suburbanization of manufacturing The Grand Crossing industrial area in Chicago was developed by Paul Cornell, the developer of the residential suburb of Hyde Park. By 1876, Grand Crossing had 12 factories, with at least 150 trains stopping there every day. Located in the southern part of Chicago, the South Branch manufacturing area was built solely by the efforts of property developer Samuel Walker. In 1854 he purchased a 1,500-acre area of riverfront land, which he used to develop industry, construct railway, and dredge and expand the harbor. Because of the presence of this infrastructure, in 1873 the McCormick brothers moved their large-scale harvester factory here, with this factory being the largest agricultural machine production plant in the world at the time. By the end of 1873, Chicago’s largest and most important iron and steel factories had all moved here, with their total employed workers exceeding 3,000. The development of the Calumet industrial area exceeded the capabilities of a single investor, and was developed by a partnership of multiple investors. Calumet was located in the southern suburbs of Chicago and had an advantageous geographic position, at one point being considered an even more suitable location for the development of a city than Chicago. In 1868, investor Colonel James Bowen formed a group of investors who purchased 6,000 acres of land near Calumet Harbor. They laid a gravel road between Calumet River and Chicago, levelled the streets, and dredged the river. With their efforts, many railway lines reached this area. By 1873, the area already had a number of manufacturing plants. In 1881, businessman George Pullman constructed a massive sleeping car factory and the United States’ earliest company town at Roseland in Calumet. By 1900, Roseland had at least five steel companies. By the early 20th century, Calumet had become the center of Chicago’s iron and steel industry. Calumet’s industrial development even crossed the state border, leading to the emergence of Indiana Harbor in 1903 and the manufacturing city of Gary in 1906. In 1889, Chicago lumber merchant Thomas Harvey also developed a manufacturing area along the Calumet River, 18 miles south of the Loop. Within three years, this area had ten large factories and 5,000 residents. One could say that the development of Calumet’s industry was initially driven by industrial property developers. In order to attract manufacturing, developers offered all kinds of benefits to businesses that were making their start. In 1891, the Aluminum Company of America in Pittsburgh moved to New Kensington, which was developed by an industrial property development company. This company provided four acres of land free, as well as US$10,000 cash, facilitating the Aluminum Company of America’s relocation. In 1894, a group of investors in Pittsburgh purchased a piece of land 30 miles south of the City of Pittsburgh and began development. They later provided 20 acres of land and US$10,000 in cash to business owner William Donner free of charge, facilitating the construction of Donner’s new factory here in 1898. By 1903, this factory had become the largest rolling mill in the United States. Eventually, a new industrial city formed here—Monessen. In addition to William Donner’s rolling mill, this city also had a foundry and machine works, a steel hoop factory, a rod and wire factory, and a highly integrated iron and steel factory with 3,500 workers. By 1916, Monessen had over 18,000 residents. 2. The driving force of railway on the suburbanization of manufacturing In the development of industrial real estate, railway was often used as an important piece of infrastructure to attract industry to settle. In fact, the driving force of railway on the suburbanization of manufacturing is multifaceted. Firstly, railway itself was a consumer for the iron and steel industry and the rail equipment industry, and its spread increased the demand for iron and steel, resulting in the industry’s shift from charcoal to coking coal as an energy source. In turn, this led to a chain reaction that brought about the flourishing of the coal industry. Secondly, railway was a revolutionary advancement in transport and transport infrastructure at the time, and its emergence met the massive needs of factories using assembly line mass production for transport of raw materials and products. This greatly facilitated industrial development in the suburbs, while also connecting industry scattered across metropolitan areas and the management services of city centers into one whole. Finally, at the turn of the 20th century, as railway companies replaced previous private investors they became major industrial property developers, developing many ‘organized industrial zones’ in suburban areas and even developing some areas into pure industrial zones. Although their purpose was often to increase railway traffic, this drove the development of manufacturing in the suburbs. In 1850, around the time that railway first emerged, the great demand for iron and steel of railway tracks, carriages, railway equipment, and bridges massively expanded the iron and steel market, eventually forcing iron and steel companies to find ways to manufacture large quantities of cheap steel to replace iron rails, which were too soft and had poor stability. Industrialist Andrew Carnegie perfected the production process of Bessemer steel (also known as ‘acid converter steel’). In 1872, Carnegie chose a site nine miles from Pittsburgh to build an integrated Bessemer steel rail factory. In 1875, within a few months of commencing production, it was producing durable rails and output was high. The factory became a benchmark in the industry, spurring its competitors to improve production and replace iron rails with steel rails. Rising demand for steel made the traditional steel-smelting method of using charcoal obsolete, prompting industrialists to find a new energy source in coal. This in turn led to the development of Pittsburgh’s Connellsville Coalfield and Klondike Coalfield. The construction of railway made the development of manufacturing in the suburbs convenient. Oakland in the San Francisco area was at first just one of several small towns in the surrounding Bay Area, and breaking through the transport bottleneck was extremely important for Oakland’s industrial development. The opening of the Pacific Railroad in 1869 was a major turning point in its development. Over the next 20 years, an additional 30 factories emerged here, and during the 1870s the population rose from 10,500 to 35,000. By 1890, the largest garment factory, canning factory, detergent factory, and carriage factory in the American West were all located here. The arrival of the Santa Fe Railway in 1900 and the Western Pacific Railroad in 1910 lowered transport costs, and the construction of a port further stimulated Oakland’s development. Between 1900 and 1930, Oakland was one of the three fastest-developing cities in the United States. The population rose from 67,000 to 284,000, four industrial zones formed, and its industry spilled over into the four neighboring towns, including Berkeley. Oakland’s development was reliant on railway and ports, but not on trucks and cars. In Chicago, of the seven railway lines passing through the city, all except one lakeside line were surrounded by industry. Strips of industry formed along either side of the railway lines, especially near freight stations, accommodating those businesses which needed rail transport but were not large enough to afford a dedicated railway branch. Such industrial zones could sometimes be as wide as several miles. At the end of the 19th century, manufacturing areas also appeared alongside the railway lines on the edge of Nashville, and their demand for rail transport resulted in the appearance of a large number of branch lines here, forming “a maze of switches and sidings”. The formation of rail networks connected entire metropolitan areas. The dense railway network of Pittsburgh connected disparate factories to the metropolitan area and integrated this metropolitan area despite the decentralization of its industry. The network included six main lines and countless branch lines, as well as 24 industrial transfer stations. The main railway line could connect several factories of a single enterprise as well as numerous manufacturing enterprises. Twelve repair factories or transfer yards worked in coordination with this system, and in 1902 their employees numbered 4500. In 1922, in addition to streetcars and the intercity railways, 368 trains commuted every day between downtown Pittsburgh and satellite cities within a 40-mile radius, from which downtown Pittsburgh could be reached within an hour. The early strategy of railway companies was to extend their routes as far and wide as possible. As the national railway network formed and competition between companies intensified, the number of profitable lines decreased, and the investments of railway companies became more diversified. Among them, the development and operation of industrial zones was an important investment activity for railway companies. Chicago’s Central Manufacturing District and the Clearing Industrial District were both established by railway companies. If the dispersal of manufacturing into suburban areas is an intrinsic requirement of industrialization, then the development of suburban industrial property and the presence of railway satisfies this demand. In this process, the driving force of railway on the suburbanization of manufacturing is multifaceted: as a burgeoning industry, it drove the exploitation of coal and the development of the steel industry, and these two industries were often concentrated around coal production areas outside the city; as a form of transport infrastructure, it made manufacturing’s shift to the suburbs easier; and as an agent of investment, the industrial real estate it developed drove the development of manufacturing in the suburbs. Something which occurred alongside the suburbanization of manufacturing was the shift of central cities from manufacturing to service industries. In the Bay Area, as new industries emerged in the suburbs, companies of these new industries began locating their headquarters in San Francisco due to its importance in areas such as finance and management. Although the factories of Standard Oil, Zellerbach Paper Company, and Castle & Cooke were in the suburbs, their headquarters were all located in the city center of San Francisco. From a merger of twelve canning companies formed the California Fruit Canners Association, whose headquarters was first located in Oakland and also moved to San Francisco in 1899. Alongside the suburbanization of manufacturing, at the end of the 19th century in Chicago, the Loop in the city center emerged as the second largest financial, retail, and commercial center in the United States. While large-scale factories continued to develop in the suburbs of Pittsburgh, corporate offices, investment banks, and legal services were taking root in downtown Pittsburgh. 4. The annexation of manufacturing suburbs by cities If American manufacturing’s suburbanization process began in the mid-19th century, and did not centralize in cities, then does the so-called decentralization of manufacturing after the Second World War really hold water? This answer to this question involves the phenomenon of annexation by the expansion of American cities, that is, the continued expansion of city boundaries leading to the incorporation of previously suburban areas into the city. Through this form of annexation, much of the manufacturing located in suburbs continued to be ‘concentrated’ within the city, and the company towns that emerged in the 19th century (such as Pullman, Chicago) and manufacturing suburbs (such as Chicago’s Packingtown in Lake) were likewise annexed by the city. These were originally located in suburban areas geographically, and in this way became part of the city under its expanded administrative boundaries. In the process of urban expansion, the decentralized manufacturing industries which emerged in the mid-19th century gradually became concentrated within the city, eventually leading to the primarily urbanized United States of 1920. 1. Manufacturing’s ‘concentration’ in cities Studies on the suburbanization of industry involve the notion of a contrast between city center and suburbs. The majority of studies view the city and suburbs as static geographical ranges, but in reality, the geographical ranges of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia in 1850 were a far cry from those of 1898, 1889, or 1854. In the study of American urban history, research perspectives that go beyond city boundaries deepen the existing research and reach new conclusions. For example, in the study of working-class suburbs, American sociologist Jason Jindrich rises above the practice of dividing cities and suburbs by city boundaries, and by digging deeper into city boundaries finds that even within the boundaries of a city, workers still live more on the fringes than the center. When investigating the circumstances of American manufacturing’s decentralization and centralization prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, paying attention to how the expansion of city boundaries turned former suburbs into parts of the city allows for a deep understanding of the relationship between suburbanization and urbanization. As an administrative unit and a statistical unit in demographic data, a city’s geographical limits are by no means immutable, and the general trend is continued expand over time. In the decades of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this expansion of American cities was particularly marked. The sudden expansion was reflected in the demographic data, with America’s urban population surpassing 50% of its total population in 1920. This usually creates the impression that population and economic activity became rapidly concentrated in cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but this overlooks the fact that the geographic limits corresponding to cities as political and statistical units expanded sharply at this time. From the mid-19th century, as the United States entered the era of industrialization, industry became the greatest creator of wealth, and the whole of society became dedicated to the development of industry. The development of industry was the most exciting event of the time. The employment opportunities of individuals, the creation of public wealth, and the acquisition of government taxes were all closely linked to the process of industrialization. For cities, industry meant prosperity and taxes. It was the most important source of tax for cities and was also a major source of competition between cities. Industry also meant a large population. At the end of the 19th century, in order to enhance their economic strength, improve their nationwide status, and even compete for and defend their status as largest city, American cities began a competition for annexation that lasted decades. Incorporated suburbs were often heavily indebted over the construction of water supply, drainage, natural gas, and other infrastructure. Amalgamation into the mother city was favored as it was a way for suburbs to avoid high taxes while maintaining or even improving the standard of municipal services. As for unincorporated suburbs, merging with a city allowed them to enjoy the many municipal services of the city, so why not do so? Moreover, whether a suburb was annexed or not was more likely determined by the state parliament than a public vote, while state parliaments were affected by a ‘bigger is better’ mentality, and were frequently supportive of annexation. Through many instances of annexation and amalgamation, between 1870 and 1920 the total regional area of 24 major cities in the United States grew from 347 square miles to 2161 square miles, an increase of 522.77%. If the slowly-urbanizing and slowly-industrializing Southern cities were excluded, and only representative cities of the American Northeast, Midwest and Western were examined, then their regional area would increase from 84 square miles in 1870 to 1603 square miles in 1930, a growth rate as high as 1808% (see Table 1). Among them, New York grew from 22 square miles to 299 square miles; Chicago grew from ten square miles to 207 square miles; Philadelphia grew from two square miles to 130 square miles; Pittsburgh grew from two square miles to 51 square miles (see Table 1). In the process, industrial suburbs originally located on the edges of a city were incorporated into cities in great numbers, the areas of cities rapidly expanded, populations grew sharply, and the strength of industry increased markedly. Between 1879 and 1919, when annexation was in vogue, the number of production workers in 16 major American cities increased by 1.683 million. Meanwhile between 1919 and 1954, when annexations came to a standstill, the number of production workers in these 16 cities increased by only 216,000 people (see Table 2). Table 1: Growth in the urban areas of some American cities (1870-1930) (Unit: square miles) City 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 New York 22 22 44 299 299 Chicago 10 36 169 185 207 Philadelphia 2 130 130 130 130 Baltimore 13 13 30 30 79 Boston 5 13 39 39 44 Milwaukee 13 17 23 41 Cleveland 5 12 28 46 71 Pittsburgh 2 23 27 40 51 Detroit 6 13 22 41 138 Los Angeles 29 29 85 440 St. Louis 14 61 61 61 61 San Francisco 5 42 42 42 42 Total 84 407 638 1021 1603 Source: Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier (translated by Xu Wang et al.), Chapter 8, Tables 8-1, 8-2. Table 2: Changes in employment in 16 American metropolitan areas (1879-1954) Metropolitan Area Employment Change (%) Employment Change (in thousands) 1879-1919 1919-1954 1879-1919 1919-1954 City Suburbs City Suburbs City Suburbs City Suburbs Los Angeles 1117 839 322 1688 43 13 152 245 New York 181 219 16 41 411 287 105 173 Chicago 409 1132 16 115 324 107 65 133 Detroit 937 2141 16 115 151 94 65 104 Cleveland 626 1113 -2 213 136 27 -2 62 St. Louis 158 484 13 52 66 37 14 23 Buffalo 321 731 -13 13 58 36 -10 46 Baltimore 74 135 -8 276 41 7 -8 37 Milwaukee 251 799 -2 54 73 37 -2 23 Cincinnati 28 346 -3 62 15 33 -2 27 San Francisco 71 1582 -16 52 20 53 -8 30 Bridgeport 359 89 -17 41 81 28 -18 25 Pittsburgh 126 781 -35 15 46 143 -29 24 Philadelphia 52 370 -16 0 96 145 -46 0 Providence 188 139 -32 -25 86 52 -42 -22 Boston 50 102 -19 -27 30 143 -17 -77 Total 184 277 8 50 1683 1245 216 854 Note: The data for Los Angeles begins from 1889. Source: Robert Lewis, “The Changing Fortunes of American Central-City Manufacturing, 1870-1950,” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 28, No. 5, July, 2002, Table 9. 2. The three largest urban annexations of 19th century America The three largest urban annexations of the 19th century occurred in the three largest cities of the time—New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia—and each annexation incorporated a large number of suburban manufacturing industries into the city. In 1854, the City of Philadelphia annexed all remaining parts of Philadelphia County, in which it was located, increasing its area from two square miles to 130 square miles in a single stroke. These annexed suburbs contained a flourishing textile industry. In 1850, the old city’s textile industry accounted for only 12.4% of the whole county’s, while that of the suburbs accounted for 87.6%. With this annexation, Philadelphia acquired a massive textile industry overnight. Chicago’s largest annexation arose in 1889. That year, the area of Chicago increased from 36 square miles to 169 square miles. The incorporated territory included the Pullman Company town built in 1881, suburban industrial towns such as Grand Crossing and South Chicago, as well as Packingtown in the Town of Lake. Because of the rapid development of the meatpacking industry, the Town of Lake was at the time the fastest growing area in Cook County. In the 1870s, its population increased from 3,360 to 18,000, and by the time it was annexed by Chicago in 1889 it had a population of 85,000. In the demographic data for 1890, the Town of Lake disappears, and data related to it becomes a part of the data for the City of Chicago. The urbanization of the United States made great strides during this period, however little attention has been given to the great many suburban towns which disappeared in the demographic data, like the Town of Lake, and their industrial accomplishments. According to Professor Qunlang Sun of Zhejiang Normal University, “Suburbanization also promoted the development of urbanization, becoming one of the fundamental modes of urbanization.” In terms of manufacturing, the statement that “suburbanization is a mode of urbanization” is equally applicable. Manufacturing developed in the suburbs under the influence of a variety of factors, bringing jobs, population, and essential infrastructure to the suburbs, giving them some of the appearance and characteristics of a city from the outset. Later, in the process of annexation of suburbs by the central city, some of these manufacturing suburbs were incorporated into the city and became part of the urbanization process. Therefore, the suburbanization of manufacturing also promoted the development of urbanization. In order to retain its status as America’s largest city in the 1900 demographic data, in 1898 New York carried out the largest municipal annexation in American history, annexing the United States’ fourth largest city at the time, Brooklyn, as well as Queens, Staten Island, and the Bronx. This increased its area from 44 square miles to 299 square miles. Within the areas annexed, Brooklyn was an industrial base possessing a variety of industries. Between 1860 and 1890, its industry developed rapidly, and the number of industrial workers in Brooklyn increased from 13,000 to 110,000. By 1890, Brooklyn’s meatpacking industry was second only to Chicago’s, and it also had the highest refined sugar output and largest grain deposits of anywhere in the world. In addition, it had a large hat factory, a chemical plant, a cast iron factory, a confectionery company, a coffee factory, and a syrup factory. Between 1860 and 1890, the working population of Queens and Richmond also rose from 3,200 to 17,000. Prior to the annexation, the proportion of those employed in manufacturing in New York, or in other words, Manhattan Island, had begun to decline as early as the 1870s. After 1890, the absolute number of jobs also showed very little increase. Related to this instance of annexation, the suburbs of New York lost 69,000 manufacturing jobs in the 1890s, a loss of one quarter. Meanwhile, the central city gained over 100,000, an increase of nearly one third. In addition, Boston annexed Roxbury and Charleston in 1867 and 1874 respectively, increasing its area from five square miles to 39 square miles. In 1888 Baltimore annexed the industrial suburb of Woodberry and many mill villages, and in 1918 it annexed the industrial suburb of Canton, which contained the densest railway and shipping facilities in the area as well as numerous factories, increasing its area firstly from 13 square miles to 30 square miles, then to 92 square miles. During this period, city areas expanded so quickly that although many places were integrated into the administrative boundaries of a city and became a part of the city’s statistical data, measured by standards such as population density, infrastructure, municipal services, they were a far cry from the built-up areas, such as to have become ‘suburbs of the city’. Cities that lagged behind in this wave of annexation meanwhile were quickly overtaken by other cities. During the American Civil War, San Francisco’s industry experienced rapid development, with its manufacturing workers and output both doubling during the 1870s. By 1880, San Francisco’s manufacturing industry accounted for one third of the city’s total employed workers and two thirds of the manufacturing workers employed in all of California. Its output value was also two thirds of the total output of Californian manufacturing, exceeding the sum of all other cities in the American West. By 1900, San Francisco had become the seventh largest city in the world. However, after 1870 San Francisco never expanded its administrative boundaries, and has remained within its 42 square mile range. In the 20th century, Los Angeles replaced San Francisco as the largest city in the American West. In fact, the San Francisco metropolitan area (the Bay Area for short) developed rapidly between 1900 and 1920, with the population increasing by 87%, employment increasing by 163%, and manufacturing output increasing by 617%. Of all metropolitan areas in the country, in terms of total employed population, it rose from 17th largest to 16th largest between 1869 and 1935, while in terms of manufacturing value added it rose from 15th highest to 10th highest. As late as 1938, the Bay Area ranked first in the American West in terms of the value of goods transported by its ports, and nationally was second only to New York. Meanwhile, the Los Angeles metropolitan area ranked only sixth. Between 1879 and 1919, San Francisco’s urban employment grew by 71%, while in the suburbs it grew by 1582% (see Table 2). This disparity between the City of San Francisco and the San Francisco metropolitan area came about precisely due to the fact that following the suburbanization of manufacturing, the central city’s annexations did not keep pace with other cities. 3. The rapid development of suburban manufacturing during the tide of annexation The large-scale annexation of industrial suburbs by American central cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries completely changed the face of industrial development in the suburbs. In the 40-year period between 1879 and 1919, due to constant annexation by central cities, 57.5% of manufacturing jobs in all metropolitan areas were located in the central cities. Subsequently, due to the central cities ceasing their large-scale annexations of suburbs, the situation reversed. Between 1919 and 1954, 79.8% of new manufacturing jobs appeared in suburban areas. In absolute terms, between 1879 and 1919 there were 1.683 million new manufacturing jobs in central cities, surpassing the 1.245 million in the suburbs. Meanwhile between 1919 and 1954, suburban areas gained 854,000 new manufacturing jobs, far higher than the 216,000 in central cities. The large-scale annexations by central cities prior to 1919 could be considered the key to their high increase in manufacturing jobs as compared to the suburbs during this period. The impact of these annexations can also be seen in that, when large-scale annexations ended around 1920, manufacturing jobs in many cities reached their peak. Demographic data shows that in 1919, manufacturing jobs in eight of the 16 largest American central cities reached their peak. Later, in the period between 1919 and 1954, four metropolitan areas and 11 central cities exhibited a decrease in the number of jobs and began to experience negative growth (see Table 2). Although central cities expanded their territory through a great number of annexations, and developed their manufacturing industries, the development of manufacturing in the suburbs still outpaced central cities. Between 1899 and 1909, among 12 industrial metropolitan areas in the United States, the number of workers in central cities increased by 40.8%, while those in the suburbs increased 97.7%. Between 1879 and 1919, within 16 American metropolitan areas, employment in the suburbs grew 277%, while employment in central cities grew only 184%. Meanwhile between 1919 and 1954, when annexations by central cities essentially ceased, the disparity in employment growth between central cities and the suburbs was even more marked, at 8% and 50% respectively. Population growth in the suburbs also surpassed that of central cities. In the first decade of the 20th century, there were 28 metropolitan areas with a central city population greater than 200,000. Among these, suburban population growth was 32.7% in this decade, exceeding the central cities’ increase of 25.1%. During the entire span of 1879-1954, although central cities annexed a great many industrial suburbs, suburban manufacturing employment still grew by 467%, far higher than central cities’ increase of 207%. Calculated in absolute terms, when the annexed suburbs are included in the calculations for the central city, the number of new manufacturing jobs in suburban areas is 2.099 million—still greater than the 1.889 million in the central city (see Table 3). Therefore, between 1879 and 1954, the proportion of metropolitan areas’ production workers located in central cities still shows a downward trend (see Table 3). Between 1899 and 1919, the proportion production workers located in the central cities of metropolitan areas decreased from 68.3% to 61.9%. Correspondingly, the proportion of production workers in suburbs increased from 31.7% to 38.1%. Similarly, central city production workers fell from 39.5% of the total employed population of the United States to 36.1%, while the proportion of suburban production workers rose from 18.3% to 22.2% (see Table 3). Table 3: Manufacturing employment in American metropolitan areas (1899-1947) Proportion of Total Employed Production Workers in the United States Proportions of Employed Production Workers within Metropolitan Areas Metropolitan Non-Metropolitan Year City Suburbs Total City Suburbs Total 1899 39.5 18.3 57.8 42.2 68.3 31.7 100.0 1919 36.1 22.2 58.3 41.7 61.9 38.1 100.0 1929 35.1 21.1 56.2 43.8 62.4 37.6 100.0 1939 32.0 23.0 55.0 45.0 58.2 41.8 100.0 1947 32.2 22.2 54.4 45.6 59.2 40.8 100.0 Source: Robert Lewis, “Running Rings around the City,” table 7.1. Thus we can see that the suburbanization of American manufacturing can be traced back to 1879. From that year onward, the development of suburban manufacturing began to outpace that of the central cities, and after 1919, the absolute number of new manufacturing jobs in the suburbs also exceeded that of the central cities. Therefore, from 1879 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the suburbanization and urbanization of American manufacturing went hand in hand. During the great tide of annexations by central cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many suburbs with flourishing manufacturing industries were integrated into cities, becoming urbanized. Thus the two processes exist in a state of confluence. During this period, annexations strengthened the force of urban manufacturing, and some of the gains of manufacturing’s suburbanization contributed to urbanization. Manufacturing’s decentralization throughout the suburbs and its ‘concentration’ in cities are unified in the process of urban expansion. Conclusion In summary, prior to the Second World War, due to the intrinsic demands of industrialization, the activities of industrial property developers in the suburbs, the large-scale construction of railway, as well as the plentiful resources and sources of energy located in the suburbs, the suburbanization of American manufacturing had already largely occurred. The ability of large-scale assembly line production to substantially reduce costs in vast, single-story factories drove manufacturing industries to the suburbs in search of greater production space. Meanwhile the activities of industrial property developers in the suburbs facilitated the development of suburban manufacturing. The emergence of railway also accelerated the suburbanization of manufacturing: the advancement of railway tracks from iron rails to steel rails transformed the iron and steel industry; the iron and steel industry’s energy needs drove the development of the coal industry; railway met the enormous demands of factories using assembly line mass production for raw materials and product transportation; and railway companies participated in the development of industrial property in the suburbs. All of these factors stimulated the development of the manufacturing industry in the suburbs, and the evidence shows that the factors driving the suburbanization of manufacturing did not arise only after the end of the Second World War. Due to industrialization’s requirements for space and resources, as well as the impetus of industrial property development and railway, the suburbanization of manufacturing in the geographical sense has been ongoing since the 1850s. Due to the expanding administrative boundaries of central cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the manufacturing industries and populations of many suburbs were included in city statistics. The rapid ‘concentration’ of suburban manufacturing and populations into cities helped the United States to become mostly urbanized by 1920. Therefore, urbanization was the result of two processes of ‘concentration’: firstly, the concentration of populations and jobs in cities in the usual sense; secondly, cities’ annexation of the surrounding suburbs, causing the populations and jobs of the suburbs to be ‘concentrated’ within the city. Despite the emergence of these large-scale annexations, between 1879 and 1954 the growth rate and even the absolute number of manufacturing jobs in cities after these boundary expansions were still lower than those of the suburbs. Although many suburbs were incorporated into cities, giving these cities more weight in the demographic data, the growth of manufacturing jobs in the un-annexed suburbs still surpassed that of the central cities between 1879 and 1919, and the absolute number of new jobs in the suburbs also surpassed that of the expanded central cities between 1919 and 1954. Therefore, even from a statistical perspective, the suburbanization of American manufacturing was already entirely apparent from the end of the 19th century to the outbreak of the Second World War. Some American manufacturing industries first underwent suburbanization, then later became urbanized in the expansion of central cities. This illustrates that the urbanization and suburbanization of manufacturing is not a sequential process with a clear boundary separating one from the other in time. At one point, the suburbanization and urbanization of American manufacturing occurred simultaneously, yet suburbanization was faster than urbanization. In the course of central cities’ subsequent annexations of the suburbs, the suburbanization of manufacturing was partially transformed into urbanization. After 1919, the absolute number of manufacturing jobs in four metropolitan areas and 11 central cities begins to decrease, displaying negative growth. Therefore, the process of ‘deindustrialization’ in central cities in the United States had already begun long before the outbreak of the Second World War. Alongside the suburbanization of manufacturing, other industries such as finance, insurance, real estate, management, and production services were already concentrated in central cities prior to the Second World War. Therefore the evolution of central cities from manufacturing to production services had also already begun long before the Second World War. The post-Second World War suburbanization of manufacturing and the transformation of central cities were not new phenomena, but the continuation of a historical process that had already begun prior to the Second World War. Yuxiang Wang: Lecturer for the Department of History at Taiyuan Normal University (Editor: Weiqing Luo)
Chinese to English: 'Linguistic Life' in Contemporary China General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: Linguistics
Source text - Chinese 当代中国的语言生活（提纲）一、中国语言生活派二、主体的与多样的三、现实的与虚拟的四、城市的与乡村的五、家庭语言生活六、外语语言生活七、在华国际移民的语言生活八、少数民族语言与汉语方言的保护九、中国语言生活状况的记录十、中国语言生活派当代中国的语言生活李宇明王春辉（北京语言大学，北京，100083；首都师范大学，北京，100089） 1949年以来，中国社会在政治、经济、文化等各个层面都经历了深刻变化和飞速发展。中国的语言规划则经历了从语言规范到语言管理再到目前的语言生活治理的转变。语言生活是运用、学习和研究语言文字、语言知识和语言技术的各种活动（李宇明2016：19）。当代中国的语言生活是近70年中国社会发展和中国语言规划实践的结果，也是未来中国语言规划的起点。本文的目的就是对当代中国的语言生活状况择其要者来做一个勾勒与呈现。一九中国语言生活派语言生活是运用、学习和研究语言文字、语言知识、语言技术的各种活动。运用、学习和研究是语言生活的三维度，语言生活中的“语言”包括语言文字、语言知识、语言技术三方面。这三维度和三方面纵横构成了语言生活的九个范畴。（李宇明2016）在中国学界，语言生活，有时又称“语文生活”“语言文字生活”“语言状况”等，大约在20 世纪末开始出现在中国的学术文献中。首次对“语言生活”予以界定的，大概是眸子（李宇明）（1997）。眸子（1997：39）指出，“运用和应用语言文字的各种社会活动和个人活动，可概称为‘语言生活’。说话、作文、命名、看书、听广播、做广告、语言教学等等，都属于语言生活范畴。”之后这一说法逐渐发展成了中国语言学界的一个重要学术用语。特别是随着上述《报告》的逐年出版，“语言生活”已经成为中国语言研究特别是语言规划学界的基础术语，并开始在海外产生影响。（李宇明2016）中国知网（CNKI）检索结果表明，十年来语言生活的文献（含期刊、博硕士学位论文、会议、报纸、征稿通知等）共2743 项，其中 CSSCI 论文数达到 403 篇，博硕士学位论文 384 篇。以“语言生活”为主题的学术会议、学术活动和课题申报都十分热络，有的院校还成立了语言生活研究中心。语言生活研究已经从“现象级”话题发展成为了中国语言学界最具活力的分支之一。（郭熙2016）可以说，近二十年来围绕“语言生活”，中国学者初步形成了一个在学术理念、方法模式和研究旨趣上具有高度共识的学术共同体，即“语言生活派”（郭熙2016），甚至一个独立的“语言生活学”（胡壮麟2017）也呼之欲出了。语言生活派的学术理念可表述为“就语言生活为语言生活而研究语言和语言生活”。围绕这种学术理念，语言生活派提出了一些重要的学术观点和行动目标，例如（李宇明2017b）： 1.关注语言生活，引导语言生活，构建和谐的语言生活； 2.语言是资源，要珍惜它，爱护它，充分开发利用它，以期获取最大的语言红利； 3.尊重各社区、各群体的语言权利，主张“地位平等、功能互补”的多语主义，使各种语言及其变体各得其所、各展其长、各安其位、相辅相成； 4.努力提升个人的语言能力和国家处理海内外事务的语言能力； 5.推进政府和学界的社会语言服务，关心国际、国家、社会各领域和家庭的语言规划，着力打造学界与社会的智力“旋转门”，探索用社会话语表述语言学研究成果； 6.语言学发展的原动力，就是解决社会前进中遇到的语言问题。解决这些语言问题，需要国家、学界和社会的共同参与，需要多学科的合作共治，需要多种研究方法的综合共用，需要重视语言国情的调查与研究，特别是各种实态数据的收集与运用； 7.信息化为语言生活提供了虚拟空间，为语言运用提供了语言技术和新媒体平台，为语言研究和语言规划提供了新手段。要全力促进语言信息化，过好虚实两个空间的语言生活，迎接人与机器人共事的语言智能时代的到来。一二主体的与多样的中国的语言生活呈现出主体性与多样性和谐共生的模式，即作为国家通用语言文字的普通话和规范汉字是语言生活的主体，在国内行使着通用的交际职责，在国外代表着中国；而少数民族语言文字、汉语诸多方言、通过教育系统而习得的各类外语乃至繁体字等的使用则又为中国语言生活增添了多样性的色彩。国家通用语言文字能够发挥主导作用，但也不忽视民族语言、方言、外国语的作用，整个语言生活才能和谐。（李宇明2012b）这一模式体现在《中华人民共和国宪法》、《中华人民共和国国家通用语言文字法》、《中华人民共和国民族区域自治法》以及各自治区的语言文字工作条例等法律法规中，也体现在人们日常生活中“双言/双语”的语言使用模式中。目前来看，只会少数民族本族语言/汉语方言/普通话的人数比例在逐渐减少，大部分国民都是能说少数民族本族语言-普通话/汉语方言-普通话的“双言/双语人”，或者是能说少数民族本族语言-普通话-外语/汉语方言-普通话-外语的“三言/三语人”。可以说，目前中国已经进入了“双言/双语生活”的时代。当代中国，普通话与汉语方言之间、少数民族语言与普通话之间以及母语与外语之间都存在着一些竞争和矛盾，这是世界上很多国家都面临的问题。在主体性与多样性辩证统一的框架下，中国有希望构建起一个更加和谐的语言社会环境。这一和谐共生的整体模式也为中国语言生活其他方面的构成提供了条件和基础。三二现实的与虚拟的如果从阿帕网(ARPANET)计划开始实施算起，因特网刚刚走过了50年；而万维网(World Wide Web)出现，因特网开始从军事、政府、教育机构向普通大众普及开来却才有27年的时间。伴随着因特网的出现，人类在现实世界的基础上又构建起一个虚拟世界，同时在现实语言生活的基础上产生了虚拟语言生活。虚拟空间的语言生活是现实空间语言生活的延伸和衍生，即既有对现实生活的复制搬运，也有虚拟空间自身衍生的新的现象。把现实语言生活搬到虚拟语言生活中时，有些可以搬，有些搬不进去；有些在搬的过程中会变化；有些现实语言生活中没有，是虚拟空间新产生的。比如说把纸媒辞书，复制搬运制作成网络辞书；再如报纸、政府公告等等也可以复制搬运到虚拟空间中。而虚拟社区、聊天室、论坛、博客、微博、微信等虚拟场景则形成了完全不同于现实言语社区的虚拟言语社区以及人们在虚拟言语社区的生活。根据中国互联网络信息中心（CNNIC）最新发布的第41次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》显示，截至2017年12月，中国网民规模达到了7.72亿，普及率达到55.8%；中国手机网民规模达到了7.53亿，网民中使用手机上网人群的占比由2016年的95.1%提升至97.5%；与此同时，使用电视上网的网民比例也提高3.2个百分点，达28.2%。由此可以看出，中国人虚拟空间语言生活的规模和形式是繁富多样的。近几年随着人工智能领域的突飞猛进，中国人的语言生活也开始出现了语言智能生活的影子。答题机器人、写诗机器人、改试卷机器人、共享 WiFi 翻译机、智能音箱等一大批语言智能技术和产品进入人们的视野与生活。（杨尔弘等2018）人类正在加快步入语言智能生活的新时代。现实与虚拟两个空间的语言生活格局已经形成，这两个空间的语言生活也会相互沟通、相互辅助、相互促进。四三城市的与乡村的近些年，中国的城市化进程有所加快。中国国家统计局《2017年国民经济和社会发展统计公报》显示，截至2017年底，中国的城镇化率为58.52%。而这一数据在2007年是44.9% ，1997年则为29.9% 。城市化使农民变成市民或是“农民工”；使许多农村变成城镇，使小城市变为大城市，使大城市变得更大，激发成为国际化大都市的雄心，并逐渐形成若干城市群。由于农村人口大量向城市流动，西部人口大量向东部流动，农村的语言问题会涌入城市，西部的语言问题会漫延到东部。例如：以往的调查数据显示，农村普通话的水平不如城市，西部普通话的水平赶不上东部，在人口向城市、向东部移动的大潮中，城市推广普通话的任务显然加重了。再如：中国的少数民族主要分布在西部，随着少数民族人员的东进和进城，东部和城市需要重视用民族语言进行城市语言服务，需要科学处理汉语同少数民族语言的关系，需要培养懂得少数民族语言的社会工作者。由此而带来的是中国人的语言生活也正在发生着重大转型：乡村人口为主的语言生活转变为城市人口为主的语言生活。由此而带来的是乡村居民向城市居民转化的过程中所面临的语言选择、语言转用、语言学习、语言身份认同等问题，乡村方言与城市方言的竞争问题，加速发展的城市化给语言/方言的多样性会带来怎样的影响的问题，以及城市本身给城市新居民所提供的语言服务等。（王春辉2014）伴随着城乡地图的快速变化，在不长的时间里，中国的“语言地图”必将大幅度改写。语言地图的改写有其积极的社会意义，但也会带来一些民族语言和汉语方言的萎缩甚或消亡。语言发展变化有自己的规律，不完全依人的意志为转移，中国语言地图的大幅度改写，尽管人们会有各种态度，会给以各种评价，但非人力所能停滞。但是，面对这种情况也并非无所作为。（李宇明2012a）比如可以：（1）用多媒体技术把现代语言实态记录下来，保存下来，留下今日语言地图的轮廓，留下语言的有声数据；（2）重视在城市语言规划中留下本地语言文化的空间，重视语言文化博物馆的建设，重视语言文化知识的社会普及；（3）提倡“双言双语生活”，探讨通过双言双语教育和在一些地方建立“活态语言保护区”等措施，尽量加强和延续一些语言和方言的活力。五四家庭语言生活家庭，是个人生活的最重要场域之一；家庭语言生活则是个人语言生活的最核心构成之一。与语言相关的各种抉择是家庭语言生活的重要议题之一：在家庭语境中，是说自己的母语/母方言还是说优势语言/通用语；孩子如果学习外语的话，应该选择哪一种外语；为了学好通用语/外语，需要付出多少时间和财力，是否需要出国学习，等等。这些问题，往往会导致家长的语言焦虑。当代中国还有一个重要的变化，就是随着上世纪八十年代制定的“计划生育政策”的取消，中国于2015年底开始全面实施一对夫妇可生育两个孩子的政策。新的人口政策，使许多原本的独生子女家庭转向了两个孩子的家庭模式。随之而来的是家庭语言生活出现了一些新的现象，比如两个孩子之间语言的相互影响，两个孩子语言学习与付出的分配等等。伴随着家庭语言成员的变动以及受中国变化的外部语言环境的影响（比如由乡村进入城市），历时地来看，中国的家庭语言格局往往处在动态的发展变化之中：可能由单语模式变化为双语模式，或者由A双语模式进入B双语模式，等等。（伍巍2003）六五外语语言生活使用外语、学习外语、研究外语等活动，形成了人类的外语生活，外语生活是人类语言生活的重要组成部分。改革开放40年来，中国外语教育发展迅速，有力推动了国家发展、社会进步和教育改革不断前行。过去，外语之于中国，主要是“外交外语”和“学习外语”，其功能是满足国家的外交需要，满足个人出国深造或学术交流的需要。这种单薄的“国外外语生活”，所需外语语种基本上是一些国际上流行的“大语种”，如英、俄、法、西、德等。普通大众的外语生活也就基本上限制在这些大语种里面，不管是自身提高还是出国深造、移民生活，莫不如此。而今，中国国内外的外语生活迅速地丰富起来：比如，外交范围扩大了，特别是需要更多地处理多边关系，需要更多在国际组织工作的国际公务员。又如，国际活动增多了，如国际维和、世界卫生合作、国际商务活动、劳务输出等等。特别是“一带一路”上的行走，使中国的国际活动呈“井喷”式发展。如此形势之下，中国所需语种、公民所要掌握的语种，绝非一些国际上流行的大语种所能满足。在此背景下，中国的一些大专院校开始了一轮“小语种”的建设高潮。随着国家对外开放和“一带一路”倡议的实施，不仅国人在陆续走出国门，国际来华人员也急遽增多。有短期的，如观光旅游，探亲访友，短期的学习培训或商务活动，参加学术会议、体育运动会或商业博览会等；有较长时期的，如来华留学，在华经商，在华工作等；还有些是长期的，如来华定居等。这些较长时间的来华人员，有些会群居而形成聚集区，如北京、上海等城市就有韩国人聚集区，广州有非洲人的习惯活动区等。这些国际移民及其社区也构成了中国外语生活的一个部分。个人语言能力的发展，主要体现在母语能力和外语能力两个方面。母语是文化之根，外语则能够增加见识和行动力，提升文化的包容力。中国之前的外语学习是精英之事，通过外语学到国外的先进科学技术与管理经验。而如今，外语已经发展嬗变为公民素质，目的已不全在于学习，还在于办理各种实务，在不同文化间穿行。个人外语生活领域的扩大，外语教育的目的及语种，都应因之发生一定改变。（李宇明2017a）七六在华国际移民的语言生活近几年，随着国际与中国国内环境的变化，来华国际移民呈现出了一些新的趋势和特点，比如中国大陆地区国际移民占总人口比重仍处于较低的水平（0.07%）；中国是第二大侨汇汇入国，第四大移民来源国，并成为第四大（2016年）、第五大（根据2017年不完全数据统计）侨汇汇出国；从2008年到2017年，中国实施了13批次的“千人计划”，目前共引进人才7000余人。在“千人计划”的引领下，中国各地引进高层次人才、留学人才5.39万。尤其在中国的一线城市，聚集了大量的各领域专业型人才；中国在不断从国际移民来源国，成长为治理方式与机制不断进步的国际移民目的国，外国人“来华逐梦”也呈现上升趋势；中国移民迁出量增速放缓，移民美加英德中国人数连续下降；全国各地掀起“人才争夺战”，各地在争抢人才时将争夺国际人才作为重要着眼点；出国游增长速度远高于入境游客的变化速度，入境旅游赤字明显；西方国家签证、移民等政策收紧，使得中国出国留学增速放缓，来华留学增长迅速；“一带一路”沿线地区也成为中国规范移民的重要流向地区；成立国家移民管理局，地方外籍人员管理与国际社区治理迈上新台阶。（王辉耀、苗绿2018）在华国际移民在中国的语言生活基本有两个模式：母语的单语模式和母语-普通话的双语模式。无论哪种模式，他们在中国的语言生活都可能面临着一些挑战，比如：（1）信息获取、公共服务设施标语的识别、医疗就医等公共生活中的问题；（2）移入社区的社区融入问题。在国际移民当地社区融入度的影响因素当中，语言掌握能力、职业以及本地化社会互动网络是三个最主要的因素。（王春辉2016）八七少数民族语言与汉语方言的保护根据《中国的语言》（孙宏开等2007：30）的统计，中国目前有130多种语言；汉语是一种非常复杂、很难分区的语言（李蓝2018），有七大/八大/九大方言区等不同划分方法。随着社会经济的快速发展以及人口流动规模的增大，中国的少数民族语言和汉语方言也遇到了这个国际性的问题：语言/方言的流失甚至濒危。在这样的形势下，为了更好地掌握语言国情，加快普通话推广和语言文字信息化建设，保存衰危的语言及方言，向社会提供语言资源服务和口头文化资源服务，中国国家语言文字工作委员会（以下简称“国家语委”）于2011年3月启动了中国语言资源有声数据库建设工程。此工程最大的特点是“有声”，也就是要实地采集真实语音并建立真实话语及其转写文本的语料库。这个数据库将依照统一规范，采集当代中国的汉语方言和带有地方特色的普通话的有声资料，采集中国各少数民族语言及其方言的有声资料，并进行科学的整理加工，长期保存。中国语言学的百年发展、方言学家和民族语言学家的研究积累、现代信息技术的水平和国家的经济力量，使中国语言资源有声数据库的建设具有了现实可行性。（李宇明2010） 2015年5月，中国的教育部和国家语委印发了《关于启动中国语言资源保护工程的通知》，决定在全国范围开展以语言资源调查、保存、展示和开发利用等为核心的重大语言文化工程。这标志着中国从国家层面以更大范围、更大力度、更加科学有效的方式来开展语言资源保护工作。2017年12月15日，“中国语言资源保护工程”标志性成果《中国语言文化典藏》由商务印书馆在北京首发出版。《中国语言文化典藏》首批共计20卷，涵盖官话、晋语、吴语、徽语、闽语、湘语、赣语、客家话、粤语等汉语方言和怀集标话等少数民族语言，具有创新与存史并重、学术性与普及性相结合的特点。（王莉宁2018） 2018年3月9日，中国国家出版基金项目“中国濒危语言志”启动仪式暨编委会会议在北京语言大学召开。这标志着“中国语言资源保护工程”的又一个标志性项目诞生了。九八中国语言生活状况的记录（一）《中国语言生活状况报告》系列 2006年9月，第一部记录和分析中国语言生活状况的《中国语言生活状况报告(2005)》（又称“中国语言生活绿皮书”，以下简称“《报告》”）由商务印书馆出版。到2018年《中国语言生活状况报告(2018)》的出版，《报告》已经走过了12个年头。《报告》由国家语委发布，是当代中国语言规划的一项具体举措，体现着新世纪中国语言文字工作的一些新理念，体现着中国语言研究的一些新进展。编辑出版《报告》的目的，是为国家决策提供参考，为语言文字研究者、语言文字产品研发者和社会其他人士提供语言服务，引领社会语言生活走向和谐。（李宇明2007）《报告》的内容主要涉及五大方面：第一，中国政府的语言文字工作；第二，社会各领域的语言生活；第三，语言生活中的热点问题；第四，媒体、教材中语言数据的统计分析；第五，世界各地的语言生活状况。（李宇明2017b）《报告》十多年来的成果主要体现在以下几个方面：（1）从语言生活中观察和认识语言，记录中国语言生活的方方面面，给历史留下了珍贵的记录；（2）提出和推展了一批新概念，为建设中国语言生活研究的理论体系打下了基础；（3）展现了一系列新的研究理念、语言观和研究视角，丰富了中国社会语言学乃至语言学的理论和方法；（4）发表了一批有针对性的调查和咨政报告，就语言生活中的问题提出了实用性建议；（5）打造了一支有共同理想信念的研究团队，客观上形成了学术理念上的“中国语言生活派”。（郭熙2015）（二） “汉语盘点”活动 “汉语盘点”活动是由国家语言资源监测与研究中心和商务印书馆等单位共同发起的，旨在“用一个字、一个词描述当年的中国和世界”，鼓励全民用语言记录生活，描述中国视野下的社会变迁和世界万象。活动始于2006年，到2017年已经连续举办了12届。十二年来，一年一度的“汉语盘点”已成为中国全民参与的语言年俗和文化盛宴，也构成了中国社会一道独特的语言文化景观。那些“一个字、一个词”的语言背后，既是世相变幻、时代变迁，更是大众观察变化、把握态势的窗口。九中国语言生活派在中国学界，语言生活，有时又称“语文生活”“语言文字生活”“语言状况”等，大约在20 世纪末开始出现在中国的学术文献中。首次对“语言生活”予以界定的，大概是眸子（李宇明）（1997）。眸子（1997：39）指出，“运用和应用语言文字的各种社会活动和个人活动，可概称为‘语言生活’。说话、作文、命名、看书、听广播、做广告、语言教学等等，都属于语言生活范畴。”之后这一说法逐渐发展成了中国语言学界的一个重要学术用语。特别是随着上述《报告》的逐年出版，“语言生活”已经成为中国语言研究特别是语言规划学界的基础术语，并开始在海外产生影响。（李宇明2016）中国知网（CNKI）检索结果表明，十年来语言生活的文献（含期刊、博硕士学位论文、会议、报纸、征稿通知等）共2743 项，其中 CSSCI 论文数达到 403 篇，博硕士学位论文 384 篇。以“语言生活”为主题的学术会议、学术活动和课题申报都十分热络，有的院校还成立了语言生活研究中心。语言生活研究已经从“现象级”话题发展成为了中国语言学界最具活力的分支之一。（郭熙2016）可以说，近二十年来围绕“语言生活”，中国学者初步形成了一个在学术理念、方法模式和研究旨趣上具有高度共识的学术共同体，即“语言生活派”（郭熙2016），甚至一个独立的“语言生活学”（胡壮麟2017）也呼之欲出了。语言生活派的学术理念可表述为“就语言生活为语言生活而研究语言和语言生活”。围绕这种学术理念，语言生活派提出了一些重要的学术观点和行动目标，例如（李宇明2017b）： 1.关注语言生活，引导语言生活，构建和谐的语言生活； 2.语言是资源，要珍惜它，爱护它，充分开发利用它，以期获取最大的语言红利； 3.尊重各社区、各群体的语言权利，主张“地位平等、功能互补”的多语主义，使各种语言及其变体各得其所、各展其长、各安其位、相辅相成； 4.努力提升个人的语言能力和国家处理海内外事务的语言能力； 5.推进政府和学界的社会语言服务，关心国际、国家、社会各领域和家庭的语言规划，着力打造学界与社会的智力“旋转门”，探索用社会话语表述语言学研究成果； 6.语言学发展的原动力，就是解决社会前进中遇到的语言问题。解决这些语言问题，需要国家、学界和社会的共同参与，需要多学科的合作共治，需要多种研究方法的综合共用，需要重视语言国情的调查与研究，特别是各种实态数据的收集与运用； 7.信息化为语言生活提供了虚拟空间，为语言运用提供了语言技术和新媒体平台，为语言研究和语言规划提供了新手段。要全力促进语言信息化，过好虚实两个空间的语言生活，迎接人与机器人共事的语言智能时代的到来。参考文献 [1] 郭熙 2015《中国语言生活状况报告》十年[J]. 语言文字应用（3）：2-11。 [2] 郭熙 2016 语言生活研究十年[J]. 语言战略研究（3）：24-33。 [3] 胡壮麟 2017 从语言生态学到语言生活学[Z]. “语言文字政策研究”公众号，2017年12月19日。 [4] 李蓝 2018方言分区的历史与方法平议[J]. 语言战略研究（2）：38-49。 [5] 李宇明 2007关于《中国语言生活绿皮书》[J]. 语言文字应用（1）：12-19。 [6] 李宇明 2010 论中国语言资源有声数据库的建设[J]. 中国语文（4）：356-363。 [7] 李宇明 2012a 中国语言生活的时代特征[J]. 中国语文（4）：367-375。 [8] 李宇明 2012b当代中国语言生活中的问题[J]. 中国社会科学（9）：150-156。 [9] 李宇明 2016 语言生活与语言生活研究[J]. 语言战略研究（3）：15-23。 [10] 李宇明 2017a 树立“外语生活”意识[J]. 中国外语（5）：1/9-10。 [11] 李宇明 2017b 致《中国语言生活状况报告》日语版读者[A]. 《中国语言生活状况报告（2015）》（日文版）[R]，北京：中国书店。 [12] 眸子（李宇明） 1997 语言生活与精神文明[J]. 语文建设（1）：39-41。 [13] 孙宏开、胡增益、黄行主编 2007. 中国的语言[M]. 北京：商务印书馆。 [14] 王春辉 2014 城市化进程中的社会语言学效应研究[J]. 江汉学术（5）：92-100。 [15] 王春辉 2016 在华国际移民的相关语言问题研究[J]. 江汉学术（1）：113-120。 [16] 王辉耀、苗绿 2018《中国国际移民报告（2018）》[R]. 北京：社会科学出版社。 [17] 王莉宁 2018 《中国语言文化典藏》出版[R]. 国家语言文字工作委员会组编，《中国语言生活状况报告（2018）》[R]，北京：商务印书馆，p150-156。 [18] 伍巍 2003家庭语言交际格局的动态研究[J]. 语言文字应用（1）：104-109。 [19] 杨尔弘、刘鹏远、韩林涛、饶高琦 2018 语言智能那些事儿[R]. 国家语言文字工作委员会组编，《中国语言生活状况报告（2018）》[R]，北京：商务印书馆，p79-86。	Translation - English ‘Linguistic Life’ in Contemporary China Outline 1. The Chinese ‘Linguistic Life’ School 2. Subjective and Diverse 3. Actual and Virtual 4. Urban and Rural 5. ‘Linguistic Life’ at Home 6. ‘Linguistic Life’ in Foreign Languages 7. The ‘Linguistic Life’ of Overseas Immigrants in China 8. Protection of Minority Languages and Chinese Dialects 9. Documenting the State of Chinese ‘Linguistic Life’ ‘Linguistic Life’ in Contemporary China Li Yuming, Wang Chunhui (Beijing Language and Culture University, Beijing, 100083; Capital Normal University, Beijing, 100089) Since 1949, Chinese society has experienced profound changes and rapid development at the levels of government, economics and culture. Language planning in China has transformed from language standards, to language management, to the present governing of ‘linguistic life’. ‘Linguistic life’ is all activities which use, learn and study languages, language knowledge and language skill. (李宇明 2016: 19). ‘Linguistic life’ in contemporary China is the result of the past 70 years of Chinese social development and Chinese language planning. It is also the starting point for the future of Chinese language planning. The purpose of this article is to draw on main points to create a picture of ‘linguistic life’ in contemporary China. 1. The Chinese ‘Linguistic Life’ School ‘Linguistic life’ is all activities which use, learn and study languages, language knowledge and language skill. ‘Use’, ‘learn’ and ‘study’ are the three dimensions of ‘linguistic life’, and the ‘linguistic’ in ‘linguistic life’ includes the three aspects of ‘languages’, ‘language knowledge’ and ‘language skill’. These three dimensions and three aspects criss-cross to form the nine domains of ‘linguistic life’. (李宇明 2016) In Chinese academic circles, ‘linguistic life’ is sometimes also called ‘linguistic and literary life’ or ‘language circumstances’ etc., and emerged in academic texts from around the end of the 20th Century. The first definition of ‘linguistic life’ is likely given by Mou Zi (李宇明) (1997). Mou Zi (1997: 39), states that “the various social activities and personal activities which use and apply languages can roughly be termed ‘linguistic life’. Speaking, writing, naming, reading, listening to broadcasts, posting advertisements, language education, and so on, all belong to the domain of ‘linguistic life’.” Later, this interpretation gradually developed into an important term in Chinese linguistics circles. Especially following the annual publication of the aforementioned Report, ‘linguistic life’ had already become a fundamental term in Chinese linguistic research, particularly in language planning circles, and had begun to exert influence overseas. (李宇明 2016) China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) search results show that in the past ten years, texts on ‘linguistic life’ (including periodicals, PhD and Masters theses, conferences, newspaper articles, solicited contributions, etc.) totalled 2743. Among these, 403 were Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index papers and 384 were PhD or Master’s theses. Academic conferences, academic activities and research projects with ‘linguistic life’ as their subjects were all extremely lively, with some institutions even establishing ‘linguistic life’ research centres. The study of ‘linguistic life’ has already developed from a ‘phenomenon’ into one of the liveliest branches of Chinese linguistics. (郭熙 2016) It could be said that in the past 20 years, Chinese academics have formed the beginnings of an academic community around ‘linguistic life’, one possessing a high degree of consensus on academic thought, methods and research objectives, and have even conceived of an independent “linguistic life studies” (胡壮麟 2017). The academic philosophy of the ‘linguistic life’ school can be explained as “to engage linguistic life as linguistic life and to study language and linguistic life”. Encircling this academic philosophy, the ‘linguistic life’ school has offered some significant academic perspectives and operational objectives, for example (李宇明 2017b): 1. Pay attention to linguistic life, guide linguistic life, create harmonious linguistic life; 2. Language is a resource that must be cherished, treasured, fully exploited and utilized, in the hope of obtaining the greatest possible linguistic dividends; 3. Respect the language rights of all communities and groups, advocate a multilingualism of “equal status and complimentary function” to ensure all languages and their variants each have their place, each show their strengths, are each secure in their positions and complement each other; 4. Work to promote the language capabilities of each individual and the language capabilities of the country in handling affairs at home and abroad; 5. Advance sociolinguistic services in government and academia. Show care for language planning internationally, domestically, in all areas of society and in the home. Strive to create a “revolving door” of intellect in academia and society, and explore the use of social discourse to express the results of linguistic research; 6. The primary force of development in linguistics is resolving the language issues encountered as society moves forward. Resolving these language issues requires the nation, academic circles and society to work together, requires cooperative governance from multiple disciplines, requires integrated application of multiple research methods, requires investigation and research that emphasizes the national state of languages, and especially the collection and application of real data; 7. Informatization provides a virtual space for linguistic life, provides linguistic technology and new media platforms for the application of language, provides new means of linguistic research and language planning. We must accelerate language informatization with all our strength, live a good linguistic life in both actual and virtual spaces, and welcome the arrival of an era of language intelligence where people and machines work together. 2. Subjective and Diverse China’s ‘linguistic life’ presents a model of harmonious coexistence that is subjective and diverse. Namely, its national common language of Mandarin and its standardized Chinese characters form the core of ‘linguistic life’, performing their common communicative responsibility domestically and representing China abroad. However the minority languages, the numerous Chinese dialects, the many foreign languages acquired via the education system and even traditional characters add diverse hues to Chinese ‘linguistic life’. The national common language can play a leading role, but one cannot overlook the role of minority languages, dialects and foreign languages. Thus can the whole of ‘linguistic life’ achieve harmony. (李宇明 2012b) This model is embodied in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the People’s Republic of China National Common Language Law, the People’s Republic of China Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, as well as the language regulations of each autonomous region and other laws and regulations. It is also embodied in the bilingual language model employed by people in their daily lives. At present, the proportion of people who can only speak a minority language, a Chinese dialect, or Mandarin is gradually decreasing. The majority of people are bilinguals, speaking a minority language and Mandarin, or a Chinese dialect and Mandarin, or else are ‘trilinguals’, speaking a minority language, Mandarin, and a foreign language, or a Chinese dialect, Mandarin, and a foreign language. It could be said that present day China has already entered the era of ‘bilingual life’. In contemporary China, between Mandarin and the Chinese dialects, between the minority languages and Mandarin, and also between mother tongues and foreign languages exists a degree of competition and contradiction. This is an issue faced by many countries throughout the world. Under a framework of a dialectical unity between subjectivity and diversity, China will hopefully begin to create a more harmonious linguistic and social environment. This comprehensive model of harmonious coexistence also provides the conditions and basis for the structure of other aspects of China’s ‘linguistic life’. 3. Actual and Virtual If we count from the implementation of the ARPANET project, then the Internet has just passed 50 years. However, 27 years have passed since the emergence of the World Wide Web, when the internet began to spread from military, government and educational systems to the general public. Following the emergence of the internet, on the foundations of the actual world, humanity also began constructing a virtual world. At the same time, on the foundations of actual ‘linguistic life’, a virtual ‘linguistic life’ has come into being. The ‘linguistic life’ of virtual space extends and derives from the ‘linguistic life’ of actual space, in that it contains both reproductions of actual life as well as new phenomena independently derived from this virtual space. When moving actual ‘linguistic life’ into virtual ‘linguistic life’, some elements can be moved, and some cannot. Some may change in the course of moving. Some will not exist within actual ‘linguistic life’, being newly produced elements of virtual space. For example, paper dictionaries are reproduced to create online dictionaries, while newspapers, government bulletins and such can also be reproduced in virtual spaces. However, virtual communities, chatrooms, forums, blogs, WeChat and other virtual settings have formed virtual linguistic communities, and lives led in these virtual linguistic communities, that are completely different from actual linguistic communities. According to the China Internet Network Information Centre’s latest report, the 41st Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, as of December 2017, China’s Internet users had reached 772 million, covering 55.8% of the population. China’s mobile phone users had reached 753 million, and the proportion of Internet users using mobile phones to access the internet had increased from 95.1% in 2016 to 97.5%. Meanwhile, the proportion of internet users using TVs to access the internet also increased, climbing 3.2% to reach 28.2%. From this we can see that the scope and form of Chinese people’s ‘linguistic life’ in virtual spaces is rich and diverse. In the past few years, following leaps and bounds in the area of artificial intelligence, the shadow of ‘language intelligence’ has also begun to emerge in Chinese people’s ‘linguistic life’. A great number of language intelligence technologies and products including machines that answer questions, machines that write poems, machines that correct test papers, translation devices that share WiFi, and intelligent speakers has come into view and entered people’s lives. (杨尔弘等 2018) Humanity is rapidly entering the new age of ‘language intelligence’. The pattern for ‘linguistic life’ in both actual and virtual spaces has already taken shape. The ‘linguistic life’ of these two spaces will be characterized by communication, mutual assistance and advancement. 4. Urban and Rural In the past few years, the process of urbanization in China has quickened. The 2017 Statistical Communiqué on National Economic and Social Development from China’s National Bureau of Statistics showed that as of the end of 2017, China’s urbanization rate was 58.52%. Meanwhile, this statistic was 44.9% in 2007 and 29.9% in 1997. Urbanization turns farmers into city people, or ‘farmer labourers’. It turns villages into cities and towns, small cities into big cities, big cities into even bigger cities, stimulates ambitions for becoming globalized metropolises, and gradually forms a number of megalopolises. Because of the flow of rural populations into cities, and the flow of western populations toward the east, the linguistic issues of rural areas can pour into cities, and the linguistic issues of the west can spread into the east. For example, the statistics of past surveys indicated that the level of Mandarin in rural areas was below that of the cities, while the level of Mandarin spoken in the west was below that of the east. With the great tide of migration towards cities and the east, the burden placed upon cities to expand the use of Mandarin is clearly increased. As another example, China’s ethnic minorities are mainly spread across the west of the country. In keeping with the advance of ethnic minority workers towards the east and into cities, the east and cities must focus on using minority languages to carry out urban language services, must handle scientifically the relationship between Chinese and ethnic minority languages, and must train social workers who understand ethnic minority languages. What this means is that the ‘linguistic life’ of Chinese people is also undergoing massive transformations: a ‘linguistic life’ with its basis in rural populations is transforming into a ‘linguistic life’ with its basis in urban populations. This results in issues of choices, adaptations, learning, and identity around languages that are faced in the course of transforming inhabitants of rural areas into inhabitants of urban areas. It leads to issues of competition between rural dialects and urban dialects, of what kind of influence the more rapid progression of urbanization will have on the diversity of languages and dialects, as well as the languages services which the city itself will provide to its new inhabitants. (王春辉 2014) In keeping with these rapid changes to the urban and rural maps, China’s ‘language map’ must, in a short time, be substantially redrawn. Some changes to this language map will have positive social significance, but they may also result in some minority languages and Chinese dialects withering and dying out. Changes to the development of languages have their own patterns, and do not move entirely according to people’s will. Although people may have many different attitudes to this redrawing of China’s language map, and may give many different assessments of it, it is not something which can be brought to a halt by human efforts. However, we need not be utterly passive in facing such a situation. (李宇明 2012a) For example: (1) Use multimedia technologies to record the modern state of languages, preserve them, leave behind an outline of the present language map and audio data of languages; (2) Focus on retaining a space for local linguistic culture within urban language planning, focus on the construction of linguistic culture museums, focus on the dissemination of linguistic cultural knowledge throughout society; (3) Promote ‘bilingual life’, exploring measures such as bilingual education and the creation of “living language protection zones”, strengthening and sustaining the vitality of some languages and dialects to the utmost extent. 5. ‘Linguistic Life’ at Home The home is one of the most important areas of personal life, and domestic ‘linguistic life’ is one of the core components of personal ‘linguistic life’. Every language-related decision is a significant matter for domestic ‘linguistic life’: Whether to speak one’s mother tongue or the dominant/common language in the home environment, which foreign language children should choose to learn, how much in the way of time and financial resources should be spent to properly learn a common or foreign language, whether one should go abroad to study, and so on. These issues frequently lead to language anxieties among parents. There is another significant change in contemporary China, which is the abolition of the family planning policy formulated in the 1980s. At the end of 2015, China began fully implementing a policy under which a husband and wife could have two children. The new population policy allowed many originally one-child families to shift to a two-child family model. Within domestic ‘linguistic life’, a few new phenomena emerged as a result of this, for example, the mutual influence of language between two children, the distribution of language education and expenditure between two children, etc. With these changes to language among family members and the impact of China’s changing external language environment (such as movement from the countryside into cities), diachronically speaking, China’s domestic language patterns are frequently in a dynamic state of change and development: changing from a monolingual model to a bilingual model, or from one bilingual model to another bilingual model, etc. (伍巍 2003) 6. ‘Linguistic Life’ in Foreign Languages Activities in which people use, learn or study foreign languages make up ‘foreign language life’, and ‘foreign language life’ is an important component of ‘language life’. 40 years since reform and opening-up, the rapid development of foreign language education in China has been a driving force for continuous progress in national development, social advancement and educational reform. In the past, foreign languages in China primarily meant ‘diplomatic foreign languages’ and ‘foreign language learning’, whose function was to satisfy the diplomatic needs of the country and meet the needs of individuals to further their studies or engage in academic exchanges. The foreign languages required by this insubstantial ‘overseas linguistic life’ were primarily just a few internationally prevalent ‘major languages’, such as English, Russian, French, Spanish, German, etc. The foreign language life of the general public was also generally restricted to these major languages, regardless of whether it was for self-improvement, going abroad for further education, or immigration. Today, however, China’s foreign language life has grown rapidly more plentiful, both domestically and overseas. For example, the range of its diplomacy has expanded, especially with the increasing need to handle multilateral relations and the need for more civil servants working in international organizations. There has also been an increase in international activities, such as international peacekeeping, world health cooperation, international business activities, labor export, etc. In particular, the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative has caused an explosion of development in China’s international activities. Under these circumstances, the languages that China requires, and which citizens must grasp, can by no means be covered by just a few internationally prevalent languages, and some higher education institutions in China have begun a wave of ‘minor language’ development. Following the opening of the country to the outside and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is not only Chinese people who have been lining up to go abroad, with the number of international visitors to China also increasing sharply. There are those coming for the short-term, such as for sightseeing tours, visits to friends and family, short-term education and training, business activities, and participation in academic conferences. There are more long-term reasons, such as coming to China on exchange, doing business in China, and working in China. There are also a few coming for the long-term, such as those coming to settle in China. Among these comparatively long-term visitors to China, some will stay in groups to form concentrated communities, such as those of Koreans in Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities, or areas of Guangzhou where Africans tend to be active. These overseas immigrants and their communities also constitute part of China’s ‘foreign language life’. An individual’s language abilities are primarily reflected by two aspects—native language ability and foreign language ability. Native language is the basis of one’s culture, while foreign language can increase one’s insight and mobility, and heighten one’s cultural inclusivity. Foreign language learning is an essential matter before China. Through foreign languages one can learn of advanced foreign science and technology, as well as management experience. Today, foreign languages have evolved into a quality of citizens, whose objective is no longer purely learning, but handling all manner of activities and engaging thoroughly with different cultures. Due to the expansion of the individual’s ‘foreign language life’, the objective and variety of foreign language education should both be changed accordingly. (李宇明 2017a) 7. The ‘Linguistic Life’ of Overseas Immigrants in China Over the past few years, in keeping with changes to the domestic environment within China and internationally, a few new trends and characteristics have emerged among overseas immigrants to China. The proportion of overseas immigrants in mainland China is still fairly low (0.07%). China is the second largest receiver of overseas remittances, the fourth largest country of origin for immigrants, and has become the fourth (2016) and fifth (according to incomplete statistics from 2017) largest country of origin for overseas remittances. From 2008 to 2017, China carried out 13 batches of the ‘Thousand Talents Plan’, which has currently brought in a total of over 7000 people. Under the Thousand Talents Plan, places all across China have brought in high level talent and 53,900 overseas students. Especially in China’s first-tier cities, a large amount of professional talent in every field has gathered. China is ceaselessly growing from a country of origin for overseas migrants into a destination country, where the methods and mechanisms of governance are constantly improving. The rising trend of foreigners ‘chasing their dreams in China’ has also appeared. The growth of migration rates out of China is slowing, and the number of Chinese people emigrating to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany is continuing to drop. Across the country, ‘talent wars’ have begun, with each region making the competition for international talent a strong focus. The growth rate for tourists leaving the country is far higher than the rate of change for inbound tourists, while the deficit of inbound tourism is clear. The tightening of policies on visas and immigration in Western countries has slowed the growth of exchange students heading out of China, while the number of exchange students coming into China has grown rapidly. Regions along the path of the Belt and Road Initiative are also becoming important destinations for regulated Chinese emigration. With the establishment of the National Immigration Administration, the management of local foreign personnel and the governance of international communities has advanced to new levels. (王辉耀, 苗绿 2018) There are essentially two models for the ‘linguistic life’ of overseas immigrants in China: the monolingual native language model and the bilingual Mandarin + native language model. Regardless of which model however, both can face challenges in the ‘linguistic life’ of China, for example: (1) issues within public life such as acquisition of information, being able to distinguish signs set up for public services, and seeking medical services and treatment, (2) issues with integrating into the community. When it comes to factors influencing overseas immigrants’ ability to integrate into local communities, grasp of language, occupation and localized social networks are three of the most important factors. (王春辉 2016) 8. Protection of Minority Languages and Chinese Dialects According to statistics in Languages of China (孙宏开等 2007: 30), China has over 130 languages at present. Chinese is an extremely complex and difficult language to divide (李蓝 2018), with different methods dividing it into 7, 8 or 9 dialect areas. Following China’s rapid socioeconomic development and increase in the flow of populations, China’s minority languages and Chinese dialects have also come up against this global issue: the erosion and critical endangerment of languages and dialects. Under these circumstances, in March 2011 the Chinese National Language Working Committee (hereafter called the ‘National Language Committee’) launched the Chinese Language Resource Audio Database construction project, in order to better grasp the national state of languages, accelerate the spread of Mandarin and the informatization of language, preserve endangered languages and dialects, and offer language resource services and oral culture resource services to the community. The most significant feature of this project is that it has audio, and the fact that it uses real language audio collected on site and constructs a corpus of real speech and its transcription. This database will follow a unified standard to collect audio data of the Chinese dialects and local variants of Mandarin within contemporary China. It will collect audio data of China’s minority languages and their dialects. It will arrange and process the data in a scientific manner and carry out long-term preservation. A hundred years of development in Chinese linguistics, the accumulated research of dialectologists and ethnolinguists, modern information technology and the country’s economic power have given the construction of the Chinese Language Resource Audio Database real feasibility. (李宇明 2010) In May 2015, China’s Ministry of Education and National Language Committee issued the Notice Regarding the Launch of the Chinese Language Resource Protection Project, resolving to begin this major nationwide linguistic and cultural project with investigation, preservation, exhibition and development of linguistic resources at its core. This signalled that China would develop language resource protection work on a national level using broader, more forceful and more scientifically effective methods. On 15 December 2017, a symbolic achievement of the Chinese Language Resource Protection Project, the Chinese Language and Culture Collection was published for the first time by the Commercial Press. The first edition of the Chinese Language and Culture Collection consisted of 20 volumes, including such Chinese dialects as Mandarin, Jin, Wu, Hui, Min, Xiang, Gan, Hakka and Yue, and such minority languages as the Biao language of Huaiji. It possessed the qualities of being both innovative and historical, both academic and universal. (王莉宁 2018) On 9 March 2018, China’s National Publication Foundation held a launch ceremony and Editorial Board meeting at Beijing Culture and Language University for its ‘Endangered Languages of China’ project. This event signified that another symbolic project of the Chinese Language Resource Protection Project had been born. 9. Documenting the State of Chinese ‘Linguistic Life’ 1. The Report on the State of Chinese Linguistic Life Series In September 2006, the first Report on the State of Chinese Linguistic Life (2005) (also known as the ‘Chinese Linguistic Life Green Paper’, and hereafter referred to as ‘the Report’), recording and analysing the state of ‘linguistic life’ in China, was published by the Commercial Press. By 2018’s Report on the State of Chinese Linguistic Life, the Report had already surpassed 12 years. The Report, released by the National Language Committee, is a concrete measure of contemporary Chinese language planning, embodying new philosophies for a new century of Chinese language work, and embodying new progress for Chinese language research. The purpose of editing and publishing the Report is to provide reference material for national policymaking and to provide language services to language researchers, developers of language products, and others in society, guiding society’s ‘language life’ toward harmony. (李宇明 2007) The content of the Report touches mainly on five broad areas: 1. The language work of the Chinese government, 2. ‘Linguistic life’ within all areas of society, 3. Issues of note within ‘linguistic life’, 4. Statistical analysis of linguistic data within media and teaching materials, 5. The state of ‘linguistic life’ throughout the world. (李宇明 2017b) The results over more than ten years of the Report are mainly reflected in the following areas: 1. Examining and understanding language from the perspective of ‘linguistic life’, recording all aspects of Chinese ‘linguistic life’, and leaving behind valuable historical records, 2. Putting forward and advancing a set of new ideas to lay the foundations of a theoretical system for Chinese ‘linguistic life’ research, 3. Putting a series of new research philosophies, linguistic viewpoints and research perspectives on display to enrich the theory and methods of Chinese sociolinguistics and even linguistics, 4. Publishing a series of targeted investigations and advisory reports to offer practical recommendations regarding issues within ‘linguistic life’, 5. Creating a research team with common ideals and beliefs to form an objective ‘Chinese Linguistic Life School’ within academic thought. (郭熙 2015) 2. The “Chinese Stocktake” Activity The “Chinese Stocktake” Activity was begun by the National Language Resource Monitoring and Research Centre together with the Commercial Press, aimed at encouraging all Chinese people to use language to record life, and to describe changes in society and world phenomena from a Chinese perspective, instructing them: “using one word, describe China and the world this year”. The activity began in 2006, and by 2017 had been held for 12 successive years. In twelve years, the annual “Chinese Stocktake” Activity has become a grand tradition of culture and language for all Chinese citizens, and has also formed a part of the unique cultural and linguistic landscape of Chinese society. Behind the results of those ‘one word’ activities are a changing world and changing times. Furthermore, they are a window through which the general public may observe changes and grasp the state of things.

Bachelor's degree - Australian National University

Years of experience: 5. Registered at ProZ.com: Mar 2021.

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Bio

I am a translator of Chinese into English with a particular focus on academic papers and news articles. I have translated for the Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure, the world's largest Chinese academic literature repository. I have also worked on a translation project concerning Chinese language for Palgrave Macmillan.In 2019 I completed my thesis on the translation of Chinese government news media (in particular, People's Daily articles concerning the Belt and Road Initiative). I also have some experience translating Classical Chinese into English, and this familiarity greatly assists me in my translation of modern Chinese texts.

Profile last updated
May 15, 2022

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